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ABSTRACT 
 
My thesis offers an examination of U.S. policy towards Rhodesia as viewed through the lens 
of the respective Presidential administrations. The aim of my research is to demonstrate the 
changing American perspective on the Rhodesian question and how this directly affected the 
ultimate emergence of an independent Zimbabwe. I discuss the transformation in U.S. policy 
from the cautious approach of the Johnson White House, the shift towards ‘white Africa’ 
during the Nixon years as anti-communism and economic interests took centre stage and the 
subsequent attempt of the Ford Administration to achieve a peace settlement to prevent 
further communist expansion into southern Africa. Finally, I will analyse the critical role 
played by President Carter in bringing an end to UDI. When evaluating U.S. policy I 
highlight the diverse factors which drove presidential decision making. Anti-communism, 
trade, strategic interests, the increasing interdependence of the global system, a moral belief 
in decolonization, the growth of human rights, domestic race relations and the growing 
importance of the African-American vote all significantly impacted White House actions. On 
a broader level, I will demonstrate how relations with Salisbury offers an interpretative prism 
which reveals the evolution of U.S. foreign relations during the Sixties and Seventies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
            On November 11 1965, the Rhodesian Government formally signed a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom. It was the first unilateral 
break by a British colony since the U.S. Declaration of Independence nearly two 
centuries before in 1776. Indeed, the wording of the Rhodesian proclamation was clearly 
modelled on the original American counterpart. Rhodesia, a self-governing colony 
desired full independence from London and following exhaustive negotiations had finally 
opted to take the matter into its own hands. In his statement immediately following the 
declaration, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith asserted that ‘In the lives of 
most nations there comes a moment when a stand has to be made for principle, whatever 
the consequences. This moment has come to Rhodesia…We have struck a blow for the 
preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity, and in the spirit of this belief we 
have this day assumed our sovereign independence.’1 
          A number of factors led to the Rhodesian decision to defy London and the world 
community by seizing its independence. The majority of white Rhodesians considered 
decolonization and majority rule in Africa as an erroneous policy symbolic of the decay 
of the once proud British Empire. A traditional Rhodesian assertion was that their white 
population, who had so heroically expanded the empire, held a ‘seemingly thankless 
sentinel duty’ to remind their more metropolitan cousins of their past glories and inspire 
them to future greatness. On a pragmatic note, the fact that many newly emergent African 
states descended into one party dictatorships or spiralled into vicious bloodletting and 
                                                 
1 From Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office, No.1707, 11th  November 1965, PREM 13/545, 
National Archives, London, From Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office, No.1708, 11th  November 
1965,  PREM 13/545, National Archives, London and Carl Peter Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence: An International History, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 39. 
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ethnic conflict further hardened the resolve of the white community to stand their ground 
against the tide of black nationalism.2   
        The populist Rhodesian Front (RF) government was also vehemently anti-
communist and both publicly and privately held to a ‘Manichean world view’ in which 
the stirrings of African nationalism within their country stemmed from communist 
subversion as opposed to genuine political grievances. In the view of white Rhodesia, 
communism was insidiously spreading throughout Africa and London was doing little to 
prevent it. It therefore became encumbent on the Rhodesians themseslves to become the 
first ‘nation in the last two decades to have the determination and fortitude to say “so far 
and no further.” ’3 
          It is also clear, however, that UDI represented the determination of the white 
community to retain their power and privilege in an ‘independent’ Rhodesia. The 
Rhodesians having built a economically viable modern nation, benefited, for the most 
part, from a privileged existence paying little tax and enjoying a high quality of life. 
Indeed, in 1965, the capital, Salisbury, boasted more swimming pools than any American 
city of a comparable size. In November 1965, just weeks before UDI, Time magazine 
commented that ‘Few communities in the world can match the sun-drenched affluence 
that Rhodesia’s hardy settlers have achieved for themselves.’ It was also increasingly 
obvious that the white Rhodesians had no intention of giving it away. Ian Smith himself 
                                                 
2 Donal Lowry “The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian political culture.c.1920s-1980,” in 
Cold War in Southern Africa. White power, black liberation, ed. Sue Onslow (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 90 and Ian Smith, Bitter Harvest. Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its Independence, 
(London: John Blake, 2008), 107-108.  
3 From Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office, No.1708, 11th  November 1965, PREM 13/545, 
National Archives, London and Lowry “The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian political 
culture”, in Cold War in Southern Africa, ed. Onslow 97-101. 
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privately stated that ‘The white man is the master of Rhodesia…He has built it and 
intends to keep it.’4 
 
UDI and the United States 
         The period of Rhodesian ‘independence’ from British constitutional rule lasted over 
14 years. The existence of the illegal regime and its ability to weather international 
hostility and economic sanctions posed an exceptional and challenging policy dilemma 
for four separate U.S. presidential administrations. The shifts in the American approach 
towards Salisbury were reflective not only of the personal beliefs of the individuals in the 
White House but represented the larger diverse pressures shaping foreign policy during 
the period of UDI. 
        The Rhodesian UDI represented an exceptional case for U.S. policy makers, an anti-
colonial rebellion undertaken not to give a suppressed indigenous population the right to 
govern their own affairs but instead allow an entrenched colonial minority to remain in 
political control of the nation. Internationally, Rhodesia was the first nation to be placed 
under comprehensive mandatory UN sanctions and remained a non-recognized pariah 
state throughout the UDI era. 
       The Rhodesian question, however, also encapsulated the key dynamics which shaped 
U.S. foreign policy during the Sixties and Seventies. The Cold War, economics, race 
relations and human rights all guided White House decision making regarding Salisbury. 
Rhodesia, therefore, serves as useful interpretive prism to examine and better understand 
                                                 
4 Time Magazine, Vol 86 No.19, November 5 1965 p.40-48 and Robert C. Good, The International Politics 
of the Rhodesian Rebellion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 4. 
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the American approach to global relations during the UDI era and the underlying forces 
that combined to shape U.S. actions. 
     Furthermore, as part of the global ‘periphery’, Salisbury offered a great deal of 
flexibility to the successive presidential administrations and this is reflected in their 
differing approaches towards Rhodesia. Indeed, the Rhodesian UDI and continued 
‘independence’ provided a range of arguments for the differing administrations to deploy 
which then reflected the set of core beliefs within each presidency of how to approach 
international politics. Rhodesia, therefore offers a true picture of the fundamental values 
of the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations. 
           Rhodesia also provides a particularly illuminative lens to view broader U.S. policy 
towards the wider racial struggle for political power in Southern Africa and especially 
towards the other members of the so called ‘White Redoubt’. Like Rhodesia, South 
Africa and the Portuguese Territories were vehemently anti-communist, occupied 
strategic locations, possessed vast mineral deposits and enjoyed close economic ties with 
Washington. As with Salisbury, however, both Pretoria and Lisbon were active 
practicioners of white minority rule and denied, to varying degrees, the political rights of 
their black African populations.   
          Across the presidential administrations, an analysis of policy towards Rhodesia 
further captures and exposes the tension and interaction between pragmatism and 
morality in U.S. foreign relations during the 1960s and 1970s. The relationship between 
the pragmatic and moral approaches was fluid and varied according to the respective 
occupants of the Oval Office as well as the changing international and domestic 
background which confronted them.  
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            The U.S. approach towards the UDI state, reveals broad patterns of conflict 
between realpolitik and moral justice but also times when pragmatism and ethical 
considerations aligned together to achieve mutually compatible goals. The case of 
Rhodesia also provides intriguing questions over the competing visions within 
Washington itself of what constituted pragmatism or morality in formulating foreign 
policy. 
           The Cold War was a major factor in shaping U.S. relations with Rhodesia during 
UDI era. The geopolitical struggle for global supremacy between Washington and 
Moscow, however, also revealed conflicting attitudes of how to deal with a vehemently 
anti-communist yet globally condemned racialist regime. For many Americans, the anti-
communism of the Rhodesians and the often repeated claim that Salisbury was a bastion 
of embattled Western civilization under siege from communist backed guerrilla 
movements meant that the clear pragmatic approach was to support Salisbury regardless 
of its domestic practices. 
          The counter-argument, advanced by both liberals and so called Cold Warriors, 
highlighted the fact that the continued existence of white minority rule in Rhodesia 
provided Moscow, Peking and later Havana, due in part to their lack of ties to Salisbury 
or Pretoria, an opportunity to align themselves as the true allies of black African 
aspirations to the detriment of Western interests. By the mid 1970s, it was contended that 
the increasing intensity of the Rhodesian Bush War combined with the expanding Cuban 
military presence in Africa dictated that the pragmatic approach was to accelerate the 
process of majority rule to prevent further communist expansion. 
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       Questions of pragmatism also entered into economic considerations. American 
companies such as Union Carbide were dominating influences in the pre UDI Rhodesian 
economy and remained major investors in the ‘independence’ era. Rhodesia also 
possessed a range of strategic materials notably chrome that were vitally important to the 
U.S. on economic and on strategic grounds. 
       It was also increasingly important, however, for the U.S. to maintain and protect the 
growing trade with and business in the independent nations of black ruled Africa. These 
states possessed a large percentage of the mineral wealth of the free world as well as 
offering lucrative markets for export and other investment opportunities. Furthermore, the 
shifting power dynamic at the UN, notably the increasing influence of the Afro-Asian 
bloc, led to fears that unless Washington was seen as taking a strong stance against 
Salisbury the U.S. could lose black African support for its broader geopolitical agenda as 
well as trade ties. 
      Domestically, morality and pragmatism also intersected in terms of policy towards 
Rhodesia. Liberals and civil rights groups highlighted America’s proud anti-colonial 
tradition and opposition to European imperialism to advocate a policy of hostility towards 
Salisbury. The fact that UDI represented the continuation of white minority rule led to 
parallels being drawn with the domestic struggle of African-Americans to achieve equal 
rights. As the African-American vote grew in electoral importance the White House 
became increasingly cognizant, on a pragmatic level, of the need to engage in policies 
which would not antagonize a key sector of the domestic electorate. 
      Many Americans, however, identified with Ian Smith seeing little difference between 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence and UDI. The shared frontier culture of both 
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nations and in the case of many white Southerners a similar racialist outlook led to 
considerable empathy for the white Rhodesian population. As pointed out by pro-
Rhodesian Americans, Salisbury should not be criticized for the imperfections in its 
political system and society given that it took Washington itself nearly two hundred years 
to give equal rights to all American citizens.  
        In the 1960s and 1970s, Anglo-Americans formed a solid electoral majority and a 
policy of slowing down the pace of racial change both domestically and overseas 
appealed to large numbers of white voters especially in the South. The political objective 
of capturing the white Southern vote combined with a powerful Rhodesia Lobby on 
Capitol Hill provided a pragmatic domestic rationale for avoiding overtly hostile policies 
towards Salisbury.      
        The late 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the emergence of the global human rights 
movement as an increasingly influential factor in international relations. The rise of the 
human rights movement led to pressure to end social injustice and asserted a global duty 
in protecting the welfare of all people regardless of national jurisdiction. In Washington, 
however, opponents and supporters of Ian Smith provided differing moral interpretations 
of how to apply the ideology of human rights to the case of Rhodesia.  
          Liberal figures and civil rights leaders observed that the right of a population to 
chose how it is governed was considered among the most vital of human rights therefore 
the Rhodesian Government operated in clear violation of the political rights of its 
citizens. Furthermore, the racial discrimination inherent in Rhodesian society represented 
a further affront to the basic human rights of black Rhodesians. A number of conservative 
figures, however, highlighted the human rights of the white Rhodesian minority, notably 
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the potential loss of their political and property rights in a black African ruled state. 
Proponents of Salisbury also observed the ‘hypocrisy’ of condemning Rhodesia for its 
lack of democracy when the vast majority of black-ruled African nations were one party 
dictatorships where the citizens, black or white, possessed even less political rights and 
freedoms.     
      It is also important to note, when comparing the policies of the presidential 
administrations towards Salisbury, the changing international and domestic backdrop in 
which they operated. Between 1965-79, the parameters of global and American politics 
altered dramatically which inevitably impacted White House decision making on 
Rhodesia.   
      On the global stage, while the 1960s and 1970s saw a period of détente between 
Washington and Moscow the world became increasingly divided between nations who 
supported the Western powers and those backed by communist support. In the Third 
World, the U.S. and USSR vied with each other to capture the political support of the 
newly independent countries. By the mid 1970s both Moscow and Havana were active in 
Southern Africa posing a direct threat to the Western oriented orbit of the region. 
      The waves of decolonization that swept over Asia and Africa during the late 1950s 
and 1960s also led to the creation of an Afro-Asian bloc. Over the following decade the 
growing political influence and economic resources of this bloc, dedicated to ending the 
last vestiges of colonial rule, contrasted with the diminishing sway of the remaining 
imperialist powers or white minority regimes. Combined with the rise of the global 
human rights movement this created a potent force for the achievement of racial justice.   
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      Domestically, the Rhodesian UDI era, spanned a period of social and political change 
within the United States. American society moved from the radicalism and protest of the 
1960s to a conservative resurgence characterized by the election of Richard Nixon and 
finally a distrust and disillusionment with Washington in part due to the revelations of the 
Watergate scandal. 
       African-American electoral power, following the Voting Rights Act of 1965, became 
an increasingly influential factor in domestic politics and indeed was the decisive element 
in the presidential election of 1976. The war in Vietnam also dominated politics in 
Washington and led to deep divisions among the American public. Indeed, even after the 
conflict, the ghost of Vietnam hung over U.S. foreign policy, especially potential military 
interventions throughout the rest of the UDI period.   
          Overall, presidential policy towards Salisbury highlights the impact of the shifting 
geopolitics of the Cold War, the fluctuating constellations of power in the global 
community, the need for and profits involved in obtaining strategic raw materials, the 
changing nature of domestic race relations and the growing political importance of the 
human rights movement on foreign relations. The case of Rhodesia, further reveals the 
wider struggle between pragmatism and moral justice in U.S. foreign relations as well as 
the opposing notions of what represented a pragmatic or moral approach.  
 
Historiography 
           At the broadest level there exists a vast range of literature offering diverse 
perspectives that purport to explain American foreign relations with Africa and the Third 
World during the 1960s and 70s. A number of historians, notably John Lewis Gaddis, 
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have argued that the ‘containment’ of global Communism was the principal concern of 
policy makers during the entire Cold War era. In this perspective, all postwar presidential 
administrations from Truman to Reagan sought primarily to limit Soviet expansion 
although the methods used differed dependent on the incumbent president. Even Jimmy 
Carter, who had entered the White House determined to end the precoccupation with 
containment eventually acknowledged that the balance of relations with Moscow 
represented ‘the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace 
or be engulfed in global conflict’.5     
           The concept of containment did not simply apply to Europe but was a global 
strategy aimed at preventing Soviet expansional anywhere in the world. Historians have 
observed that during the Sixties both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations retained 
the ‘zero-sum game’ view of the world that victories for communism anywhere 
represented losses for the U.S. Nixon, Ford and Carter also remained strongly intolerant 
of Marxism in the developing world. Indeed, it has been suggested that the wider Third 
World was integral to the broader struggle for supremacy as both Washington and 
Moscow realized that full scale conflict in Europe or North America was unwinnable 
therefore the Cold War descended into a contest that consisted of ‘shadow-boxing’ in the 
peripheral regions.6 
                                                 
5 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
during the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ix and 343-344. 
6 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 20-22, 127-128, 200-202, 273-275 and 343-345, Nancy Mitchell, 
“Terrorists or freedom fighters? Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia,” in Cold War in Southern Africa. White 
power black liberation, ed. Sue Onslow (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 178, Nancy Mitchell 
“The Cold War and Jimmy Carter” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III Endings, ed. ed. 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 67 and 74-75, 
and Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 1-2 and 7-8. 
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        Odd Arne Westad and Michael E. Latham have contended that American efforts to 
shape the Third World centered around the belief that the trajectory of American history, 
specifically the experience of the its own ‘modern’ revolution coupled with its liberal 
democratic values provided a compelling vision for emerging nations as well as offering 
a promising future for those who would follow the American path. Thus Washington 
sought to press developing nations to adopt an ideological free market to counter Soviet 
collectivism and felt duty bound to assist in the exportation of American democracy. In 
contrast, Moscow was perceived as preying on the poverty and instability of the Third 
World. In the words of Walt Rostow, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to 
LBJ, the communists were the ‘scavengers of the transitional process’, a malevolent force 
for that thrived on the weakness of the developing nations.7       . 
        In many cases the U.S. sought to influence the Third World through ‘positive 
interventionism’ in the forms of development aid to improve areas such as education and 
healthcare. The Peace Corps, established in 1961, was conceived as a tool to accelerate 
modernity. It has also been observed, however, including by Elizabeth Schmidt that 
American aid was primarily restricted to regimes that displayed anti-communist 
credentials, opposed radicalism and were willing to act as regional policeman in defence 
of Western interests. Policymakers in Washington generally exhibited little concern if 
such allies displayed repressive internal policies provided the governments remained 
firmly in the U.S. sphere of influence. Furthermore, other historians such as Gaddis and 
Andrew DeRoche have observed the covert role of the CIA in attempting to destabilize 
                                                 
7 Odd Arne Westad. The Global Cold War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8-38 and 
Michael E. Latham “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975” in The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War, Volume II Crises and Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 259-262. 
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leftist governments and replacing them with pro-Western regimes whether democratic or 
dictatorial in nature.8    
          In the case of Southern Africa, it has been posited that not only did the Cold War 
stimulate U.S. support for the vehemently anti-communist white settler states but 
moreover the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans deliberately employed Cold 
War rhetoric and highlighted the international communist threat to the region in order to 
seek American assistance. In the cases of both Rhodesia and South Africa, anti-
communism also prevented Washington from embracing the cause of majority rule 
during the 1960s and early 1970s. It has been further argued, that American involvement 
to achieve a Rhodesian settlement in the mid to late 1970s was motivated primarily by a 
desire to remove a source of potential communist intervention in the region rather than to 
achieve racial justice.9   
        Scholars have noted the role of economics in shaping U.S. foreign policy towards 
Africa during the Cold War period. According to this school of thought, the promotion of 
free market capitalism, specifically access to the raw materials and markets previously 
                                                 
8 Andrew DeRoche, “Relations with Africa since 1900” in A Companion to American Foreign Relations, 
ed. Robert D. Schulzinger (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 112, Mark Atwood Lawrence, 
“Containing Globalism. The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s”, in The Shock of the 
Global: The 1970s in perspective, Niall Ferguson et al. (Cambridge: Belknapp Press, 2010) 209-210,  
Robert Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 
1969-1976, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Jeremi Suri “Henry Kissinger and the 
Geopolitics of Globalization” in The Shock of the Global, ed. Ferguson et al., 175-186, Stephen Weissman, 
“The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola”, in American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the 
Stance (Second Edition), ed. Rene Lemarchand (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 
438,  Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 155, Latham “The Cold War in the Third World,” in The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II, ed. Leffler and Westad, 259-263, Westad. The Global Cold 
War, 34-35, and Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 8.  
9 Andrew DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998, (Trenton, 
New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2001), 7 and 209-210,  Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The 
United States and The War against Zimbabwe, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 
166, Thomas Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa in Africa, 
1948-1968, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 254, Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow “The 
Cold War and southern Africa, 1976-1990” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III, ed. 
Leffler and Westad, 223 and Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 81-88 and 103. 
 
 
18 
 
controlled by European colonial powers, was a principal objective of policy makers. The 
mineral wealth, industrialized economies and cheap labour costs of the Rhodesian and 
South African regimes proved to be especially alluring for American corporate 
investment and trade.10  
        It has also been observed that for the U.S. the ideological role of capitalism versus 
Soviet collectivism heightened the importance of trade with and investment in Africa and 
the wider Third World. It has been asserted, notably by Westad, that Washington sought 
a greater economic role globally in order to demonstrate the superiority of the free market 
system over the rigid state centric economy of the USSR.11     
        The high levels of American direct and indirect investment in South Africa and the 
predominance of Western companies in the apartheid economy have been documented by 
historians. American, and more broadly, Western investment, was particularly prevalent 
in the mining industry which was not only important to the West on strategic and 
economic levels but was also highly lucrative for the businesses involved. In the case of 
Rhodesia, while American support for UN sanctions effectively prohibited the direct 
involvement of domestic companies, subsidiaries of the major oil companies continued to 
sell petroleum products to Salisbury via Mozambique and South Africa. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that it was the strong support that Nixon enjoyed from the business sector 
                                                 
10 Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early 
Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 81 and 97, , Hunt Davis Jr, “US Policy toward South 
Africa: A Dissenting View” in American Policy in Southern Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 323-326, William 
Foltz “U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa: Economic and Strategic constraints” in Ibid, 283-285, David 
Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo 
Crisis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Edgar Lockwood, “The Case of Zimbabwe” in 
American Policy in Southern Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 169, Robert K. Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The 
United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years, (New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997), 
Winston Nagan, “The U.S. and South Africa: The Limits of “Peaceful Change””,  in American Policy in 
Southern Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 231, and Westad, The Global Cold War, 208. 
11 Westad, The Global Cold War, 30-32. 
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that pushed his administration to adopt a policy of closer ties with and partial relaxation 
of sanctions against both Pretoria and by extension Salisbury.12 
        The emerging human rights movement in the 1970s also shaped the development of 
U.S. foreign policy. According to Michael Cotey Morgan, the ‘rebirth’ of human rights, 
‘expanded the vocabulary of international ethics…spawning unprecedented concern for 
the fate of strangers on the other side of the world.’ Indeed, the growing assertiveness of 
the human rights movement and the increasing power and influence of its moral ideology 
has been highlighted as a factor in international decision making.13 
         Christian Americans on both the political left and right believed in promoting the 
cause of universal human rights. The ideal resonated strongly due to their beliefs in the 
universal applicability of Christianity, that natural rights came from God not the state and 
that America represented the ‘last best hope’ for freedom and justice.  Many Christians 
therefore called for a foreign policy that extended beyond the political sphere to address 
social problems such as poverty and racism. It is noteworthy that Jimmy Carter, who 
made the human rights agenda a particular priority for his administration, was a born-
again Southern Baptist who believed that universal human rights stemmed as much from 
social justice as political liberty.14   
                                                 
12 Hunt Davis Jr, “US Policy toward South Africa: A Dissenting View” in American Policy in Southern 
Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 323-326, Foltz, “U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa”: in Ibid, 283-285, Anthony 
Lake, The “Tar Baby” Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976), 123-130, Lockwood, “The Case of Zimbabwe” in American Policy in Southern 
Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 169, Nagan, “The U.S. and South Africa” in Ibid, 231 and Westad, The Global 
Cold War, 208. 
13 Michael Cotey Morgan, “The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights”, The Shock of the Global, ed. 
Ferguson et al., 238 and Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History, (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2010), 118. 
14 Andrew Preston, “Universal Nationalism. Christian America’s Response to the Years of Upheaval,” in 
The Shock of the Global, ed. Ferguson et al., 313-314, and Atwood Lawrence, “Containing Globalism”, in 
Ibid, 214 and 216. 
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          By the mid 1970s American foreign policy towards Southern Africa became 
increasingly influenced by the burgeoning cause of human rights and in particular the 
political right of the population to elect their government. In the case of Rhodesia, Carl 
Peter Watts has suggested that Ford sanctioned the Kissinger peace initiative of 1976 at 
least partly due to a strong commitment to the ethical principle of majority rule. He 
further argued that Ford was not prepared to back down from this moral duty even when 
it was clear such an approach posed an electoral risk to his campaign in the Republican 
primaries of 1976.15   
          It is widely agreed that following the inauguration of Carter in 1977 a major 
priority for the new president was ‘to launch a new era in American foreign policy by 
attaching central importance to human rights as a standard for crafting U.S. decisions and 
weighing the performance of other nations’. Many scholars have praised the Carter 
Presidency for its accomplishment in bringing an end to the UDI era noting Carter’s 
strong support for majority rule and taking the strongest stance against Salisbury ever 
adopted by an American president.16 
          The impact of race, specifically the rise of African-American political power 
during the Cold War era, on foreign policy towards Africa, has also been discussed 
among historians. It has been argued that as early as the 1950s, blacks in U.S., at least 
elite blacks, considered the liberation of colonial peoples of colour inseparable from the 
                                                 
15 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 209-210 and Carl Watts, “‘Dropping the F-bomb’: President Ford, 
the Rhodesian crisis, and the 1976 election”, Panel 89: Domestic Aspects of U.S. Policy towards Southern 
Africa from Ford to Reagan, (SHAFR Conference, Lexington, Kentucky, 2014).  
16 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 228, Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and 
Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 266-268, Lawrence, “Containing 
Globalism”, in The Shock of the Global, ed. Ferguson et al., 214 and 216, William Minter, King Solomon’s 
Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa, (New York; Basic Books, 
1986) 298-299 and Mitchell, “Terrorists or freedom fighters”, in Cold War in Southern Africa. White power 
black liberation, ed. Onslow, 178 and 189-191. 
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struggle for racial justice in America itself. It has been further argued that the LBJ 
Administration was not only aware of the growing importance of the African-American 
vote but also that the Rhodesian issue represented a test of the White House’s 
commitment to racial issues both domestically and overseas.17 
          By the 1970s, African-American electoral power had become sufficiently strong as 
to play a significant role in shaping relations with both the black and white regimes in 
Southern Africa. In his memoirs, Ian Smith himself has argued that Carter was heavily 
influenced by the increasingly important African-American vote. Scholars have also 
observed that Carter owed his electoral victory to black support in the southern states and 
African-American leaders including Coretta Scott King and Andrew Young possessed an 
‘unprecedented level of influence’ on the White House which directly impacted decision 
making on Rhodesia.18 
           A different perspective on the impact of race is offered by Gerald Horne who 
argues that in the aftermath of UDI the primary concern of LBJ was to avoid a racial 
conflict in Rhodesia as such an event would aggravate racial tensions in the U.S. He 
further posits that the election of Nixon was significant as it demonstrated a dual electoral 
‘Southern Strategy’ and ‘Southern Africa Strategy’ designed to play to the racial fears of 
white Americans. An approach that slowed down the pace of racial change both in the 
southern states and Southern Africa appealed to many whites in the U.S. He further 
suggests that the two strategies were mutually compatible as their origins lay in Cold War 
                                                 
17 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 106 and 115, Brenda Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and 
U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), Schmidt, 
Foreign Intervention in Africa, 24 and Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and 
Anticolonialism, 1937-1957, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
18 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 4 and 244-245, DeRoche, “Relations with Africa since 1900” in A 
Companion to American Foreign Relations, ed. Schulzinger, 117, Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 
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rationalization, which postulated African Americans and Africans as the allies or dupes 
of the communists.19 
          The Cold War and the Color Line by Thomas Borstelmann also offers an insightful 
overview of the role of race in shaping U.S. decision making during the Cold War era. 
Borstelmann explores how questions of race and racial equality linked foreign and 
domestic policy. He highlights the dilemma faced by Washington of how to oppose racial 
discrimination both at home and abroad while not alienating Cold War allies such as 
apartheid South Africa or local authorities in the American South. Borstelmann further 
argues that the principal strategy adopted by the Cold War era presidential 
administrations was to try and control the pace of racial reform both domestically and 
overseas to encourage both gradual change but also to minimize provocation to the white 
authorities.20    
          American policy towards Rhodesia, especially in light of the political repression 
and economic ineptitude of the post independence ‘majority rule’ regime led by Robert 
Mugabe, has once again become a topic of scholarly interest. Nevertheless, with the 
exception of Diplomacy in Black and White: America’s Contribution to the Search for 
Zimbabwean Independence, 1965-1980, a dissertation by William Bishop, there is a 
comparative paucity of research regarding direct American-Rhodesian bilateral relations 
especially in terms of examining U.S. policy towards Salisbury through the lens of the 
specific presidential administrations. The existing literature typically comprises of either 
                                                 
19 Gerald Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and The War against Zimbabwe. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 7. 
20 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2, 5 and 198-199. 
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broad overviews of American policy, narrow examinations of an individual time period 
or simply viewing Rhodesia through the restrictive prism of a single political issue.21 
         A number of the existing works are too expansive to offer an in depth analysis of 
each individual presidency and the rationale behind the presidential strategies to the 
Rhodesian crisis. Black, White and Chrome by DeRoche offers an overview of U.S. 
relations with Rhodesia/Zimbabwe between 1953 and 1998 but does not exclusively 
focus on the UDI era and the unique challenges that the rebellion posed for the U.S. both 
domestically and internationally. In  Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 
Watts provides an excellent and insightful analysis of the international responses to UDI. 
While useful to scholars of American foreign policy, it is, however, a primarily 
international history which covers the British, Commonwealth, UN and U.S. reactions in 
the immediate aftermath of the rebellion.22 
           Furthermore, Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, also deals 
solely with the actions of the Johnson Administration. This is the case for a number of 
works, including The “Tar Baby” Option by Lake and Mitchell’s Jimmy Carter in Africa 
which provide useful information on the approaches adopted by one or two presidents but 
do not offer a complete picture of the American role over the course of the entire UDI 
period.23 
         Stephen Stedman’s Peacemaking in Civil War offers an in depth analysis of the 
international efforts to mediate a settlement to end UDI and the Bush War. The book 
challenges the dominant view in conflict resolution theory, at least in 1990, which 
                                                 
21 William Bishop, ‘Diplomacy in Black and White: America’s Contribution to the Search for Zimbabwean 
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22 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome and Watts. Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
23 Lake, The “Tar Baby” Option and Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, (Washington: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2016). 
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dismissed the possibility of a negotiated settlement in a civil conflict. While a major 
contribution to the literature on war termination it does not focus exclusively on U.S. 
policy or the whole UDI era.24 
          Another weakness in the existing scholarship is the fact that much of the literature 
seeks to examine the Rhodesian issue through the use of a specific lens. A good deal of 
the literature has either been defined by race centric narratives or Cold War binaries. 
Such works tend to discount or marginalize other dynamics that influenced decision 
making.  
        A number of works including Power and Prejudice by Lauren and DeRoche’s 
Black, White and Chrome either focus primarily on race or seek to highlight the 
importance of race relations as opposed to a complete evaluation of the diverse factors 
which impacted presidential decision making. In The Cold War and the Color Line, 
Borstelmann insightfully observes that the question of Rhodesian independence reflected 
the fundamental disagreements within the U.S. itself of how to define Western values, 
specifically racial inequality, during the Cold War. Borstelmann nevertheless uses race as 
his sole lens to examine the Cold War era and simply integrates other determinants into 
his broader race-based narrative.25 
        In From the Barrel of a Gun, Horne stated that his objective is to demonstrate the 
role of the U.S. in supporting the racist Smith regime and hindering the advent of 
majority rule. Lake, in The “Tar Baby” Option, offered an in depth analysis of the Nixon 
Administration’s shift in policy but operated from the premise that the White House was 
                                                 
24 Stephen Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1990, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).  
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clearly erroneous in its policy of greater ‘communication’ with the racialist regimes of 
white Africa.26   
         Much of the literature has also been defined by narratives that place the Cold War 
as the dominating factor shaping U.S. policy towards Salisbury. In The Global Cold War, 
Westad offers an excellent account of the ideological and strategic rationale for U.S. 
involvement in Southern Africa. It is, however, primarily a Cold War history which 
places other determining factors, notably economic considerations, domestic civil rights 
and the changing dynamics at the UN, solely within the framework of the broader Cold 
War.27   
          Foreign Intervention in Africa by Schmidt provides an analysis of how the Cold 
War powers sought to shape an international order in Africa that catered to their interests. 
The work, however, primarily focuses on the Cold War narrative offering only a brief 
analysis of economic concerns and does not consider the impact of other important 
dynamics. In Jimmy Carter in Africa, Nancy Mitchell provides a discerning account of 
Carter’s approach towards Rhodesia. She offers an insightful portrait of Carter himself, as 
well as examining the broader makeup and functioning of his administration. It is, 
nevertheless, primarily a Cold War history that acknowledges but downplays the role of 
other influences and Mitchell unequivocally argues that Carter was ‘from the beginning 
of his presidency to its end, a Cold Warrior.’28       
       The existing literature on U.S. foreign policy towards Rhodesia is also somewhat 
dated. The last scholarly works that encompassed the full range of the UDI era were 
Black, White and Chrome by DeRoche and Horne’s From the Barrel of a Gun both of 
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which were published in 2001. In the fifteen years since then a greater range of primary 
source material has become accessible to researchers notably the number of declassified 
documents at the presidential libraries. These new sources help to provide a broader 
understanding of the differing approaches adopted by the presidential administrations 
towards Salisbury.   
       In this work, I have sought to provide the first sustained critical study of the 
approaches adopted by the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations and the 
influences, both global and domestic, which shaped the presidential decision making on 
Rhodesia. My work goes beyond merely considering the Rhodesian problem through the 
prism of a single overriding factor. International relations is never that simple, and I am 
not seeking to praise nor condemn the paths chosen by the occupants of the Oval Office. I 
believe that my research serves to illuminate the choices made by the various 
administrations and in so doing provides a deeper understanding of policy towards 
Salisbury, emphasizing the different strategic, economic, ideological and moral 
viewpoints of each president, as well as the changing international and domestic arena 
against which their decisions were made. 
       Chapter 1 examines the approach adopted by LBJ both during the build up to the 
UDI and in the years following the Rhodesian rebellion. It discusses the various factors 
that influenced the White House including the ‘special relationship’ with London, the 
need to retain standing in black Africa to protect U.S. interests, the increasing power of 
the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN, the fact that the white regimes provided an opening for 
communist meddling in Southern Africa, the potential impact of UDI on American race 
relations, domestic support for Rhodesia and LBJ’s own personal ideological opposition 
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to the concept of white minority rule. The chapter analyzes how these diverse and often 
conflicting influences impacted White House decision making throughout the road to 
UDI, the imposition of sanctions both bilaterally and at the UN, the Zambian airlift, the 
establishment of the Rhodesian Information Office (RIO) in Washington and during the 
tortuous negotiations between London and Salisbury over a potential ‘return to legality’. 
         Chapter 2 discusses the shift in policy following the electoral victory of  Nixon. The 
chapter analyzes the factors leading to the shift towards closer ties with the white regimes 
of Southern Africa. It observes that the Nixon Presidency was typified by a fixation with 
Cold War geopolitics especially the strategic balance of power and explains how the 
Rhodesian problem played into this preoccupation as chaos in Southern Africa would 
complicate the broader strategic mission. The chapter also discusses the significance of 
the fact that the Nixon Administration was also faced by an increasingly confident and 
assertive Rhodesian Government, a strategic need for chrome and a powerful domestic 
Rhodesia Lobby with ties to the White House itself.  The chapter thus investigates how 
these factors not only influenced Nixon’s move to greater ‘communication’ with 
Salisbury but also impacted on the other policy choices including the closure of the U.S. 
Consulate, the importation of Rhodesian chrome under the Byrd Amendment and support 
for the Smith-Home Agreement during the fall of 1971.                        
         Chapter 3 explores the dramatic change in U.S. relations towards Salisbury that 
took place under President Ford. It observes how Washington, for the first time, became a 
crucial diplomatic protagonist in seeking a peaceful political resolution of the Bush War 
and shaping the future of an independent Zimbabwe. The chapter also considers the 
rationale behind the White House decision to place the power and prestige of the U.S. 
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Government into actively seeking a resolution to the Rhodesian problem including the 
sense of morality that Ford brought to the Oval Office but more importantly how the 
geopolitics of the Cold War stimulated an American interest in resolving the longstanding 
Rhodesian question.    
         The final chapter analyzes the key role played by President Carter in ending UDI 
and bringing about Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) independence under majority rule. It 
considers the elements underlying the vehement opposition of the administration to white 
controlled Rhodesia including Carter’s deeply held moral commitment to democracy and 
human rights. The chapter also discusses the influence of leading African-American 
figures, notably Andrew Young, on White House thinking, the growing electoral 
importance of retaining the African-American vote, the belief that the escalating Bush 
War in Rhodesia was providing fertile conditions for Soviet and Cuban involvement and 
that only a fully democratic Zimbabwe under majority rule would curtail communist 
penetration. The chapter then illustrates the impact of these issues on the presidential 
decision making from early actions such as the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and 
attempted closure of the RIO to the involvement in the Anglo-American initiative, 
opposition to the Internal Settlement and most significantly the non-recognition of the 
government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa which directly led to the Lancaster House 
Agreement and the end of UDI.     
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CHAPTER 1. CAUTIOUS HOSTILITY: PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
 
          On November 11 1965, the day of UDI, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his 
senior advisers were gathered at his ranch near Austin, known as the Texas White House. 
The immediate reaction of the Johnson Administration to UDI was one of criticism and 
condemnation. In a press statement, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, declared 
unequivocally that the White House deplored UDI and as a result the U.S. would not 
recognize the rebel regime and would furthermore immediately recall its Consul General 
from Salisbury. For the remainder of the Johnson era, the White House remained 
privately and publicly critical of continued white minority rule in Rhodesia and along 
with the UK sought to undermine or force concessions from the pariah regime through 
financial pressure and trade embargoes which eventually included mandatory 
comprehensive economic sanctions.29  
         President Johnson, widely known by the disambiguation LBJ, had been Vice 
President under John F. Kennedy and ascended to the White House following the 
assassination of Kennedy on November 22 1963. While Johnson was in many ways an 
intimidating and ruthless career politician from rural Texas whose administration was 
dominated by the escalating conflict in Vietnam he also possessed an idealistic and 
compassionate nature and held a firm commitment to aiding those groups, notably the 
poor and the African-American community, which he felt needed the aid and protection 
                                                 
29 Chapter 10 (The United Nations) Sections C, D and E, Department of State Administrative History Vol. 
1, Box 4, LBJ Library, Executive Order relating to trade and other transactions involving Southern 
Rhodesia, January 5 1967, as attachment to letter to President Johnson from Walt W. Rostow, December 31 
1968, “Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3),” Country File, NSF, Box 97, LBJ Library, Executive Order 11419: 
Relating to trade and other transactions involving Southern Rhodesia, July 29 1968, as attachment to letter 
to President Johnson from Walt W. Rostow, December 31 1968, “Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (1 of 3),” Country File, 
NSF, Box 97, LBJ Library, Lake, The “Tar Baby” Option, 80-81 and Watts, Rhodesia’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, 174. 
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of the U.S. Government. His dedication to his beliefs is demonstrated by a domestic 
legacy which included the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial segregation in 
public facilities, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Great Society legislation designed 
to end poverty and improve the quality of life for all Americans.30     
        The position developed by LBJ regarding Rhodesia was shaped by a number of 
significant factors. First, Johnson and many of his key advisers including Rusk viewed 
the Rhodesian issue as primarily a British responsibility but equally one in which 
America would support the UK both bilaterally and in international forums such as the 
UN. As observed by Anthony Lake, the so called ‘special relationship’ between London 
and Washington mattered deeply to Johnson who felt it a basic American interest to 
continue to develop close political, security and economic ties with UK. The 
administration was also aware that Britain no longer possessed the economic or military 
power to achieve its goal of ending UDI without active tangible U.S. assistance.31 
         Leading figures in the administration , however, including Rusk, Under Secretary of 
State George Ball and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy expressed 
reservations about taking measures beyond those adopted by the UK. It was felt that 
London was trying to push Washington to take the lead on the Rhodesian issue which 
could mean the U.S. sharing the blame for the failure of any initiatives and furthermore 
could prove potentially damaging to geopolitical and economic interests. This led to 
                                                 
30 George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative History 8th Edition, (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2010), 1317-1324. 
31 Memorandum for Walt W. Rostow from Rick Haynes, Balance Sheet: Rhodesian Crisis, April 22 1966, 
“Rhodesia, Vol. 2 (3 of 3),” Country File, NSF, Box 97, LBJ Library, Summary Notes of 567th NSC 
Meeting January 25 1967, “Vol.4 Tab 49 Southern Rhodesia”, NSC Meetings File, NSF, Box 2, LBJ 
Library, 484. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom. Washington, 
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Johnson developing a cautious approach to the Rhodesian problem while broadly 
remaining supportive of Britain.32 
          LBJ was also influenced by the need to retain prestige and protect interests in the 
newly independent African states. As noted by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, G. 
Mennen Williams, not only did Africa’s huge land mass and air space have great strategic 
importance but African nations possessed a large free world percentage of certain 
minerals critical to American interests. Africa also offered lucrative markets for export 
and Washington had both a strategic and humanitarian interest in promoting democracy 
and encouraging economic and social improvements.33 
       The White House was well aware that the extent of U.S. influence in black Africa 
was intrinsically linked to the stance that Washington took on the issues of primary 
interest to the Africans themselves. The president and his advisers were also cognizant of 
the fact that the ending of white minority rule in Southern Africa was of paramount 
importance to the black African states. In December 1965, Deputy Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs Robert W. Komer informed LBJ that the Africans viewed 
Rhodesia as a straight anti-colonial issue and U.S. actions on UDI would greatly effect 
American influence on the continent.34  
                                                 
32 Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview IV 3/8/70, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Electronic Copy, LBJ 
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33 Memorandum to Ambassadors and certain Principal Officers from Assistant Secretary of State, G. 
Mennen Williams, May 10 1965, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (3 of 4),” Country File NSF Box 76, LBJ Library 
and Confidential, Strengthened Africa Program, “Africa General, Vol. 3,” Country File NSF Box 76, LBJ 
Library. 
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       The changing power dynamic at the UN also affected the response to UDI. As 
observed by Glenda Sluga, at the time of its establishment the UN was comprised of 
fifty-one member states the majority of which were either European or part of the ‘White 
British Commonwealth’. By the Sixties, however, the postcolonial bloc had become 
increasingly powerful, indeed by 1960 the number of newly independent colonies meant 
it had become impossible for U.S. and Western allies to muster enough votes to deprive 
the Afro-Asians of the two thirds majority needed for resolutions. This Afro-Asian bloc 
further sought to mobilize the power and resources of the UN to achieve their own 
objectives. High on the agenda was the increasingly volatile issue of the white minority 
governments in Southern Africa. As early as December 1960, the UN General Assembly 
passed Resolution 1514 the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples’ which demanded a swift end to colonial rule.35 
       The increasing power of the Afro-Asians forced the West to rely on Third World  
diplomatic support for their geopolitical goals at the UN. This salient fact was noted not 
only by U.S. UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg but also by officials at the State 
Department and the White House. If the U.S. did not take a strong line on Rhodesia then 
this would adversely affect American objectives at the UN. It is important to note, 
however, the Johnson Administration did not allow the UN to simply dictate policy on 
Rhodesia. At the UN Security Council, U.S. representatives opposed far reaching 
measures including the use of military force and together with the UK sought to pre-empt 
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or moderate the demands of the more extreme Afro-Asians and replace them with more 
practical and peaceful solutions.36 
        The White House position on UDI was also heavily influenced by disquiet with the 
growth of communist interest in and effect on African affairs. As early as the 1957 
Bermuda Conference both Britain and U.S. had expressed strategic concerns about Soviet 
and Chinese influence in Africa. By April of 1965, the CIA observed that the USSR had 
cultivated diplomatic relations with twenty-one states in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Communist China had relations with twelve countries in the region. The early Sixties also 
witnessed a startling increase in communist economic and military aid to the newly 
independent black nations as well as funds, covert arms shipments and guerrilla training 
to the liberation movements fighting white minority rule.37 
        Intelligence reports at the time indicated that there was little danger of a broad 
communist takeover of the African continent and most newly independent African 
nations were unlikely to develop more than token relations with the communist bloc. The 
African desire for non-alignment in the Cold War, the massive amounts of aid received 
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from Western sources and the inapplicability of key parts of communist ideology to the 
African political milieu reduced the chances of communist penetration.38  
        The ‘White Redoubt’ in Southern Africa, however, provided an opportunity for 
communist meddling and exploitation. The Soviets and Communist Chinese were 
unburdened by a colonial legacy and unlike Britain or the U.S. were not encumbered by 
close political or economic ties to the white regimes. In the words of Komer, the 
communists were able to pose as ‘the apostles of decolonization’. Moreover, the longer 
the minority governments remained in power the greater the opportunities for communist 
sway over the leadership of the liberation groups. A widespread racial conflict in the 
region could lead to a sharp decrease in Western influence and a growth in power of pro-
communist and other indigenous radicals.39      
         As pointed out by Gerald Horne, the White House was also deeply concerned about 
the impact that UDI, and by extension racial conflict in Rhodesia, would have on 
domestic race relations. The passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act had 
incurred the ire of many white Americans especially in the South which was intensified 
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by events such as the Watts riot in Los Angeles in the summer of 1965. A violent split 
along racial lines in Southern Africa could potentially exacerbate race tensions in 
America. In spring 1965, the meeting of the American Negro Leadership Conference on 
Africa to create a permanent black pressure group to influence U.S. foreign policy was 
viewed with alarm and concern by the administration. It was feared that the appearance 
of an ‘ethnic lobby’ on Africa could lead to a segregated approach to foreign policy.40    
          Finally, it is important to note that Johnson held a deep personal interest in ending 
white supremacy whether it existed in the Mississippi delta or in a distant African 
country. After taking office he told a White House staff member that ‘I’m going to be the 
best friend the Negro ever had’. On March 15 1965, in a speech to a joint session of 
Congress entitled the ‘American Promise’, LBJ stated unequivocally that if America 
proved incapable of the task of achieving equal rights for African-Americans then ‘we 
will have failed as a people and a nation.’ This commitment to racial equality was not 
merely domestic in scope. In a less than subtle gesture, LBJ dispatched a copy of the 
‘American Promise’ to South African Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd the so called 
‘architect of apartheid’.41  
                                                 
40 Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Robert W. Komer, January 6 1965, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 
of 4),” Country File NSF Box 76, LBJ Library, Memorandum for the Secretary of State from McGeorge 
Bundy, January 7 1965, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” Country File NSF Box 76, LBJ Library, 
Memorandum to Robert W. Komer from Rick Haynes, March 25 1965, “Africa General, Vol. 2 (2 of 4),” 
Country File NSF Box 76, LBJ Library, Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 15 and Tindall and Shi, 
America, 1320. 
41 Remarks of the President to a Joint Session of the Congress. The American Promise, March 15 1965, 
“Africa-Letters from the President to African Leaders, enc “The American Promise”,” Country File NSF 
Box 77, LBJ Library, Letter to Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, Prime Minister of the Republic of South 
Africa, May 8 1965, “Africa-Letters from the President to African Leaders, enc “The American Promise”,” 
Country File NSF Box 77, LBJ Library, Backgrounder: The President’s concern for Africa, “Chrono (1 of 
3)”, Files of Ulric Haynes, NSF, Box 1, LBJ Library, DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 8 and 98 and 
Tindall and Shi, America, 1318. 
 
 
37 
 
         The Rhodesian UDI divided the American public although not exclusively along 
racial lines. African-American interest groups such as the Congress of Racial Equality, 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, not unexpectedly, offered severe criticism of Ian Smith 
and urged LBJ to take the strongest possible stance against Salisbury. Equally 
unsurprisingly, an array of conservative groups ranging from the Liberty Lobby to the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans urged diplomatic recognition of Rhodesia and support for 
the Smith government.42 
         Presidential correspondence, however, reveals that Rhodesia enjoyed widespread 
support among the American public. Letters to LBJ frequently criticized the U.S. 
Government’s aggression toward a ‘friendly’ nation. A plethora of pro-Rhodesian interest 
groups sprung up post UDI including most notably the Friends of Rhodesian 
Independence which by June 1967 claimed 122 branches with 25,000 members. These 
groups often possessed colorful and quite bizarre names including the memorable 
Rhodesian Gung-Ho Troops and Hooray for Ian Smith, Titan of Rhodesian Yearning.43 
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         The divisions among the public were also reflected in Congress. Liberal figures 
such as Congressman Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
Massachusetts) urged LBJ to take tough measures against the Rhodesian Government and 
sought to prevent American association with any potential British deal which allowed 
continued minority rule. The pro Rhodesia Lobby on Capitol Hill, however, included not 
only southern conservatives such as Senator James Eastland (D-Mississippi) and 
Representative Joe Waggoner (D-Louisiana) but also figures such as Senator Barry 
Goldwater (R-AZ), Congressman Harold R. Gross (R-Iowa) and Congressman Durwood 
G. Hall (R-Missouri). While race certainly played a role for some in explaining their 
support for the Rhodesians, others questioned American aggression against a non-hostile 
nation and wondered why LBJ appeared so eager to aid the UK when London was 
continuing to trade with Cuba and N. Vietnam.44       
        The response of the Johnson Administration to UDI was shaped by a number of 
factors both international and domestic in nature. As a firm believer in the close bilateral 
relationship between Washington and London, LBJ naturally sought to aid Britain in 
bringing down the the Rhodesian ‘rebels’ although he was wary of any attempt to play 
more than a supportive role in a British colonial problem. The White House was also 
aware of the need to retain U.S. prestige in black African especially given the increasing 
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power of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN. Johnson was also conscious that UDI and 
continued white minority rule in Rhodesia provided Moscow and Peking with an 
opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Southern Africa. 
         On the domestic front, the Johnson Administration feared the impact that racial 
conflict in Rhodesia would have on the still volatile field of American race relations. LBJ 
himself also deeply opposed white supremacy on moral grounds regardless of whether it 
was in the cotton fields of the southern states or the veld of Southern Africa. Johnson was 
thus publicly critical of the Smith government and followed a policy designed to force an 
end to the rebellion through diplomatic and economic pressure. 
 
The road to UDI: LBJ backs the British stance 
          When LBJ took office in the fall of 1963 the Rhodesian problem was growing 
rapidly in magnitude, indeed a CIA report described it as Britain’s ‘thorniest 
decolonization problem to date’. A potential UDI held strategic, political, economic and 
social repercussions not only for London and Salisbury but Washington too. As the crisis 
developed the White House found itself increasingly emmeshed in a volatile situation that 
was none of its making.45 
           The first indication of the growing gravity of the Rhodesian issue was the ousting 
of Prime Minister Winston Field for failing to secure the goal of full independence. Field, 
a comparative moderate by Rhodesian Front (RF) standards had come under increasing 
criticism from his party for not taking a firm enough stance during negotiations with 
Britain. In December 1963, the CIA warned that unless the British gave further 
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concessions to Field during negotiations then he would be removed and this would 
increase the chances of a UDI.46  
            In January 1964, Field travelled to London for talks with British Prime Minister 
Alec Douglas-Home. It had been made clear to him by the RF caucus that he must give 
an ultimatum to the British that it was impossible for Rhodesia to continue in its present 
status if the other two states of the Central African Federation obtained independence. He 
also stated that he would not countenance a turnover of power to Africans but would 
consider some minor changes in franchise and end discriminatory legislation. The British 
responded that they were not prepared to precipitate a Commonwealth crisis by granting 
independence merely based on minor franchise alterations. In early April, the RF reacted 
by demanding the resignation of Field and on April 14 he resigned as prime minister.47 
           The new leader was Ian Douglas Smith, the former finance minister and the first 
Rhodesian born prime minister. Smith despite a humourless demeanor and unsmiling 
countenance nevertheless possessed a disarming charm and engaging public modesty. His 
local roots made him less susceptible to the British viewpoint and inclined him to a more 
parochial and Rhodesian centric worldview.48  
           An official British biographical note described Smith as  a ‘simple minded, 
politically naïve, and uncomprehending character’ but also observed that he often 
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possesses a ‘shrewder assessment of a particular situation than at first appears on the 
surface and he should not be under-rated.’ In his memoirs, Smith himself commented 
that; ‘For the first time in its history the country now had a Rhodesian-born PM, someone 
whose roots were not in Britain, but in Southern Africa, in other words, a white 
African.’49 
           In Washington, the U.S. Government viewed with grave concern the developments 
in Rhodesia. The State Department considered the cabinet crisis of Field as wiping out 
any moderation in the RF and heightening the chances of a UDI. State therefore advised 
interested embassies to inform host governments that the U.S. was troubled by recent 
events but also emphasize that direct responsibility for Rhodesia lay with the British 
Government.50  
          The State Department also issued instructions to the U.S. Consul General in 
Salisbury, Paul McClelland, to maintain only the minimum necessary contact with the 
new Rhodesian Government. McClelland shared the anxiety of officials in Washington 
over the increased prospect of a UDI but also noted that Smith himself faced a limited 
time frame to attain the elusive goal of independence or he too could face a coup by 
extremists from within the RF.51         
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            Over the following months relations between London and Salisbury continued to 
deteriorate. The decision of Douglas-Home to exclude Rhodesia from participation in the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference and refusal to meet with Rhodesian African 
Chiefs engaged in a tour of Europe was met with anger in Salisbury. In September, 
during negotiations with Smith in London, the British also rejected a proposition for an 
indaba or council meeting of African Chiefs and Headmen as an adequate representation 
of African opinion on independence.52 
          On October 15, the Labour Party led by Harold Wilson triumphed over the 
Conservatives in the British General Election. The Labour victory stimulated further 
anxiety in the white Rhodesian  community due to repeated publicly stated opposition to 
independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution and insistence on majority rule. New 
Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley moved quickly to reaffirm that the British 
Government did not recognize an indaba as sufficient and it would not send observers to 
such a meeting.53 
         Smith, however, was determined to prove, albeit by his own methods, that the 
majority of all Rhodesians black or white favored independence under the 1961 
Constitution. On October 22, six hundred and twenty-two Chiefs and Headmen gathered 
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in the largest indaba in the history of Rhodesia and every single attendee voted yes to 
independence. While the British and Americans stayed away eight other nations 
including Australia, France, Portugal  and South Africa sent observers to the event. On 
November 5, a referendum of the white electorate also voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
independence.54    
         As observed by Carl Peter Watts, the determination of the RF to demonstrate, on 
their own terms, that the Rhodesian population wished for independence alarmed the 
newly elected Labour government. Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley demanded an 
audience with the Black Nationalist leaders in Salisbury. He further stated that if 
prevented from seeing who he wished then the British would publish a public statement 
warning of the consequences of UDI. The terms as well as the imperious nature of the 
demand enraged Smith who refused and subsequently rejected a proposal to meet in 
London. On October 27, the UK released a public statement stating that a UDI would 
have no legal effect and would represent an open act of rebellion against the Crown.55  
          The increasing likelihood of a UDI also created angst on the other side of the 
Atlantic and spurred Washington to make American opinion clear to Salisbury. 
According to Wilson, both Johnson and Rusk were increasingly concerned about Chinese 
and Russian penetration in Africa and recognized that Western influence was being 
threatened by events in Rhodesia. For his part, Wilson was eager to enlist U.S. assistance 
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in placing pressure on Salisbury to take a more accomodating line towards the British 
position.56 
          In October, Rusk assured Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker that the U.S. 
firmly supported the British in opposing any UDI. American diplomatic officials in 
Salisbury declined the opportunity to attend the indaba and on October 28, in response to 
a request from London, issued a public statement of support for the British which warned 
Salisbury to consider the dangers of a UDI.57    
          To what extent the combined Anglo-American diplomatic warnings daunted Smith 
and the RF is a matter of conjecture. Richard Wood has argued that the threats had little 
effect on the Rhodesian Prime Minister. Wood states that ‘If Wilson was hoping to cow 
Ian Smith, he had misjudged his man.’ Nevertheless, as noted by Watts, on October 29 
just days after the British and American public statements the Rhodesian Legislative 
Assembly passed a motion which rejected any program for UDI based on the upcoming 
referendum of the white community in early November.58         
          While the RF may not have been prepared in the fall of 1964 to force the issue of a 
UDI the question of independence continued to sour relations between London and 
Salisbury. It is also quite clear that on a personal level Smith and Wilson disliked and 
distrusted for each other. At a meeting in January 1965, Wilson described Smith as being 
‘extremely difficult, extremely sour, and not a little offensive about his particular 
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aversions’ one of which happened to be the Labour Government. Smith was not alone 
among his cabinet in his disdain for the British Prime Minister. The Minister of 
Information, P. K. Van der Byl, described Wilson as a ‘highly dangerous, uninformed 
and conceited little man.’59 
          On April 26, the Rhodesian Government published a White Paper titled ‘Economic 
Aspects of a Declaration of Independence’ which suggested that the economic 
consequences of UDI would not be as serious as claimed by London. Less than two 
weeks later the RF won an overwhelming electoral victory capturing all fifty ‘A’ Roll 
seats. British officials in Salisbury stated that the electorate voted for Smith and 
independence.60  
           Earlier in April, the Commonwealth Relations Office formulated five principles 
for the granting of full independence to Rhodesia. First, the principle and intention of 
unimpeded progress to majority rule already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution would 
have to maintained and guaranteed. Secondly, there must be guarantees against 
retrogressive amendment of that constitution. Thirdly and fourthly, there would need to 
be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population and progress 
toward ending racial discrimination. Finally, the British would need to be satisfied that 
any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the whole population of 
Rhodesia. The principles, though, were not revealed to Smith by British High 
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Commissioner Johnson until May 27 to avoid turning the Rhodesian General Election 
into a referendum on them.61 
             On the global stage, the U.S. remained fully supportive of the approach adopted 
by the British Government. In late April, at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
meeting convened at the request of African nations to consider whether Rhodesia was a 
threat to international peace and security, Washington voiced approval of the British 
position. On May 6, in support of London, the U.S. abstained from voting along with the 
British on UNSC Resolution 202 which while opposing UDI also demanded action 
exclusively by the UK.62  
            The U.S. was also becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of Rhodesia. At the 
UN Human Rights Commission, American representative Marietta P. Tree scolded the 
Rhodesian Government for its oppressive practices and its insistence on minority rule. 
Tree expressly stated that immediate independence was not an answer to Rhodesia’s 
problems.63  
             U.S.-Rhodesian bilateral relations reached a new low in mid April following the 
refusal of Washington to sell Salisbury T-28 military aircraft. On April 14, the Rhodesian 
Government issued a harshly worded aide memoire to Consul General McClelland in 
Salisbury protesting the decision. The aide memoire deplored this ‘unfriendly act’ and 
stated that Rhodesia concludes that the United States ‘has reached position in its relations 
with Rhodesia which removes basis of friendship, mutual respect and cooperation.’ The 
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State Department was infuriated by the intemperate response and instructed McClelland 
to stress American ‘shock, regret and irritation at inaccuracies, unrealistic tone, 
intemperate and undiplomatic phrasing and offensive lecturing tenor of document.’64  
           On June 15, Assistant Secretary of State Williams, in a speech before the Chicago 
Chapter of the Federal Bar Association clarified the American position by formally 
announcing a policy of a total arms embargo on Rhodesia and stated that the U.S. would 
support the British position in event of a UDI. British records suggest that Washington 
even considered a strong statement in the UNSC noting they had refused the Rhodesian 
arms request as they would not associate themselves with policies that were ill-advised 
and dangerous, but did not do so at the request of London.65   
          The State Department also contemplated refusing to receive the new Rhodesian 
minister in Washington, Air Vice Marshal Bentley, who was attached to the British 
Embassy. The Rhodesian minister’s first meeting with Williams demonstrated just how 
prickly relations had become between the two nations. Williams denounced the 
Rhodesian Government and hectored Bentley to push the RF to show greater willingness 
for talks with the African Nationalists. Bentley, in turn, suggested that perhaps 
Washington should consider practicing what it preaches vis a vis North Vietnam.66    
         The growing possibility of Rhodesian independence also prompted the White 
House to consider the implications on the U.S. and make contingency plans to deal with 
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such an eventuality. Measures included non-recognition of the post-UDI Rhodesian 
Government and support for diplomatic and economic punitive actions taken by the UK 
or the Commonwealth. The U.S. would however maintain a skeleton staff at the consulate 
as a symbol of concern for the black Rhodesian population.67 
          Zambia posed a particularly difficult problem.  The threat that a UDI and ensuing 
sanctions posed to the Zambian economy was a primary concern not only to Lusaka but 
to London and Washington as well. The Zambian copperbelt, along with the southern 
Congolese province of Katanga produced almost 700,000 tons annually which 
represented 25% of all free world copper. The Zambian economy, however, was 
dependent on the whim of her southern neighbour. If Zambia imposed sanctions on 
Rhodesia then Salisbury could retaliate by crippling Zambian financially and driving up 
the price of copper on the world market.68              
           In May 1965, U.S. officials held talks with Canada and the UK to clarify what 
measures could be taken to assist Lusaka in the event of a UDI. It was agreed that 
through the use of alternative land routes and supplemented by an airlift it would be 
possible to maintain the Zambian economy at minimum levels and allow the export of 
approximately 300,000 tons of copper annually. This would neverthless still cause a price 
rise on the global market, have a damaging effect on UK industry and could force 
Washington to consider a release of copper from the strategic stockpile.69   
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          President Kenneth Kaunda was more than aware of the dangers that a UDI posed to 
his country. In May he approached Washington requesting assistance in constructing a 
1,000 mile long rail link from Zambia to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thus providing 
Lusaka with an outlet to the Indian Ocean. Johnson, however, was reluctant to engage in 
such an expensive project, the cost would have been around $400 million, and vetoed the 
proposal. Komer described the proposal as an economically unfeasible ‘boondoggle’. The 
White House instead offered a comprehensive economic survey of a road link deemed far 
less expensive and more economically versatile.70 
            By September, the White House was increasingly convinced that the Rhodesian 
Government was moving towards an imminent UDI. Officials noted that at the RF party 
conference in August, there was a clear impatience with talks and a desire to swiftly 
engage in a UDI. White Rhodesian public sentiment was also strongly in favor of full 
independence. Furthermore, as observed by Haynes the ‘Lack of progress during the last 
six months dialogue between Salisbury and London has driven both Rhodesians and 
British to the point of mutual exasperation.’  
              On September 8, Clifford Dupont, the Rhodesian Minister for External Affairs 
announced that he had appointed Harry Reedman as an ‘Accredited Diplomatic 
Representative’ to Lisbon. In terms of independent diplomatic representation, Rhodesia 
already possessed a High Commission in London,  a Mission in Pretoria and a Consul 
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General in Lourenco Marques but as noted by the British the action represented a 
‘creeping independence’. The fact that Portugal, despite strong representations from 
London continued to allow Reedman to operate in its jurisdiction further emboldened 
Salisbury.71   
            The volatility of the situation led to apprehension at the highest levels of the 
Johnson Administration. At the National Security Council (NSC) Robert Komer and 
Ulric Haynes were especially vocal in urging a more aggressive effort to deter a UDI. On 
September 29, Komer wrote to LBJ urging stronger support of the UK position arguing 
that a UDI was legally and morally wrong, Anglo-American ties required Washington to 
help London in a situation that threatens them economically and politically and almost all 
Afro-Asian nations opposed UDI and would be judging the U.S. on its actions regarding 
Rhodesia.72 
            On September 29, the Department of State instructed Consul General McClelland 
in Salisbury to give an oral message to Smith warning the Rhodesian leader that the 
course of events was causing increasing concern to the U.S. Government. The message 
noted the ‘close and friendly’ relations between Rhodesia and the U.S. which would be 
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tragically severed by ‘an ill-considered and irrevocable unilateral action on the part of 
your Government.’ The message also specifically stated that Washington would not 
condone a UDI and would support the British position. At the meeting with the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Smith informed McClelland that his government would not 
engage in ‘rash or irresponsible’ action but it was his duty to protect Rhodesia from 
becoming another Tanzania dangerously infiltrated by communists. Smith also observed 
the irony of London appealing to Washington for help against a rebellious colony.73              
                In early October, Smith travelled to London accompanied by several other high 
ranking Rhodesian officials including Minister of Internal Affairs William Harper and the 
Minister of Justice, Desmond Lardner-Burke. During the extensive negotiations, Wilson 
made clear to the Rhodesians that while he was prepared to grant independence before 
majority rule it had to be on the basis of the Five Principles. Smith, though, insisted that 
independence must be based on the 1961 Constitution and rejected repeal of the Land 
Apportionment Act on the grounds that it protected the Africans from exploitation.74  
              During the talks in London, Wilson also made the somewhat strategically bizarre 
decision to inform Smith that in the event of a UDI the UK did not consider the use of 
force against Rhodesia as a realistic possibility. According to the head of the Rhodesian 
Central Intelligence Organization, Ken Flower, up to this point leading figures in the RF 
had expressed serious concerns about a British military response to a UDI. It appears as 
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though Wilson, arguably unwittingly, may well have given the green light to the 
Rhodesians to declare independence.75 
             On October 7, at the request of the White House, again following an appeal from 
Wilson for U.S. involvement, the Charge d’Affaires in London, Phil Kaiser, met Smith 
and passed on a statement of support for British policy towards Rhodesia. The Rhodesian 
Prime Minister commented with disgust that the British were ‘crawling’ to the United 
States for help.76  
             Two days later Kaiser received a written reply from Smith stating that Rhodesia 
was seeking independence on its 1961 Constitution agreed by the UK and Rhodesia as 
well as representatives of all political parties and racial groups in the country. While 
Smith appreciated the advice of friendly governments like the U.S., nevertheless, the 
‘Rhodesian government would be failing in their duty not only to themselves but to the 
ordinary people of the country and to the cause of Western civilisation on the continent of 
Africa if they were persuaded to abandon the stand they have taken and to expose the 
people of the country to all the unhappiness and conflict which stems from unbridled 
racial government, which would be the result of immediate majority rule.’77 
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            The gravity of the situation and its effect on American geopolitical objectives was 
highlighted by a CIA report considering the repercussions of a Rhodesian UDI. It was 
observed that political and economic sanctions alone would prove insufficient to dislodge 
white minority rule at least for the next few years. The continued presence, however, of a 
white government in Salisbury would cause increasing frustration among black African 
nations triggering recurrent difficulties for the U.S. at the UN and lead to greater pressure 
on Washington to take stronger measures. It would also provide an opportunity for 
greater Communist involvement in the region to the detriment of Western interests.78 
              On October 25, Wilson personally visited Rhodesia and met with the Council of 
Chiefs, detained Nationalist leaders, as well as Smith and other members of the 
Rhodesian Government. Wilson  made two proposals to Smith regarding the granting of 
independence. First, a referendum of all Rhodesian taxpayers to test the RF assertion that 
the majority of the population favored independence on the basis of 1961 Constitution 
and secondly, a Royal Commission to propose constitutional arrangements for 
independence which would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. 79 
           In terms of the two options, Smith summarily rejected the former and made a 
counter-offer on the latter that the Royal Commission should receive from the Rhodesian 
and British Governments’ an agreed constitution which it would then put to the 
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Rhodesian population to ascertain if it was acceptable. On November 1-2, the British 
Cabinet agreed to a Royal Commission and agreed to submit the constitution proposed by 
Smith but would publicly disassociate the British Government from it. It was also agreed 
that the UK would only support the report of the commission if it was unanimous in 
nature. The British decision infuriated Salisbury which viewed the terms as evasive and 
essentially a rejection of the proposals.80      
            In Washington, the White House closely monitored the course of the negotiations 
and sought to emphasize to Salisbury both the gravity of the situation and the extent of 
American support for the British. Before the commencement of the talks,  Rusk, via the 
U.S. Embassy in London, asked Wilson to convey to Smith that Washington supported 
UK in seeking a solution satisfactory to the Rhodesian population as a whole and that the 
U.S. would condemn a UDI and be compelled to sever traditional close and friendly ties 
with Salisbury.81  
             On October 29, Johnson himself, at the request of Wilson, sent a personal 
message, via McClelland, to Smith. The message reminded Smith that Washington was 
fully supportive of the British and would continue to back UK policy in the event of a 
UDI. LBJ urged Smith to give deep consideration to the proposals advanced by Wilson 
and expressed the ‘hope that you and your colleagues will avoid a course which, in 
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addition to all its other consequences, would inevitably break the strong ties of friendship 
and understanding which have bound our countries together in war and peace.’82 
             Despite Smith’s assurances, delivered in his ‘usual disarmingly reasonable 
manner’, that Salisbury sought a constitutional solution of its problems with London, 
McClelland was increasingly convinced that negotiations had reached the end of the road. 
McClelland pointed out that the British proposal of a Royal Commission was an 
anathema to the RF and the majority of the white electorate. Furthermore, the delaying 
tactics adopted by Wilson had only served to fuel the fires of Rhodesian impatience for 
independence. He also observed that the RF caucus informed Smith that if he accepted 
the Royal Commission and its report was negative on independence then he would be 
asked to resign. His replacement would undoubtedly be less moderate on the question of  
a UDI.83 
            The RF, especially the powerful hardliners like Dupont and Lardner-Burke, had 
indeed lost patience with the negotiations and were pushing Smith inexorably towards a 
UDI. On November 5, the Rhodesian Government declared a three month State of 
Emergency including severe newspaper censorship. Smith then rejected the British terms 
for, although not the concept of, a Royal Commission and refused an offer from Wilson 
for further talks in Malta. The following day McClelland reported that the Rhodesian 
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Government was ‘poised, indeed impatient, to take UDI’. Finally, on November 11 1965, 
the Rhodesian Government, despite a last minute telephone call from Wilson to Smith, 
formally declared a UDI from British rule.84  
              Throughout the tortuous and eventually futile negotiations between London and 
Salisbury, the LBJ Administration stood steadfastly behind the British position. This 
solid support was partly due to Johnson’s belief in the importance of the Anglo-American 
alliance but also due to concerns over the strategic and economic consequences of a UDI 
especially the impact on Zambian copper exports which could destabilize the world 
market. As the chances of a UDI grew stronger the U.S. attitude not only hardened 
against Salisbury, as demonstrated by the arms embargo, and the White House repeatedly 
warned the Rhodesians against taking such a rash and unwise action. Ultimately, 
however, the warnings were not heeded and LBJ was faced with the undesirable option of 
how to deal with an ‘independent’ Rhodesia.   
  
Geopolitical realities dictate U.S. involvement in seeking a swift end to UDI  
           In the aftermath of the Rhodesian declaration, Washington adopted a posture of 
hostility towards Salisbury to demonstrate American opposition to white minority rule, 
show solidarity with black African nations and to support London, a key Western power. 
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Nevertheless, the LBJ Administration wished to avoid radical actions that could 
precipitate a broader racial war in the region and invite communist intervention. 
Furthermore, the Rhodesian situation was still deemed to be primarily a British 
responsibility and while the White House was prepared to assist their NATO ally the U.S. 
was not prepared to take the lead in dealing with an internal colonial predicament which 
could have serious repercussions on American interests. This decision, however, would 
prove difficult to stand by as broader pressures came to bear on the U.S. Government.85 
             On the day of the UDI, Secretary of State Rusk, in a press statement, deplored the 
action, declared that Washington would not recognize the rebel regime, announced the 
recall of Consul General McClelland and the closure of the U.S. Information Office in 
Salisbury. The following day Johnson approved a comprehensive embargo of all arms 
and military equipment, suspension of loans, credit and investment guarantees, 
suspension of the quotas for Rhodesian sugar and the withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic 
recognition for Rhodesian personnel at the British Embassy in Washington.86  
             The British had commenced actions against Salisbury on the day of UDI 
including a boycott of Rhodesian sugar and tobacco as well as exchange controls and a 
denial of financial capital. London subsequently passed a number of Orders in Council 
including the annullment of the Rhodesian 1965 Consitution, voiding of any laws passed 
by the illegal regime and granting Britain the power of excecutive authority over the 
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colony. On December 1, the sanctions were extended to include all agricultural, metal 
and mineral products which represented ninety-five percent of imports from Rhodesia.87  
           At the UN, UDI became, in the words of Robert Good, a ‘cause celebre 
overnight’. On November 11, the UN General Assembly voted by one hundred and one 
votes to two (Portugal and South Africa) to condemning the Rhodesian action. The 
following day the UNSC passed Resolution 216 denouncing UDI and and called on all 
states not to recognize or render any assistance to the illegal regime. The U.S. voted in 
favor of both these measures.88  
           Both London and Washington, however, were aware of the desire of the African 
group at the UN to demand radical action including the use of Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. This would have declared Rhodesia a threat to international peace and security 
and authorized all necessary action, nonmilitary and military, to restore peace. On 
November 20, in a compromise deal brokered largely by U.S. Ambassador Goldberg the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 217 which called on all member states to voluntarily cut 
economic relations with Rhodesia including the sale of oil and other petroleum 
products.89      
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           The issue of sugar quotas proved to be the first test of the American desire not to 
get ahead of the UK on the Rhodesian question. On November 12, Ambassador Goldberg 
had informed the UN that the U.S. had suspended its quotas for Rhodesian sugar imports. 
The suspension would commence with the upcoming quota for the calendar year of 1966. 
The 1965 quota, however, comprising 9,542 tons had been contracted for by a U.S. 
importer and was already en route to the United States. The question of how to approach 
this shipment of sugar deeply divided opinions in the Johnson Administration.90 
          The British Embassy informed the State Department that London intended to honor 
all import agreements with Rhodesia which were made prior to November 12, 1965. 
Under Secretary Ball therefore opposed the cancellation of the quota as he feared this 
would place Washington in the lead regarding sanctions on Rhodesia. The Department of 
Agriculture also urged the White House not to interfere with the sugar due to adverse 
comment in the trade and possibility of legal action.91 
          Ambassador Goldberg, however, argued strongly in favor of suspension of the 
quota. In his opinion, the arrival of a boat load of Rhodesian sugar at an American port 
would cause ‘considerable excitement at the United Nations’ and cast doubt whether 
Washington was genuinely determined to end white minority rule in Rhodesia. The 
Africa Bureau at the State Department shared his concerns and counselled cancellation. 
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The issue was also certain to raise questions domestically. Indeed, as early as November 
18, the powerful AFL-CIO labor union had already spoken out against the shipment and 
pressed for cancellation of the quota.92   
           The White House had been informed, by the Legal Adviser’s Office of the State 
Department, that the President could legally suspend the quota under the 1965 
amendment to Sugar Act of 1948. The matter was also somewhat urgent as the shipment 
of sugar was due at Yonkers, New York, on December 10. On November 20, at the 
recommendation of the State Department, Johnson directed the Secretary of Agriculture 
to formally suspend both the 1966 and 1965 sugar quotas for Rhodesia. The presidential 
decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First of all, for the first time in the Rhodesian 
crisis it pushed Washington ahead of London regarding punitive measures against 
Salisbury and secondly, as the decision was clearly influenced by a need to mollify the 
Afro-Asians at the UN and avoid domestic criticism at home.93 
           The Johnson Administration also increasingly feared that the situation was 
escalating beyond the control of the British and this could lead to greater pressure on the 
U.S. to adopt a more assertive and indeed aggressive approach towards Salisbury. On 
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December 6, Komer warned LBJ that there was ‘a mounting risk that Wilson may lose 
control of it to a gaggle of irresponsible Africans, perhaps with Soviet support.’ If 
London did lose power over the proceedings then the Organization of African Unity and 
radical African states would likely press for more extreme measures including use of 
force. The CIA warned that African emotions were ‘aroused to an unprecedented extent 
over the Rhodesian crisis’. Washington feared facing the unappealing choice of assisting 
in military operations against Rhodesia or losing a great deal of credibility in black Africa 
to the benefit of the communist bloc.94  
          Johnson himself recognized the mounting gravity of the situation and the need to 
assist the British in moving faster to end the rebellion. The White House and the State 
Department, however, were frustrated by perceived British prevarication and the apparent 
lack of any plan that would soon see the rebellion defeated. Indeed, G. Mennen Williams 
asked Ball to inform London that Washington was fully prepared to help but needed to be 
advised about the British program or indeed the overall thinking on Rhodesia.95 
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          The apparent normalcy on the ground in Rhodesia and high level of support for 
Smith and the UDI among the white population appeared to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of the British response. U.S. Consul Gebelt reported that the security forces were firmly 
in control and he believed that existing sanctions would not adversely affect the local 
economy in the immediate future. The Consul also noted that the measures sanctions had 
additionally served to unite the white community solidly behind Smith. He urged that 
contingency planning include the possibility of a relatively long tenure Smith 
government.96  
         On December 17 the British formally announced the embargo of oil to Rhodesia. 
The same day the the U.S. made a public announcement backing the UK decision. ‘The 
United States Government welcomes and supports the British decision to prohibit oil 
imports into Rhodesia. The United States fully recognizes the authority of HMG in this 
matter and therefore is advising all U.S. citizens and enterprises to comply with the terms 
of the British Order.’ It is important to note that the British only agreed to impose an 
embargo after LBJ had assured Wilson of the voluntary compliance of American oil 
companies.97 
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           The White House, however, was aware that it was unlikely that the announcement 
of an oil embargo would go far enough to satisfy the African bloc. NSC staffer Haynes 
noted that African attitudes towards London ranged from ‘profound disappointment to 
wild fury’. The extent to which this concerned the Johnson Administration is 
demonstrated by the fact that LBJ deemed it necessary to write a personal message to 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania regarding American support for the British position. 
In the letter, Johnson pointed out that the measures taken against Salisbury represented a 
‘broader range of economic restrictions than ever applied by the international community 
to a single country in peacetime.’ He urged support for the thorough application of 
sanctions and commented that it was difficult for him to fathom the apparent feeling 
among many Africans that London and Washington were not determined to end the 
UDI.98  
           While publicly supporting the British position, in private the White House doubted 
the effectiveness of the approach adopted by London. In late December, a CIA report 
observed that the British strategy of tightening diplomatic, economic and political 
pressures on Salisbury would fail to bring down the Rhodesian Government or erode 
support for Smith in the white community. Indeed, U.S. officials expressed scepticism 
over Wilson’s confidence that South Africa would not violate the embargo leading to the 
failure of sanctions.99 
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          The perceived ineffectiveness of the British measures led to concern over how this 
would impact U.S. involvement on the Rhodesia question. The CIA warned that as 
Britain became more deeply embedded in costly and difficult sanctions initiatives, 
Wilson would increasingly turn to Washington for aid including foreign exchange 
commitments and access to the U.S. copper stockpile. On a diplomatic level, as pointed 
out by Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann in a memorandum to LBJ, if the status 
quo was to continue ‘African resentment against the U.K. will inevitably rub off on the 
U.S.’100   
           The British continued to publicly and privately insist that the economic sanctions 
would soon end the rebellion in Southern Africa. In early January, at a special 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on Rhodesia, hosted by Nigeria, Wilson stated 
that the cumulative effects of economic sanctions would end UDI in a matter of weeks 
rather than months. The British subsequently announced new economic measures which 
included a total ban on imports and exports to or from Rhodesia.101 
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          While doubtful of the efficacy of sanctions Washington continued to back the UK 
position. By February 26, the Department of Commerce was able to announce that a 
license was now required for virtually all U.S. exports to Rhodesia. On March 18, there 
was a comprehensive ban on virtually any commodity of value to the Rhodesian 
economy.102 
        The actions taken by the White House against Rhodesia following UDI divided both 
the American public and political figures. Following UDI, African-American community 
leaders including Dr. Martin Luther King and A. Philip Randolph denounced the 
Rhodesian action as an attempt to perpetuate white supremacy and praised LBJ for the 
imposition of sanctions. Other political or religious groupings including the Catholic 
Association for International Peace, the National Council of Churches and the United 
States Youth Council also supported a strong stance against Salisbury. At the grassroots 
level, however, many Americans were supportive of UDI and condemned the use of U.S. 
power and influence to suppress Rhodesia national aspirations.103 
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       In Congress, opinions were also deeply split on the question of policy towards an 
‘independent’ Rhodesia. Congressmen Adam Clayton Powell (D-New York), Chairman 
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, and Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-New 
York) were fierce critics of UDI and urged the White House to consider stronger 
measures including a world economic boycott, severance of all diplomatic relations and 
Chapter 7 measures at the UN. Congressman Harold R. Gross of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee and Senator James Eastland remained strong supporters of Ian Smith 
and condemned any economic measures designed to hurt the Rhodesian Government. 
Indeed, on February 17, in the House of Representatives, Congressman Gross denounced 
the fact that ‘the friendly government of Rhodesia has been made the victim of an 
outrageous boycott by the US Government’.104 
            Following UDI, the White House supported the British sanctions initiative to end 
the rebellion on both strategic and moral grounds. Johnson also recognized that taking a 
strong stance on Rhodesia would enhance American prestige in Africa and garner support 
from liberal whites and African-Americans at home. While publicly supportive of the 
British position, privately however, LBJ doubted the effectiveness of sanctions. 
Washington backed London, though, in part due to a fear that if the UK lost control of the 
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situation then the Afro-Asian bloc, via the UN would seek to impose far more extreme 
measures which would escalate the simmering situation to a far more volatile level.   
 
Zambian airlift: Despite doubts over its effectiveness, LBJ offers U.S. assistance  
         In order to protect Western interests and urged by both London and Lusaka, 
Johnson, despite skepticism over its success, reluctantly agreed to American participation 
in an emergency airlift to alleviate Zambian oil shortages and expedite copper exports. It 
also aimed to bolster the local economy before a border closure with its pariah neighbor 
to the south which the British hoped would end the Rhodesian rebellion. 
         The White House was well aware of the potential repercussions of a Rhodesian UDI 
on the export of Zambian copper. The Katangan and Zambian copperbelt produced 
approximately one quarter of all free world copper. If this supply was to be cut off it 
would drive up the price of copper on the world market and lead to Britain suffering a 
substantial loss in foreign exchange earnings and a crisis of confidence in sterling. While 
the U.S. would be less adversely affected, nevertheless, the scarcity of copper could force 
the release of copper from the national stockpile and Washington would face increasing 
pressure from London for large scale financial assistance.105 
         UDI presented Lusaka with thorny economic, political and social problems. The 
Zambian economy was reliant on the good will of Salisbury. The Kariba Power Station 
on the Rhodesian side of the Zambezi provided the majority of Zambian hydroelectric 
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power while virtually all imports including oil and petroleum products arrived in Zambia 
via Rhodesian railroads. The immense wealth of the copperbelt could only be profitably 
harnessed through continued economic and trade ties with her southern neighbour. 
Copper exports flowed south via Rhodesia and the mines were dependent on coal from 
Wankie.106 
         Nevertheless, President Kaunda, a comparative moderate by African standards, 
faced pressure both externally from more radical Organization of African Unity leaders 
and internally from colleagues including Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe to take 
strong action against Salisbury. Kaunda, had hoped to build a peaceful non-racial society 
on the borders of white-ruled Africa and avoid the the racial violence suffered by other 
newly independent African nations. UDI threatened this noble experiment. Black African 
emotions ran high and many in the white community, who often played a key role in the 
civil service and transportation network, were sympathetic towards Salisbury. In a racial 
flare up in Livingstone, two hundred white railroad workers, many of whom were 
Rhodesian, went on strike bringing Zambian rail traffic almost to a standstill.107 
            Zambia was also becoming increasingly important to the British plan for a ‘quick 
kill’ to rapidly bring an end to the nettlesome rebellion. The idea was to intensively 
reinforce the Zambian economy with oil and POL products to allow it to survive on a 
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‘care and maintenance’ basis then Lusaka would close the border with Rhodesia. Wilson 
hoped that the slowly tightening diplomatic and economic pressures, especially the oil 
embargo, would lead to public pressure forcing Smith to either surrender or resign 
permitting the establishment of a government willing to return to legality on British 
terms. Zambian participation in sanctions was crucial as thirty percent of Rhodesian 
foreign revenue derived from sales of goods or services to its northern neighbour.108 
             As with the broader strategy of British sanctions, U.S. officials doubted the 
effectiveness of the plan. The NSC and CIA were pessimistic that the strategy would 
bring down the RF. There were also fears that a Zambian border closure would actually 
hurt Lusaka more than it would Salisbury. In a memorandum to LBJ, Komer expressed 
the fear that the ‘simple fact of the matter is that Ian Smith can strangle Zambia a lot 
faster than Britain can strangle Smith.’109 
            The situation was further exacerbated by the woeful Zambian contingency 
preparations. By the time of the UDI very little had been achieved by Lusaka to extricate 
itself from its dependence on Salisbury. Zambia still only had a marginal stockpile of 
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coal and almost no supplies of oil and petroleum. Furthermore, the Zambian Government 
had only just begun the to explore the possibility of developing alternative routes and 
sources of supply for its vital imports.110 
            Both London and Lusaka were eager for American involvement in an intensive 
program to support and reinforce the Zambian economy. As early as December, during 
talks with the State Department, UK officials raised the question of U.S. participation in 
an emergency air lift for Zambia which would serve to bring oil and petroleum into 
Zambia and facilitate the export of copper. Kaunda also urged the White House to assist 
and Zambian officials warned Washington that an economic collapse could lead to the 
establishment of a radical leftist government in Lusaka.111          
         During the talks in mid December with Wilson in Washington, LBJ agreed to help 
the British in a Zambian airlift. The agreement was on the understanding that the support 
was limited to a two month period while Zambia developed alternative supply routes and 
was by no means an open-ended undertaking. On December 30, the State Department 
formally announced American participation in the airlift.112 
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        On December 18, one day after the British oil embargo, Salisbury announced it had 
cut off oil supplies, but not broader trade ties, with Zambia. On December 19, the first 
RAF Britannia aircraft arrived in Lusaka carrying three thousand gallons of fuel. The 
Canadian Government also joined the airlift before the end of December. On New Year’s 
Day 1966, Smith, offered to accept crude oil for Lusaka, refine it and ship it north to 
Zambia. He further stated that he hoped the gesture would lead to restoration of normal 
relations between Lusaka and Salisbury. The American Consul in Salisbury considered 
the offer a ‘legitimate attempt to make statesmanlike gesture in critical situation’ and 
urged acceptance. The British Government, however, dismissed it as a ploy and Kaunda 
rejected the offer.113 
          Three days later, the U.S. joined the rescue mission. Washington had chartered two 
Boeing 707s from Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines. Each of the 
giant aircraft was capable of carrying almost thirty tons of cargo per trip. The White 
House also agreed to assist the British and Zambians in repairing and improving the 
Great North Road which connected central Zambia to the Tanzanian capital of Dar es 
Salaam on the Indian Ocean thus giving Lusaka an outlet to the sea.114    
        The timing of the potential embargo was of paramount importance. If Kaunda 
succumbed to domestic or external African pressure to close the border before Zambia 
was able to sustain itself without Rhodesian trade then Lusaka would face severe 
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economic dislocation and possible political unrest. U.S. officials also feared that 
Washington would be obligated to supply Lusaka with all its essential economic needs. 
The border closure would also prevent the export of Zambian copper. It was imperative 
that the embargo be imposed by Lusaka at a time when Rhodesia was already so 
weakened by the existing sanctions, especially oil sanctions, that the the Zambian action 
would simply become the final ‘coup de grace’ in ending UDI.115  
        As early as mid November 1965, U.S. Ambassador Good met with Kaunda and 
urged restraint regarding any moves to aggravate tensions with Salisbury. Following the 
Rhodesian decision to cut off Zambian oil supplies Kaunda first threatened a total trade 
embargo on Salisbury but following a personal warning from Secretary of State Rusk 
advising against this rash action merely issued a generic threat to take action if Rhodesia 
continued to threaten Zambian interests.116  
       In mid January, following the commencement of the airlift, the Zambian Government 
again threatened to close the border despite the economy not being sufficiently reinforced 
to survive such a move. Prime Minister Wilson flew to Lusaka to avert any precipitous 
actions. Johnson, in support of Wilson, wrote to Kaunda assuring him that the crunchtime 
with Salisbury was approaching but it was essential to get the timing correct. LBJ also 
reminded Kaunda of the vast efforts and expense undertaken by London and Washington 
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to place Zambia in the position of striking the final blow against Rhodesia. Again Kaunda 
backed down.117    
        In Washington, though, officials were also becoming anxious over the increasingly 
prolonged duration of the ‘quick kill’ and the spiralling cost of the airlift. Johnson, had 
initially approved a two million dollar expenditure for the Zambian contingency plan. As 
early as late December, before the operation had even begun, the projected outlay 
spiralled to five million dollars due to the airlift expenses proving more costly than 
anticipated and the U.S. agreement to help improve the overland transportation routes. 
Haynes counseled that the mission was proving to be ever more expensive and would be 
increasingly so as the British and Zambians would push for a longer commitment from 
Washington than the existing two month duration.118    
        On February 1, London requested that Washington continue the airlift until April 30. 
British officials assured their U.S. counterparts that Rhodesia would run out of oil and 
petroleum products by mid April which would cause a significant erosion in white 
Rhodesian confidence in the RF as Smith had declared that this would never happen. The 
White House agreed to support the UK and maintain the airlift until the end of April.119 
         On April 30, the U.S. oil airlift to Zambia ended. The Boeing 707s had completed 
around five hundred round-trip flights between the Congolese airports at Leopoldville 
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and Elisabethville (the POL was then trucked to Zambia) and transported nearly four 
million gallons of oil and petroleum products. The total cost to the U.S. Government was 
four and half million dollars. The airlift and increased oil tanker traffic on the Great 
North Road provided Lusaka with a much needed accumulation of petroleum stocks 
although rationing remained in place until August 1968 and oil flowed in through a newly 
laid pipeline from Dar es Salaam.120   
          The Rhodesian-Zambian border, however, was never closed and the UK hopes for 
a ‘quick kill’ failed to materialize. Indeed by April, it was becoming clear that the whole 
program of British sanctions was increasingly unlikely to achieve its intended goal of 
ending UDI. The British had not only underestimated the determination and solidarity of 
white Rhodesians when faced by external threats but also failed to counter the growing 
support that Salisbury received from her de facto allies in the ‘White Redoubt’.121 
          It is quite clear that London failed to appreciate the support that Smith and the RF 
had acquired in the white community. The white Rhodesians were isolated from London 
not only in terms of distance but also societal values and political outlook. Rhodesia was 
an insular society with an inherent suspicion, even hostility, of external forces especially 
the socialist government in Britain. As noted by Donal Lowry, many white Rhodesians 
were proud of their British heritage but disillusioned with London for allowing the 
decline of the British Empire. Smith and the RF reflected the values of white Rhodesian 
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society in general and had become representative of Rhodesian cultural and political 
beliefs.122 
          In the months following UDI and the imposition of the British sanctions, the 
reports from Consul Gebelt in Salisbury reflected a growing sense of solidarity among 
the white community and a unifying of the electorate behind the figure of Smith. As early 
as November 29 1965, Gebelt reported that the Rhodesian Government enjoyed the firm 
support of the white population and warned that the imposition of sanctions had helped 
create a ‘laager mentality’ which will do more to unite Rhodesians than anything else. 
The CIA also observed that there was a strong sense of cohesion in the white community 
and little evidence that this would change in the near future.123 
          During the first months of 1966, despite British assurances that the Smith 
government was close to collapse, Gebelt saw little evidence of a desire for regime 
change in Salisbury. He informed Washington that the imposition of sanctions had served 
to harden white support of the RF and even those who opposed UDI were now rallying 
behind Smith. By mid February, it was becoming increasingly clear to the White House 
that sanctions were not having the desired political effect on the Rhodesian electorate 
indeed NSC staffer Haynes offered a damning indictment of the sanctions program. He 
observed that not only had it failed to remove the RF from power but on the contrary ‘the 
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sharper the economic pinch, the more whites rally behind the Smith regime to the point 
where Smith is now supported by nearly all whites in Rhodesia.’.124 
           By the spring of 1966, it was also becoming increasingly clear that the sanctions, 
notably the oil embargo, were becoming increasingly ineffective due to Salisbury 
receiving extensive assistance from Lisbon and especially Pretoria. The Portuguese 
viewed Rhodesia as a barrier against communist infiltration and shared the concerns of 
Salisbury regarding the potential upheaval of a rapid transition to black majority rule in 
Rhodesia or indeed their own African territories. The ruling National Party government 
in South Africa, as noted by John Daniel, saw Rhodesia as an integral part of a ‘cordon 
sanitaire, a political and military buffer between the Republic and black-ruled Africa.’ 
South Africa also possessed long standing commercial, familial, religious and sporting 
ties to white Rhodesia and among the white South African electorate the Rhodesian 
Government enjoyed widespread support.125 
         Lisbon and Pretoria, while offering no overt declarations of support or recognition 
of the Rhodesian Government, were not prepared to commit their respective nations to 
participate in any form of embargoes or sanctions against Salisbury. South African Prime 
Minister Verwoerd stated that Pretoria would pursue a policy of ‘non-interference’ and 
maintain ‘normal and friendly’ relations with both London and Salisbury. At the UN 
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Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira was noncommittal about participation in 
sanctions and Lisbon emphasized its legal responsibilties as a seaboard entrepot to land 
locked states.126 
          On January 25, as oil shortages became severe in Rhodesia, Verwoerd gave a 
speech to the South African Parliament in which he interpreted the policy of ‘non-
interference’ as meaning that South Africa would not stop the continuation of normal 
trade with Rhodesia. On February 5, it was reported by the Rand Daily Mail that at least 
three or four fuel tankers carrying oil crossed the Beit Bridge into Rhodesia. Five days 
later Consul Gebelt informed Washington that fourteen tankers delivered oil from South 
Africa over a single twenty-four hour period. It was also noted that many of the tankers 
belonged to South African subsidiaries of American or British oil companies. Gebelt 
warned that if ‘such traffic becomes regularized, this critical weapon in British hands 
becomes badly blunted.’127 
            Over the month of February, oil from South Africa continued to breach the 
embargo in ever spiralling amounts. On February 28, Verwoerd, in a campaign speech 
defined normal trade as selling as much as you can. He stated that ‘Normal trade means 
that everyone in competition tries to sell as much as he can….If one sells more, it is not 
abnormal trade, but better trade.’128  
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          Portugal was also conspicuously violating sanctions. In early March, the South 
African press reported that large volumes of oil were being shipped by rail to Rhodesia 
from Lourenco Marques while the U.S. Consul General in Mozambique noted the 
construction of six large oil storage tanks in Beira built with Rhodesian finances. On 
March 3, as a result of the growing flow of oil from South Africa and Mozambique, the 
Rhodesian Government allowed a relaxation of the gasoline rationing.129   
          The White House viewed these developments with great concern. Washington was 
aware that the longer the Rhodesian crisis continued the greater the anger and frustration 
of the black African nations leading to increased pressure for more radical action. Both 
London and Washington, however, wished to avoid precipitating an economic or military 
confrontation with Pretoria through the use of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter or an oil 
blockade of South Africa. In March, U.S. representatives in Portugal and South Africa 
informally approached their host governments expressing grave concerns over the oil 
leakage and warned that pressures for Chapter 7 action would mount if the oil embargo 
continues to be circumvented.130 
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           On April 9, the UNSC passed Resolution 221 which declared that the oil 
importation to Rhodesia through Mozambique posed a Chapter 7 threat to world peace 
and called upon the British to use force if necessary to prevent any vessels carrying 
shipments of oil destined for Rhodesia from reaching Beira. The resolution also 
instructed the UK to arrest a Greek registered vessel, the Joanna V, which was currently 
in Beira harbour, if she discharged her cargo of oil. London had tabled the resolution two 
days previously in an obvious attempt to preempt the Afro-Asian group at the UN from 
pushing for more extreme measures. U.S. representatives supported the British position 
and voted in favour of the resolution.131 
          The UN resolution was met with anger and righteous indignation in both Salisbury 
and Lisbon. On April 16,  Smith castigated London for breaking its solemn pledges not to 
use force and accused the British of intervening militarily in Rhodesian affairs. Smith 
also stated that Rhodesia would not use any oil from the Joanna V as by so doing 
Salisbury could endanger the whole world by disturbing the peaceful conditions in 
Southern Africa. The Portuguese Government criticized Britain and the UN for making 
Lisbon the ‘scape goat’ for the failure of the oil sanctions given that the oil for Rhodesia 
was being supplied by international companies and the leak had originated in South 
Africa.132  
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           In terms of actually preventing the passage of oil to Rhodesia the UN resolution 
achieved little. The British were not prepared to hazard an economic or military 
confrontation with Pretoria and scrupulously avoided the inclusion of South Africa in the 
resolution. It is also worth noting that while London asked the UN for permission to use 
force against vessels suspected of carrying oil to Beira the resolution made no mention of 
the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques which would have interfered with South 
African oil imports. Pretoria continued to allow oil to flow across its northern border and, 
as pointed out by Smith himself, Portugal continued to supply Salisbury from its refinery 
in Lourenco Marques. The oil embargo had failed and Rhodesia continued to defy the 
will of the majority of the international community.133    
           American participation in the Zambian airlift was motivated by three important 
factors. The White House wished to avoid the economic repercussions of a loss of nearly 
25% of free world copper, wanted to avoid the political collapse of a comparatively 
moderate African government and while skeptical of the British plan for a ‘quick kill’, 
was nonetheless prepared to support its ally in London, at least for a limited period. 
Washington, however, was not prepared to countenance actions that could lead to an 
economic or military confrontation with South Africa thus threatening U.S. and Western 
interests. 
       . 
The Rho-dents: Salisbury’s quasi-diplomacy causes problems for the White House 
            In the early months of 1966, while the oil embargo was collapsing, Rhodesia was 
also posing a domestic headache for President Johnson. The Smith government stirred up 
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controversy by establishing the Rhodesian Information Office (RIO) in Washington DC, 
posing an awkward problem that the White House was unable to overcome. The inability 
of the LBJ Administration to end the operations of the RIO led to criticism both 
internationally from black Africa and also domestically from liberals and civil rights 
groups.  
       Prior to November 11 1965, Salisbury, had been diplomatically represented in the 
U.S. by the Office of the Minister of Southern Rhodesian Affairs at the British Embassy 
in Washington. The Rhodesians who staffed the office, including Senior Counselor 
Kenneth Towsey and Henry J. C. Hooper, were fully accredited members of British 
Embassy staff holding diplomatic passports and full privileges. Nevertheless, on October 
18, the Southern Rhodesian Minister Bentley held a press conference in which he stated 
that he expected to be asked to leave the U.S. following the announcement of a UDI.134 
           Following UDI, the Rhodesians on the British Embassy staff became ‘out of 
status’ for immigration purposes and lost their diplomatic privileges. Former Minister 
Bentley and Counselor Towsey were further informed by the Rhodesian Affairs 
representative at the State Department, Edward W. Mulcahy, that there would be no 
special arrangements to maintain minimum contact between the U.S. and Rhodesian 
Governments’ as the current administration in Salisbury was not recognized by 
Washington. Towsey and Hooper, however, remained in the U.S. In January, the 
American Consul in Salisbury informed the State Department that if Towsey was to be 
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deported then reliable sources had warned him that the Rhodesian Government would 
close down the U.S. Consulate or expel three members of its staff. Either action would 
accord Salisbury an authority or a de facto recognition that Washington was reluctant to 
grant.135    
           On February 4, Hooper filed registration for the RIO with the Department of 
Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Hooper himself was named as an 
agent of the ‘Department of External Affairs, Ministry of Information, Government of 
Rhodesia’. Former Counselor Towsey also became a member of the newly established 
RIO. The RIO was located at the same address as the former Office of Southern 
Rhodesian Affairs, 2852 McGill Terrace NW Washington DC. The Rhodesians, despite 
having had their diplomatic privileges withdrawn, nevertheless, continued to carry their 
British diplomatic passports.136 
           The RIO, almost immediately began to disseminate information, indeed often 
slanted propaganda in favor of Salisbury. The office also began to attract support from 
groupings on the extreme right of the political sphere including Goldwater Republicans, 
the John Birch Society, Dixiecrats and the Liberty Lobby. NSC staffer Haynes 
commented that the RIO enjoyed the backing of a ‘most vocal and unsavory bunch of 
right-wing reactionary types’. It is worth noting, however, that Hooper himself told U.S. 
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officials that he was dismayed by attempts of American racists to associate themselves 
with the RIO. He further asserted that Salisbury could not win the propaganda war with 
London if the public were aware of these type of connections.137 
              On February 12, the Department of State issued a public statement regarding the 
establishment of the RIO. It was made clear that the registration of the office with the 
Department of Justice in no way implied U.S. approval of the activities of the agent, 
political faction or regime that it represented. The statement also reiterated U.S. non-
recognition of the Rhodesian Government and the acknowledgement of Britain as the 
sovereign power.138 
              The U.S. statement, though, did little to appease the outraged reaction of the 
black African nations. Ghana condemned the opening of the RIO while Zambia presented 
an official protest to the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka criticizing what it saw as the lack of any 
‘definite statement against the propaganda center opened on behalf of the rebel regime’ 
and hoped it did not become a step towards de facto recognition. African ambassadors in 
Washington also met at the residence of Zambian Ambassador Soko to consider the issue 
of the RIO.139 
            Both the White House and the State Department were concerned by the African 
reaction. Officials were instructed to use the statement of February 12 as the basis of their 
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replies to any protests and highlight that the registration of the RIO with the Justice 
Department did not signify U.S. approval and that Washington did not recognize the 
regime in Salisbury. On February 22, Assistant Secretary of State Williams met with the 
African ambassadors to explain the situation and clarify the position of the U.S. as laid 
out by the earlier public statement.140 
           The establishment of the RIO also excited considerable interest from media outlets 
and angered domestic civil rights groups. On February 17, the picketing of the RIO by an 
albeit small group of African-Americans received coverage in both the press and 
television. Interviews with the protestors and Hooper were published in newspapers and 
shown on news networks. Civil rights organizations stridently condemned the U.S. 
Government for permitting the founding of the RIO. In one letter to Johnson, Charles 
Kindle, Chairman of Foreign Affairs for the United Negro Protest Committee, stated that 
by ‘allowing the Rhodesian rebels to establish an information center in Washington, 
D.C., the United States is indirectly encouraging the dissemination of false news about 
racial superiority.’141        
             In the Johnson Administration, opinions differed greatly over the best approach 
to adopt to the RIO and the Rhodesians who staffed it. U.S. Ambassador to the UN 
Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Legal Adviser to the State 
Department Leonard Meeker all advocated immediate deportation of the Rhodesians. It 
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would not only serve to hinder the effectiveness of the RIO but send a strong 
psychological message to Salisbury and the global community. This position was also 
shared by Haynes who urged the deportation of these ‘bothersome Rhodesian residents’ 
or ‘Rho-dents’.142    
              A number of senior figures, however, contested such a move. Under Secretary of 
State Mann argued that the U.S. should not take such action as the registered agents of 
other non-recognized regimes including Communist China and Cuba were allowed to 
remain and establish similar offices. Assistant Secretary of State Williams, certainly no 
friend of Rhodesia, also opposed deportation on the grounds that it could lead the 
Rhodesian Government to force the closure of the U.S. Consulate which provided 
information on the ground and support for Americans in Rhodesia.143 
              In a compromise agreement it was decided that Under Secretary Mann would 
send a letter to Hooper informing him that RIO would be permitted to continue to operate 
provided it did not portray itself as representing the Government of Rhodesia but instead 
a foreign principal or group. Hooper was reminded, though, that he and his colleagues 
had no official capacity or legal immigration status in the U.S.144  
            On February 28, Hooper replied to the Under Secretary stating that ‘it has not 
been my intention to lay claim to any official capacity in the United States, and my action 
in filing a registration statement in terms of the Foreign Agents Registration Act was 
taken on the supposition that no such capacity was in present circumstances available to 
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me.’ Rhodesian supporters in the U.S. associated the warning letter to Hooper with a 
potential closure of the RIO and urged the White House not to engage in such an 
action.145 
           The RIO, despite the fears of its supporters, remained in place and continued to 
promote the regime in Salisbury. No further steps were taken to act directly against the 
‘Rho-dents’. Towsey, was promoted to run the office in March 1967 and later that year 
was granted permanent resident status. In March 1968, Hooper also submitted an 
application for permanent residency. While under review, the UNSC passed Resolution 
253 which required all states to prevent entry of persons ordinarily resident in Southern 
Rhodesia as well as those who have encouraged or will encourage actions of the Smith 
government. The status of Hooper, however, remained ‘an applicant for adjustment of 
status to permanent resident’ and he did not face deportation. The RIO was also able to 
circumvent the further financial restrictions imposed by the UNSC resolution by 
withdrawing from U.S. bank accounts funded by groups who transmitted money to 
Rhodesia for charitable purposes and were subsequently refunded by Salisbury in 
Rhodesian dollars.146 
            The establishment and continued existence of the RIO led to repeated criticism 
from both international and domestic sources. It is also important as it demonstrated the 
ability of the Rhodesian Government to circumvent the restrictions placed upon it and the 
limited options available to the White House when Rhodesia used the freedoms inherent 
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in American democracy to engage in quasi-diplomacy by establishing an unofficial yet 
clearly representative office of the pariah regime located in Washington DC itself. 
 
Spring of 1966: LBJ continues to back London and reassures black Africa of U.S. 
opposition to white minority rule 
 
           As noted earlier, by April 1966, it had become clear to U.S. officials that the 
program of British sanctions would not achieve its stated goal of bringing down the 
Smith government in Salisbury. Furthermore, the White House was aware that the longer 
the crisis dragged on the greater the determination of the RF regime to push forward 
alone or seek any settlement on its own terms.  
         The Johnson Administration was also cognizant of the fact that the U.S. could not 
realistically avoid involvement in the Rhodesian issue and it was in the best interests of 
Washington to aid the British in achieving a internationally accepted settlement. 
Furthermore, the British objectives could not be achieved without tangible U.S. support 
and despite the ‘fiction’ that Rhodesia was a British problem, the substantial American 
support of the UK linked Washington and London together on the Rhodesian question.147  
            In the view of the State Department as well as the CIA, the continued existence of 
the white minority regime constituted a threat to U.S. prestige and influence both in 
Africa and on the world stage. By the spring of 1966, the Organization of African Unity 
had become increasingly focused on the problems of Southern Africa especially the 
eradication of the vestiges of colonial rule. The impotence of black African nations, 
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however, when confronted by the ‘staying power of white Rhodesia’ led to frustration 
and even embarrassment when compared to the intractable economic problems of the 
independent states and the stagnation of the liberation movements.148 
           Given the already substantive U.S. involvement, its global role as the preeminent 
Western power and anti-colonial heritage, any unsatisfactory outcome would have a 
negative impact on Washington’s relations with black ruled Africa. The collective 
strength of the Organization of African Unity gave the thirty-six member states a 
powerful voice among the international community and at global forums such as the UN 
General Assembly. U.S. officials, notably diplomats at the State Department and UN, 
feared the diplomatic and economic implications of antagonizing the Afro-Asian bloc 
especially given the Cold War gridlock at the UN Security Council. The White House 
was urged to give a high priority to ensuring that American policy meshed with African 
aspirations especially bringing an end to white minority rule in Southern Africa.149    
           On April 12, U.S. officials held a Senior Interdepartmental meeting focusing on 
Rhodesia. It was agreed that the U.S. should continue to play a constructive role in 
helping to create conditions that would lead to a speedy and acceptable political 
settlement between London and Salisbury. The decision was also made, however, that 
America should avoid actions including military or a further escalation of sanctions 
which would increase Washington’s involvement in the crisis.150     
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            In late April, the British and Rhodesian Governments’ announced that they were 
prepared to begin informal talks without preconditions to ascertain if there existed a basis 
for formal negotiations. It was illustrative of the growing importance of Anglo-American 
unity on the Rhodesian issue that Wilson apprised Johnson of this development before 
publicly announcing it to his own parliament. LBJ assured Wilson of his support in 
peacefully settling the ‘critical problem’.151 
             The U.S. was aware, however, that Zambian President Kaunda was deeply 
angered by the British move as he opposed the talks and feared a British compromise 
deal allowing continued white minority rule. This uneasiness was also shared by civil 
rights groups within the U.S.. The Portuguese Government, though, was delighted by the 
resumption of talks. President Salazar wrote a personal message to LBJ stating that 
Lisbon was advocating a position of moderation to Salisbury and urged Washington to 
press London to be accomodating during the talks.152 
             The British-Rhodesian talks, though, failed to make any tangible progress. 
London insisted on a end to UDI then a test of acceptability of the Rhodesian people on 
an agreed consititutional settlement. For its part, Salisbury sought to settle the 
constitutional question then consider renouncing UDI provided the British gave 
assurances that independence would be granted on the basis of that constitutional 
formula. Any testing of public opinion would take place under the present Rhodesian 
Government.153  
                                                 
151 534. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, London, April 27, 1966, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Volume XXIV, Africa and Good, UDI, 150-152. 
152 Letter to President Johnson from Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, May 4 1966, Gen CO 250 Rhodesia, WHCF, Box 65, LBJ Library, Letter 
to President Johnson from Prime Minister Salazar, May 11 1966, LBJ Library, RAC Project Number NLJ-
004R-47-2-2-3 and Good, UDI, 155-156. 
153 Good, UDI, 160. 
 
 
90 
 
            It was also clear, that the Rhodesians were in no mood to make any significant 
concessions. Prior to the opening of the talks, the Chairman of the RF, Lt. Col. William 
Knox, publicly declared that Smith would not let white Rhodesia down and would never 
surrender independence. On June 21, Smith himself told the annual congress of the 
Rhodesian National Farmers Union that the ‘last thing we are going to do is throw in the 
sponge’. In early July, Prime Minister Wilson announced a pause in the talks to consider 
the respective positions.154 
             While the talks in London and Salisbury dragged on to an unsatisfactory 
conclusion, in Washington, the Johnson Administration was determined to maintain good 
relations and reaffirm U.S. interest and support for black Africa. Of particular 
importance, especially following the British failure to swiftly end UDI was to publicly 
reiterate American opposition to white minority governance in Southern Africa and 
commitment to the establishment of majority rule.155 
             On May 26, the White House held a reception for African ambassadors to 
celebrate the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity. In his address, 
Johnson stated that it was the ‘inalienable right’ of all people to control their destiny and 
enjoy the benefits of self-government. He criticized the ‘repugnant…narrow and 
outmoded policy which in some parts of Africa permits the few to rule at the expense of 
the many.’ LBJ noted that as part of the American national tradition, Washington cannot 
condone perpetuation of racial or political injustice anywhere in the world and supported 
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self-determination and majority rule globally and furthermore these principles shape U.S. 
policy on Rhodesia.156 
            As U.S. officials had hoped, the speech was enthusiatically received by black 
African leaders and was praised by UN Secretary General U. Thant. The British press 
gave positive reviews while the USSR, in a rare display of unity with Washington, was 
also supportive, though Moscow hedged its approval by saying it would welcome the 
remarks if backed up by actions too. Unsurprisingly, the speech received heavy criticism 
in the Afrikaans press of South Africa. In the influential Die Burger, in an editorial 
entitled ‘America Discovers A New Deep South’, the paper condemned the projection of 
American domestic civil rights to white controlled Africa as ‘a very dangerous 
view…and to a false parallelism between the American Negro Problem and white-black 
relations in southern Africa’.157 
            In the view of most American media and press outlets, the most important fact 
was that President Johnson had made such a speech at all. This of itself signified a major 
shift in the U.S. approach to white ruled Africa and was generally well received. In the 
Chicago News, though, conservative commentator, William F. Buckley Jr. launched a 
scathing criticism of LBJ’s approach to Rhodesia and South Africa. He noted the 
hypocrisy of censuring the nations for white political control when such governance had 
brought material progress and benefits to all Rhodesians whether black and white. He 
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also stated that the black majority in Rhodesia enjoyed greater freedom than in almost all 
the states of black Africa many of which were also dominated by black racism under the 
guise of ‘Africa for the Africans’.158  
             As noted by the New York Times, however, whether American commentators 
agreed or disagreed with LBJ on white minority rule in Africa, the salient fact remained 
that the speech underlined the Johnson Administration’s interest in Africa and publicly 
aligned the U.S., at least theoretically, on the side of majority rule and self determination 
for all the indigenous peoples of Southern Africa.159     
         The actions of the White House during the spring of 1966 reflected a growing 
realization that Washington could not avoid involvement in the Rhodesian crisis and that 
the best approach was to support British efforts for a globally acceptable settlement. The 
LBJ Administration was also cognizant of the need to maintain strong diplomatic and 
economic ties with the newly independent African states and recognized that any 
agreement unacceptable to black Africa could prove prejudical to American interests. It 
was thus important for Johnson to demonstrate a steadfast commitment to the cause of 
majority rule in Southern Africa.  
   
As diplomacy fails the White House turns to UN sanctions 
            The fall of 1966 saw increased U.S. involvement in the Rhodesian question 
culminating in support for mandatory UN sanctions on the rebel regime.  The White 
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House, remained eager to see a swift resolution to the crisis and supported British efforts 
to obtain an equitable settlement at the talks on HMS Tiger. Following the failure of the 
negotiations, Washington, despite doubts over its effectiveness and domestic opposition, 
backed the British resolution at the UN which successfully imposed selective economic 
sanctions on Salisbury.     
              On September 6, the annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference began 
in London. The African delegation at the conference was determined to press the UK to 
use force against the Smith regime, to declare categorically and unconditionally that there 
would be no independence before majority rule, known by the acronym NIBMAR, and 
also to support a resolution of comprehensive mandatory sanctions at the UN Security 
Council.160  
             The British Government itself sought two broad objectives at the conference. The 
first was to hold the Commonwealth together, the second was to keep the Rhodesian 
problem, as much as possible under the control of Britain and away from the more radical 
African nations. London was not prepared to consider the use of force, unequivocably 
commit to NIBMAR or seek comprehensive mandatory sanctions at the UN.161 
             At the conference, despite vociferous criticism from the African nations, Wilson 
was able to achieve a compromise agreement. First, the British would prepare a 
settlement proposal as an ultimatum to Rhodesia. This would include the termination of 
UDI, the appointment of a broad based representive administration with which the British 
would negotiate a new constitution acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole as 
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well as the world community. Secondly, if this last chance was rejected by Salisbury then 
the British would support selective mandatory sanctions at the UN Security Council 
against Rhodesia. It was also agreed that if the Commonwealth nations supported these 
limited sanctions then London would withdraw all previous offers made to the 
Rhodesians and publicly declare no independence before majority rule.162 
            On September 7, Foreign Minister Stewart met with Assistant Secretary of State 
Sisco in Washington to request an American assessment of the feasability of a UNSC 
resolution on Rhodesia. The resolution would include mandatory sanctions on the 
importation of certain Rhodesian products including pig iron and chrome as well as the 
transit of petroleum products for Rhodesia through Mozambique but not South Africa. 
Stewart stated that the British goal was to take the minimum action necessary at the UN 
to hold the Commonwealth together ‘without risking UK vital economic interests’ and 
specifically wished to avoid being forced into oil sanctions on SA leading to economic 
warfare with Pretoria.163 
           The Department of State response was that the U.S. would be prepared to support 
limited sanctions on pig iron and possibly chrome. Regarding petroleum, officials 
believed that such a resolution was unlikely to impress the Commonwealth and would 
fail pass the UNSC as South Africa was the main conduit. Indeed, the British proposal 
would probably elicit an immediate response to broaden the resolution to include South 
Africa along with Mozambique. In such an event the U.S. was not prepared to risk the 
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international odium of vetoing a potential UNSC resolution which extended the sanctions 
to cover oil transit from South Africa.164 
            It is clear that Wilson wished to ensure that London and Washington remained 
united on the Rhodesian question and any attempt to expand sanctions to include South 
Africa. In a message on September 23, Wilson reminded LBJ of the repercussions of 
imposing sanctions on Pretoria. In his view, this would lead to an economic war with the 
subsequent excessive damage to British, American and Western interests as well as 
possible armed conflict. Wilson also stated that the UK alone could not be expected to 
veto a UN resolution involving South Africa. In an obvious attempt to induce the White 
House to greater participation, Wilson concluded that ‘I think these are really our joint 
troubles; and if there is anything you feel you can usefully do now, we may be able to 
avoid finding ourselves jointly in a much more difficult situation which may confront us 
within the coming months’ and urged LBJ to remind Pretoria that a Rhodesian settlement 
would be in their own best interests.165 
          Johnson, aware of the necessity of a swift and internationally acceptable political 
settlement, informed Wilson that while the U.S. was not prepared to have direct contact 
with the Rhodesian Government the U.S. Ambassador in South Africa would reiterate 
support for British policy and remind Pretoria that a settlement was in its own political 
and economic interests. LBJ also assured Wilson that if ‘Smith throws away his last 
chance, you may depend on our full support for the moves spelled out in your letter. 
Specifically, we will support your withdrawal of all previous offers to Smith, your 
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adoption of a position of no independence before majority rule, and your proposal of 
limited mandatory economic sanctions in the Security Council.’166   
             By late November the prospects of a settlement looked bleak indeed. British 
efforts to gain Rhodesian agreement for the proposals had proven unsuccessful. Smith 
insisted that Salisbury would only restore normal relations after a final settlement was 
signed and he would be ‘mad’ to give up independence for an unknown constitution. On 
November 4, Rhodesia formally rejected the British proposals. In the House of 
Commons, on November 22, Wilson declared that he would only meet Smith once 
‘Rhodesia has returned to constitutional rule’.167 
             The Prime Minister, however, was clearly prepared to be more flexible than his 
public statement indicated. Two days after his speech Commonwealth Secretary Herbert 
Bowden was back in Salisbury. Smith offered minor concessions including the use of the 
1961 Constitution during the transition period until the test of acceptability was 
completed and a new constitution approved. This would of course leave the Rhodesian 
Government in complete control but offered Wilson the appearance of a return to legality. 
On November 29, the British Government formally offered to meet with Smith for talks 
on the battleship HMS Tiger off Gibraltar. It is noteworthy, in terms of the importance of 
U.S. support that Wilson informed LBJ of his decision before telling his own 
parliament.168 
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              On December 2, talks between Wilson and Smith began on board the HMS 
Tiger. On the subject of a new constitution for Rhodesian independence, the discussions 
progressed positively and the two parties were able to concur on a broad consitutional 
settlement including unimpeded progress towards majority rule, immediate improvement 
in the political status of black Rhodesians and guarantees against retrogressive 
amendments to constitution. Following the advent of majority rule, the white minority 
would be assured of a ‘blocking quarter’ in parliament to assure the protection of their 
rights.169 
             The Tiger talks, however, fell apart on the question of the mechanism for the 
implemention of the constitutional agreement. At the heart of the problem was the issue 
of which party would possess military and political power in Rhodesia during the period 
of British sovereignty before the granting of independence. Wilson insisted on the 
dissolution of the existing Rhodesian Government and the establishment of a broad based 
government appointed by Governor Gibbs for the interim period. Gibbs would also have 
legislative power during the interim period although would act on the advice of the 
ministers. For Smith, this was intolerable as it amounted to a ‘surrender and submission 
of power’ and would leave the British in complete control. The Rhodesian leader 
informed Wilson that while he would sign the document as a correct record of 
proceedings he needed to return to Salisbury to consult his colleagues.170 
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              Following the departure of Smith, Wilson wrote to LBJ expressing his 
frustration at the ‘strangely tantalizing--yet again--ultimately disappointing’ meeting. He 
claimed that the British had offered a better deal on the independence constitution, return 
to legality and external guarantees than the Rhodesian Government deserved but 
nevertheless failed as ‘we are dealing with a very devious and schizophrenic personality’. 
Wilson noted that the South African Government was leaning heavily on Smith to accept 
the settlement and proposed that LBJ send a message to Pretoria urging continued 
pressure on Salisbury.171      
              Secretary of State Rusk advised the White House not to become directly 
involved in the settlement especially as the U.S. had not been provided with substantive 
details of the exact agreement. It was determined instead that Rusk himself would send a 
general message to the South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller urging in broad 
terms to encourage a settlement. The note to Muller emphasized that the U.S. had not 
seen the text of the agreement  but stated that ‘If this is the fair and equitable settlement it 
appears to be, I believe that the interests of all of us lie in Mr. Smith’s accepting it. If you 
agree, I would urge you to try to convince him of the wisdom of reaching agreement with 
the British.’172 
              On the evening of December 4, the British Cabinet accepted the working 
document that had been produced by the talks on the Tiger. In Salisbury, however, the 
Rhodesian Cabinet remained locked in discussions over the settlement throughout the 
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day. Finally, Smith announced to the press that while the Rhodesian Government was 
prepared to accept the constitutional principles it could not accept a return to British rule 
before the new constitution was secured and voted on by the people. He concluded with 
the laconic statement; ‘and so, ladies and gentlemen, as you might have guessed, the fight 
goes on.’173  
            Following the Rhodesian rejection of the Tiger Proposals the British moved 
swiftly to seek UN sanctions. On December 8, Foreign Secretary Brown tabled a 
resolution for selective mandatory economic sanctions on Salisbury. The goal, according 
to Brown was ‘to reduce Rhodesian economic activity and prospects to a point where 
even the most stubborn members of the Rhodesian Front party could see that there would 
be no tolerable economic future for their country if their present policy were pursued.’174 
            On December 12, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Goldberg made a strong statement 
of support for the British draft and stated the Washington was supportive of the need for 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Intelligence reports, however, indicated 
serious reservations over the efficacy of mandatory sanctions especially the use of 
Chapter VII in circumstances where enforcement was almost impossible. As noted by 
Good, though, it was difficult to identify a better alternative and as a result Washington 
continued to back the British position at the UN.175  
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           The draft resolution did not go far enough for the African bloc at the UN. On 
December 13, Uganda, Nigeria and Mali, on behalf of the African nations, submitted to 
the UNSC proposals to amend the British resolution to include a comprehensive oil 
embargo, sanctions on Rhodesian coal and manufactured goods as well as a reminder that 
‘appropriate action’ would be taken against violators of mandatory sanctions. It also 
called upon the UK to declare categorically that it would not grant independence to 
Rhodesia until majority rule was achieved. London indicated that if necessary it would 
not oppose the oil provision but the majority of the other amendments were 
unacceptable.176 
         On December 16, the UNSC passed Resolution 232 which imposed selective 
mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia. The resolution represented a compromise 
deal between London and the African bloc. It determined that the situation in Rhodesia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, embargoed Rhodesian export 
commodities including asbestos, chrome, meat, sugar and tobacco, and prohibited any 
activity promoting the supply of arms, military equipment, aircraft, motor vehicles and 
oil. In a veiled warning to South Africa, the resolution also reminded member states that 
a failure or refusal to implement the sanctions constituted a violation of the UN 
Charter.177  
          In Rhodesia, UNSC Resolution 232 was met with anger and criticism. In his 
memoirs, Smith noted that Salisbury wrote to the UN challenging the decision on the 
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grounds that if Rhodesia was not an independent state but a part of the UK then how 
could Britain under international law impose sanctions on itself? Equally, if the UN 
imposed sanctions on Rhodesia that must represent a de facto form of recognition in 
which case Salisbury had a right of a hearing at the Security Council. U.S. Ambassador 
Goldberg, however, explained the U.S. legal rationale for supporting the resolution by 
stating that Rhodesia was not a ‘state’ recognized by any nation and the UN resolution 
was not intervention but action taken at request of London which possessed the legitimate 
legal authority over Rhodesia.178   
           On January 5 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11322, which, 
under Section 5 of the UN Participation Act, enacted into law the provisions of the UN 
resolution. It is worth noting, however, that both the British and U.S. implementation of 
the resolution did not affect the operations of foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled by 
their nationals. The embargo, therefore, did not extend to U.S. or UK oil subsidiaries in 
South Africa thus helping to avert an overt clash with Pretoria. A Department of Treasury 
press release also stated that to avoid cases of ‘undue hardship’ Treasury would licence 
imports which had been exported from Rhodesia prior to December 16 1966 and in 
general issue a licence when payment has been made by Americans prior to January 5 
1967.179    
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           The issuance of Executive Order 11322 led to intense criticism of the White House 
from both political leaders and the American public. Former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson condemned them as entirely inappropriate for dealing with Rhodesian internal 
difficulties while Congressman Hall pointed out that Rhodesia had engaged in no hostile 
actions against the U.S. and constituted no threat to world peace which would be the only 
justification for sanctions under the UN Charter. He further observed that there were no 
sanctions against North Vietnam and that Washington continued to trade with communist 
nations who aid the North Vietnamese. On a broader level, criticism from Capitol Hill 
centered around fears that U.S. support for mandatory economic sanctions could lead to 
use of military force and Washington should not have helped out London because of their 
less than satisfactory performance on Vietnam.180 
          Presidential correspondence also indicated concern and anger regarding the 
imposition of U.S. sanctions on Rhodesia. Bruce L. Odou, a city councilman from 
Montebello, California wrote that it appeared that Washington had declared ‘war’ on 
Salisbury and reminded LBJ of the great American tradition of non-interference of the 
internal affairs of any other nation. Spencer McCallie from Chattanooga, Tennessee, 
stated that he had never written to a President before but felt obliged to do so as he 
fervently believed that U.S. policy toward Rhodesia was all wrong.181   
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          In terms of the effectiveness of the UN sanctions, the CIA warned the White House 
that they were unlikely to achieve the desired result of bringing down the Smith 
government or ending the rebellion. The agency stated that South Africa and Portugal 
would continue to support Salisbury and this would allow the Rhodesian economy to 
function at close to present levels. The report also pointed out that there was a worldwide 
demand for Rhodesian agricultural and mineral products and that UK companies, 
communist nations and Afro-Asian states had surreptiously been trading with Rhodesia 
since UDI. Furthermore, Salisbury had now gained experience in sanctions busting and 
increased international pressure would merely stiffen white resolve and rally support 
behind Smith.182 
           The CIA analysis would prove to be correct. South African Prime Minister B.J. 
Vorster stated Pretoria would not participate in sanctions whether voluntarily or under 
compulsion while Lisbon continued to insist on a policy of neutrality. While the 
Rhodesian tobacco and sugar industries suffered damage, mineral exports remained a key 
part of the economy. Indeed, according to Smith, chrome from his home town of 
Selukwe, was exported to the USSR which then sold an inferior grade of its own chrome 
to the U.S. at double the price. Rhodesian imports and exports continued to flow through 
Mozambique or South Africa, albeit at a price, and customers included British and 
Japanese companies. In the words of Good, ‘It was not for nothing that grateful 
Rhodesians displayed car stickers reading ‘Muito obrigado, Mocambique’ or ‘Dankie 
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Suid Afrika’. Occasionally a cynical Rhodesian would add ‘Dankie Suid Afrika, plus 10 
per cent’.’183  
          In Washington, officials were concerned by the prospect of a further prolonged 
period of de facto Rhodesian ‘independence’ potentially leading to a reduction of U.S. 
prestige in Africa, racial conflict and communist meddling, but saw no feasible option for 
the U.S. other than to continue to support the British position. and provide London with 
the maximum leverage to reach an acceptable settlement. At a NSC meeting on January 
25, it was agreed that economic sanctions were not going to succeed and there was no 
realistic way to stop South Africa from continuing to aid Rhodesia. The decision was 
reached that the best policy for the U.S. was to urge the British to resume negotiations 
with Rhodesia and to use American leverage to try to bring the parties together and 
achieve a viable agreement.184   
             In Rhodesia itself, the year of 1967 brought some ominous signs of the beginning 
of a long term insurgency by the black Nationalist groups. In July, approximately two 
hundred guerrillas crossed the Zambezi and engaged in fighting with the Rhodesian 
security forces. While the military were able to stop the incursion it took nearly a month 
to do so and seven Rhodesian security personnel were killed. On October 25, the Minister 
for Law and Order, Lardner-Burke told the Rhodesian Parliament that the raid signified 
‘a serious threat and probably a mounting one, and we must be prepared.’185 
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              As the year progressed, South Africa became increasingly involved in the 
Rhodesian counterinsurgency efforts. The intervention of Pretoria was based not only on 
a shared belief in a white controlled Africa but also concerns that if Rhodesia fell to a 
radical black nationalist movement then South Africa would have lost an integral part of 
its own cordon sanitaire. The anxieties of the South African leadership were heightened 
by the fact that the guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia were joint operations conducted by 
both the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)  and Umkonto we Sizwe, the armed 
wing of the South African ANC.186 
             In September, the number of South African ‘riot police’ units in the Zambezi 
Valley rose to two thousand men. In response to a formal diplomatic complaint by 
London over the South African presence, Vorster responded that the units had been 
dispatched at the request of Salisbury and would remain as long as necessary. The 
Rhodesian Government policies on racial issues also appeared to be falling in line with 
Pretoria. This was demonstrated by the the passage of the Muncipal Amendment Act 
which segregated recreational facilities and the Residential Protection Bill which 
prevented Asians and ‘Coloreds’ from owning property in white areas. Black Africans 
had already been excluded by the Land Apportionment Act.187 
            Despite the increase in insurgent activity, the CIA advised the White House that 
the liberation movements in Rhodesia stood little chance of success in the near future. 
The intelligence community believed that neither ZAPU nor the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) possessed sufficient indigenous support, suffered from 
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factionalism and were unlikely to expand insurgency operations sufficiently to shake 
determination of the Rhodesian Government. In contrast, the white minority regime 
retained a steely resolve to remain in power and possessed the necessary military might to 
destroy any black nationalist threat to its security.188         
            The success of the Rhodesian regime in maintaining white minority rule and de 
facto independence increasingly concerned the Johnson Administration. The prolonged 
existence of the Smith government in Salisbury was seen as potentially sparking a racial 
conflict in the region, encouraging communist intervention and was clearly detrimental to 
U.S. interests in  black Africa. The White House therefore supported British efforts to 
obtain an acceptable agreement at the Tiger talks and backed the UK on the question of 
mandatory sanctions. While U.S. officials expressed reservations over the effectiveness 
of the embargo, the White House recognized there was no realistic alternative other than 
offering political and economic leverage to the British in hope of attaining an equitable 
and internationally supported solution.       
 
The Salisbury hangings lead to further sanctions   
            On March 6 1968, three black African inmates were hung in Salisbury Central 
Prison. The executions caused outrage in the international community and vociferous 
condemnation of Rhodesia. In Washington, the Johnson Administration recognized the 
moral and strategic necessity of a UN response to punish Salisbury and assauge the anger 
of the Afro-Asian bloc. The White House, however, wished to avoid the imposition of 
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radical or unenforceable measures or steps that would place UN punitive actions in 
conflict with the U.S. judicial system and provoke an major domestic controversy.189 
           Two of the condemned men, Victor Mlambo and James Dhlamini, had been 
members of a ZANU guerrilla band known as the Crocodile Gang. On July 5 1964, near 
Umtali, Mlambo and Dhlamini had murdered a white farmer named Petrus Johannes 
Oberholzer. The two guerrillas had been convicted and sentenced to death in December 
1964. The third prisoner, Duly Shadreck, had murdered a tribal Chief following a violent 
argument over the Chief’s support for the Smith government.190 
            Despite the convictions, Salisbury had procrastinated over the enactment of 
capital punishment. Under Rhodesian law, any death sentences had to be signed by the 
British Governor. Following UDI, Salisbury was unwilling submit any cases to the 
Officer Administering the Government, Clifford Dupont, to avoid a defense counsel 
raising with the High Court judiciary the potentially embarrassing question of the legality 
of the regime. No executions therefore were carried out and the three inmates remained 
alive in prison. On August 31 1967, however, the Rhodesian Government announced that 
the sentences would be carried out. In February 1968, after a prolonged legal battle the 
Appellate Division of the Rhodesian High Court decided that the de facto government 
had the duty to govern including ‘the unpleasant task’ of death sentences.191  
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             On March 2, at the request of Prime Minister Wilson, the Queen issued a Royal 
Reprieve which commuted the sentences to life in prison. Rhodesian Chief Justice 
Beadle, however, stated that the nature of the de facto governance and the internal 
sovereignty granted by the 1961 Constitution meant that only Salisbury could exercise 
clemency. On March 5, the Rhodesian Cabinet sat for seven hours considering the issue. 
It was decided that the viability of the government and the security of the nation required 
full retribution for acts of terrorism and therefore the condemned men must be 
executed.192       
            Following the executions, Salisbury was subjected to strident condemnation from 
much of global community. In the UK, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 
George Thomson expressed ‘shock and outrage’ at the Rhodesian actions. It is worth 
noting, that for Britain, the executions were not only morally questionable but 
represented an ultimate act of defiance against the constitutional authority of the British 
Crown.193  
            On March 19, the UNSC met to discuss the executions and a suitable UN 
response. The Afro-Asian bloc pushed for strong action including use of force, broader 
mandatory sanctions backed by enforcement measures to ensure South African and 
Portuguese compliance and the severance of all communication links to Rhodesia. 
Britain, for its part, advocated a less radical response encompassing comprehensive 
sanctions, a limited travel ban on all persons ordinarily resident in Rhodesia and who 
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were believed to be involved in activities calculated to evade sanctions, as well as the 
expansion of the role of the UN Secretary-General in policing sanctions.194 
            In Washington, the White House sought to assist British position at the UN but 
also wished to avoid actions that would contravene U.S. law, lead to adverse domestic 
reaction or were simply unenforceable. Both London and Washington agreed that a 
resolution calling for the use of force, severance of communications or enforcement 
measures against Lisbon and Pretoria were totally unacceptable.195 
           The White House, however, also expressed concerns over a number of British 
suggestions including a travel ban affecting U.S. citizens as it would lead to domestic 
political problems and stopping transport services to and from Rhodesia due to the 
potential impact on the Zambian economy. London was also informed that the U.S. 
wished to maintain its consular establishment in Salisbury and had no legal basis to act 
against the RIO in Washington. The U.S. also expressed doubts over the effectiveness of 
comprehensive sanctions, noting the difficulties in implementation and enforcement, but 
recognized that it represented the best course of action to deflect more radical proposals 
and agreed to support such an embargo.196 
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             On May 29, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 253 against Rhodesia. 
The resolution implemented a comprehensive mandatory trade embargo on Rhodesia, 
called on member states to prevent the entry of Rhodesian passport holders or individuals 
ordinarily resident in Rhodesia and whom it was believed to have furthered or likely to 
further the interests of Salisbury, prohibited investments or transfer of funds to Rhodesia, 
tightened transportation restrictions and called for a UN committee to monitor the 
progress of the embargo. The resolution also contained two non-mandatory provisions 
that member states cut off communications and withdraw consular and trade 
representation. Overtly radical measures, however, had been avoided after London and 
Washington made representations to the other members of the UNSC. 197    
            On July 29, Johnson issued Executive Order 11419 which implemented the 
mandatory provisions of the UNSC resolution. By so doing LBJ prohibited virtually all 
financial and trade transactions between the U.S. and Rhodesia. The White House was 
aware, however, that the intelligence community doubted the effectiveness of the UN 
embargo. The CIA observed that South Africa and Portugal would continue their policies 
of non-compliance which would allow Rhodesia to sell sufficient exports and obtain the 
necessary imports. Furthermore, the Rhodesian economy had become more self sufficient 
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than at any time during the UDI. Salisbury could not only feed itself but also produced a 
wide range of manufactured goods for its domestic requirements.198 
            The Johnson Administration had voted in favor of Resolution 253 as it was 
deemed tolerable and avoided the imposition of more radical measures. The White House 
was especially pleased with the formation of a UN committee to supervise the 
implemention of sanctions. U.S. representatives had pressed for the inclusion of this 
measure as commercial interests felt they were being asked to adhere to sanctions more 
strictly than in a number of other countries. Regarding the non-mandatory measures, 
Ambassador Goldberg stated that the U.S. would not cut off communication links to 
Rhodesia. Regarding the consular representation in Salisbury, it was decided to maintain 
the consulate as it offered protection for the over one thousand U.S. citizens in Rhodesia, 
supplied vital intelligence reports and provided a focal liaison with the other nine nations 
with consular or other missions in Salisbury.199  
 
Fearless Talks: LBJ supports Wilson’s diplomacy but fears the implications of a 
British sell out 
           
           In October of 1968 the British and Rhodesians met once again on a warship 
anchored off Gibraltar in order to try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement to end 
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UDI. The White House, while in favor of any solution which was broadly acceptable to 
the international community was neverthless guarded in terms of endorsing any potential 
settlement. The Johnson Administration encouraged British efforts but also feared that 
London, for the sake of expediency, might settle for a compromise which while ending 
UDI could be viewed by African states as a sell out of black Rhodesian political rights 
and majority rule. If such a deal was struck, Washington would be placed in the 
unenviable dilemma of either being seen globally as backing a settlement that explicitly 
allowed continued white minority rule or would be forced to overtly and unequivocally 
dissassociate the U.S. from the British stance on Rhodesia and by so doing aggravate a 
key Cold War ally. 
              In a speech to the British Parliament following the executions, Wilson had 
labelled the Rhodesian Government as ‘essentially evil’ and stated he had taken a serious 
risk in negotiating with such men and offering them independence before majority rule. 
The British leader, however, was a pragmatist and in September dispatched a senior 
Commonwealth Office official, James Bottomley, to Salisbury to gauge the receptiveness 
of the Rhodesian Cabinet to the prospect of talks. Bottomley reported that Smith was 
receptive to a settlement based on the Tiger proposals but steadfastly opposed NIBMAR 
and the return to legality remained a stumbling block.200      
           On September 28, Wilson, via Governor Gibbs, invited Smith to join him at 
Gibraltar for formal talks aboard the HMS Fearless. In London, the Labour Government 
was under increasing pressure from the business community and vocal Conservative 
critics to engage in new negotiations. Wilson also viewed the recent resignations of 
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William Harper and Lord Graham, both hardliners on racial issues, from the Rhodesian 
Cabinet as a sign that Smith was willing to compromise. In early October Smith formally 
accepted the offer. 201  
           It is likely that the Rhodesian willingness to meet stemmed primarily from South 
African pressure to end the instransigent problem. While Pretoria was prepared to offer 
economic and military aid to Salisbury, the South Africans also realized that if left 
unresolved the situation could become an international liability. Such a scenario could 
only be to the detriment of South Africa itself. The growth of the guerrilla insurgency and 
fears over the long term effects of comprehensive sanctions also undoubtedly influenced 
the Rhodesian decision.202 
          In a letter to Johnson, Wilson reassured the White House that any settlement would 
not represent a sacrifice of the rights and interests of the black Rhodesians. The Head of 
the British Residual Mission in Salisbury affirmed to U.S. Consul Paul O’Neill that the 
UK Government would not grant independence unless there was a blocking quarter of 
elected black Africans in the Rhodesian Parliament, right of appeal to Privy Council on 
constitutional changes and the formation of a broader based government. O’Neill warned 
the State Department, however, that the first two positions were only acceptable to 
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Salisbury if modified and Smith viewed the demand for a change in government as 
‘humiliating’.203  
           On October 8, negotiations began aboard the Fearless. The British Government, 
despite its assurances to Washington, in fact offered Rhodesia an exceedingly generous 
compromise settlement regarding the terms for independence. Wilson dropped the 
commitment to NIBMAR and only asked for a commitment to majority rule. In terms of 
the return to legality, there would be no period of direct British rule and thus any test of 
acceptability would take place under the control of the Rhodesian Government.204 
           As noted by Peter Baxter, the Rhodesians should have been delighted with the 
settlement but instead the talks stalled when Smith and his colleagues took issue with the 
‘apparently innocent clause’ that any individual could make an appeal to the British Privy 
Council on matters of legislation. Smith believed that was inherently wrong that ‘a 
British court could decide as to whether the Rhodesian Parliament was making the 
correct political decisions.’ Smith left for Salisbury with a document stating the British 
terms for independence including entrenched provisions protected by an African blocking 
quarter in parliament and the external safeguard of Privy Council.205 
         On October 22, the Rhodesian Government sent an aide memoire to London which 
indicated that if the Privy Council problem could be removed then all other issues were 
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resolvable. In early November, while a British counter offer preserved the review powers 
of the Privy Council it left the last word on the amendment of the constitution within 
Rhodesia. In exchange, the British requested that Salisbury accept all other points at issue 
including the formation of a broad based interim government and allow ZANU and 
ZAPU to be politically active.206 
           The White House had adopted a cautious approach to the Fearless talks. It was 
believed that the best posture was to remain broadly supportive of the UK unless London 
so clearly betrayed the principle of unimpeded progress toward majority rule as to force 
Washington to consider explicit detachment from the British position. By early 
November, officials were confident that London and Salisbury would reach agreement on 
the terms for independence. The Rhodesian question began to shift from how to help 
achieve a satisfactory settlement, to whether this particular agreement would be 
internationally accepted and how the U.S. should  treat a ‘legitimate’ Rhodesia especially 
if it remained a pariah state. As noted by the NSC staffer for African Affairs Roger 
Morris, the key issue was whether the White House would be forced to decide between 
the American moral and political position in black Africa and a public break with UK.207    
          As it turned out, the White House was never required to deliberate over such a 
potentially hazardous decision. By mid November there had been no movement at all 
towards an agreement and talks adjourned on November 17. While Smith had accepted 
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the proposals for a broad based interim government and the internal safeguard of an 
African blocking quarter in parliament, the Privy Council issue remained a stumbling 
block and the Rhodesians also opposed the concept of the banned terrorist organizations 
being allowed to resume political activity. On November 19, in a public broadcast, Smith 
commented that it had become clear that the British were ‘obsessed’ with the question of 
black majority rule and defiantly stated that ‘There will be no majority rule in my 
lifetime….or in my children’s’.208 
          On November 26, following the failure of the Anglo-Rhodesian negotiations, the 
Senior Interdepartmental Group met to consider policy towards the white minority 
governments in Southern Africa. In a paper prepared by the Department of State, it was 
observed that the confrontation between black and white-controlled Africa was deepening 
but nevertheless the ‘White Redoubt’ would survive for the forseeable future. In the case 
of Rhodesia, South African economic assistance would help Salisbury survive the 
sanctions while the security forces would be able to prevent any serious internal threats. 
It was also noted that the integration of Rhodesia into the South African security sphere 
dimmed the prospects of meaningful African political participation. While the liberation 
movements were weak, the paper observed a disturbing increase in communist influence 
leading to indoctrinated cadres hostile to Western interests.209 
         In terms of U.S. policy, the Interdepartmental Group considered that American 
relations with both black Africa and the white minority governments were under 
increasing pressure as racial tensions mounted on both sides of the Zambezi. It was 
agreed that economic and political interests dictated continued support for black African 
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aspirations but a commitment to a peaceful adjustment of racial relations in the region. A 
race war would not only be a ‘bloodbath’ but invite communist intervention and would be 
detrimental to U.S. geopolitical and financial interests. It was proposed that the best 
approach was to continue to strengthen the stability of the black states, identify 
Washington with nationalist aspirations, avoid any alignment with Salisbury and to urge 
Pretoria, in its own interests, to press Salisbury to take a moderate line in any future 
negotiations with the UK.210 
          By this point, however, the LBJ era was already drawing to a close. On March 31, 
Johnson had publicly announced that he would not be seeking or accepting the 
Democratic Party nomination for another term as president. Following the presidential 
election of November 1968, Rhodesia, along with Vietnam and the domestic social 
upheaval of the Sixties would soon become the responsibility of the newly elected 
Republican president, Richard M. Nixon.211 
 
The LBJ Years 
          For Johnson, the Rhodesian decision to declare UDI, was a most unwelcome 
development which embroiled Washington in a colonial issue that was none of its own 
creation. In November 1965, the White House was occupied with the growing crisis in 
Southeast Asia and implementation of the domestic Great Society programs. The 
prospect of significant entanglement in the racially charged atmosphere of Southern 
Africa was unappealing. The nature of the Rhodesian crisis, however, necessitated that 
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Washington, albeit reluctantly, involve itself in the confrontation between Salisbury and 
London.      
           While LBJ viewed the Rhodesian issue as primarily a British problem the White 
House was also aware of the fact that London no longer held sufficient economic or 
military strength to end UDI especially in the event of a direct confrontation with 
apartheid South Africa. It was clear that Britain would require substantive American aid 
both geopolitically and economically to achieve its aim of ending UDI. Johnson also 
believed that it was a basic interest to maintain the ‘special relationship’ of close ties with 
London. Supporting the British position on Rhodesia would reflect the unity of purpose 
between the two nations.                   
          The White House was also influenced by the need to retain prestige and protect 
interests in black Africa for strategic, economic and diplomatic reasons. LBJ was well 
aware that the extent of U.S. influence in black Africa was inherently tied to the stance 
that Washington took on the issues of primary importance to the Africans themselves. In 
the case of Rhodesia, the ending of white minority rule was an issue of utmost 
importance to the black African states.    
          The need to maintain a positive American image in Africa was heightened by the 
increasing power of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN. Washington was becoming 
increasingly reliant on Third World support for its geopolitical objectives at the UN 
especially in the General Assembly. The White House was aware that any perception that 
the U.S. was less than wholeheartedly committed to ending UDI could potentially play 
havoc with its broader Cold War agenda.       
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          The early 1960s had revealed a substantive increase in communist interest in 
African affairs which also influenced the position of LBJ regarding the Rhodesian 
rebellion. Although there appeared to be little concern of broad communist penetration 
into the continent, the ‘White Redoubt’ in Southern Africa provided an opening for 
communist regimes to exploit at the expense of the West. While Communist China and 
Soviets could emphatically align themselves with the cause of black liberation thus 
gaining prestige with black African nations, the U.S. was forced to tread a more delicate 
line due to its close political and economic ties to Lisbon and Pretoria.  
           On a domestic level, the LBJ Administration was also troubled about the potential 
repercussions of a Rhodesian race war on communities in the U.S. itself. Following the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act race relations in the U.S. remained 
tense and on occasions erupted into violence. The White House feared that a racial 
conflict in Southern Africa could exacerbate political and social tensions in America. 
         Finally, Johnson himself held a deep moral interest in ending white supremacy in 
Rhodesia. For LBJ, his commitment to racial equality and ending discriminatory 
practices extended beyond the borders of the United States. White minority rule in 
Southern Africa was as abhorrent to him as white political control in the southern states. 
        In terms of policy, the administration adopted a posture of support and close 
consultation with London regarding the Rhodesian issue. As early as 1964, officials 
assured their British counterparts of U.S. opposition to UDI and urged Salisbury to avoid 
such a precipitous action. Following UDI, Washington continued to publicly back the 
British posture against Rhodesia and offered substantial assistance when required.  
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         It is important to note, however, that the White House approach was not simply 
following in the British footsteps but reflected an awareness of how Rhodesia could 
affect U.S. strategic and economic interests. This is reflected in the guarded approach 
adopted by the administration which for the most apart avoided measures deemed 
detrimental to the U.S. and the LBJ was prepared to dissassociate the U.S. from any 
Anglo-Rhodesian agreement which could prove harmful to broader American global 
objectives. 
        The White House also consistently reiterated its opposition to white minority rule 
both in Rhodesia and Southern Africa in general. Both publicly and privately LBJ 
identified himself as supportive of black African hopes for majority rule and critical of 
any form of continued white political control. 
        The President, however, urged a peaceful resolution of racial relations in the region 
and opposed attempts to change the status quo through violence. LBJ was more than 
aware that a race war would be a protracted brutal struggle, invite communist 
intervention and be injurious to U.S. goals. The White House was also not prepared to 
countenance the possibility of an economic or military confrontation with the members of 
the ‘White Redoubt’, especially South Africa. At the UN, the United States, sought to 
avoid radical action including the the use of force to end UDI and the broadening of 
sanctions to include Pretoria.    
         Overall, the stance on Rhodesia during the LBJ era represented a cautious and 
measured approach. The White House, offered tangible public backing along with 
material support to the British but was neverthless prepared to distance itself in the event 
of a settlement that would prove unacceptable to the black Africans and the broader 
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global community. LBJ also sought to align the U.S. alongside the African aspirations for 
genuine independence and majority rule but was not prepared to support extreme 
measures that could embroil Washington in a broader economic and military conflict in 
Southern Africa. His successor in the Oval Office, however, would adopt a posture that 
shifted U.S. policy toward a greater degree of association with the white minority 
regimes. 
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CHAPTER 2. LIMITED ASSOCIATION: PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON 
 
         On January 20 1969, Richard Milhous Nixon was inaugurated as President of the 
United States. In the presidential campaign of 1968, Nixon had been elected by the 
conservative resurgence of a middle class America angered and tired by the liberalism 
and radical politics of the 1960s. At the end of a traumatic decade in U.S. history Nixon 
promised a middle ground on which a majority of Americans could come together.212 
          The election of Nixon also led to a distinct shift in policy towards Southern Africa. 
As early as January 1970, the administration moved towards a policy of closer ties with 
South Africa and greater ‘communication’ with the rebel regime in Rhodesia. The Nixon 
years also witnessed the U.S. openly defying the UN and formally importing Rhodesian 
chrome in violation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Nevertheless, it 
should also be noted that the U.S. continued to support the British position on Rhodesia, 
closing, albeit reluctantly, the consulate in Salisbury following the Rhodesian decision to 
become a republic and privately supporting the Smith-Home Agreement of late 1971.      
             As Secretary of State, Nixon appointed the former Attorney General under 
President Eisenhower, William Rogers. His control of foreign affairs, however, was 
limited by both Nixon’s distrust of the State Department as a holdout of liberal 
Democrats and the influence of National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger, a former 
professor of Political Science at Harvard University. The realpolitik espoused by 
Kissinger focused on the reassertion of American power and the prevention of communist 
expansion across the globe. For Kissinger, containing the communist threat trumped 
                                                 
212 Tindall and Shi, America, 1337 and 1364. 
 
 
123 
 
issues of justice or morality, especially as applied to anti-communist nations, and he 
viewed the world as too complex to simply adopt a univeral code of right and wrong.213  
            Kissinger was also a pragmatist who based his policy choices on the facts on the 
ground. If circumstances changed in any given situation he reacted by rearranging his 
policies to fit the new realities. In the late Sixties and early Seventies, the anti-
communism of Rhodesians and the firm political and military control enjoyed by 
Salisbury, dictated for Kissinger, that on a pragmatic level, Washingon should support for 
the Smith regime.   
           White House domination of key foreign policy decision making was further 
stimulated by Nixon’s desire that he personally would be perceived as the key figure in 
shaping foreign policy in both conception and execution. The new president surrounded 
himself with staffers and advisers who both stood for traditional conservative values and 
would carry out his orders without question.214                
            On a conceptual level, the foreign policy of Nixon years, as shaped by Kissinger, 
was characterized by a preoccupation with the balance of power linked to a form of 
global federalism with the U.S. at the apex of a multipolar pyramid of nations. Kissinger 
believed that in such a system both of the two superpowers would feel less directly 
threatened by each other’s every action and also American leverage would increase as 
regional allies could voluntarily shoulder responsibility for their area of the globe. 
Therefore, in addition to ending the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, the priorities of the 
White House were to focus on solidifying the transatlantic alliance with Western Europe 
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and increased overtures to the People’s Republic of China to engage in this new strategic 
framework.215                 
         Southern Africa, while at least theoretically an area of comparatively little interest 
to the new administration, was nonetheless important as a loss of influence in the 
‘periphery’ would complicate the broader geopolitical mission. Peripheral regions such as 
Southern Africa or Southeast Asia, unlike Europe, offered a greater range of policy 
options for both Washington and Moscow including opportunities for military 
intervention. The expansion of communist influence into such areas would not only affect 
the geopolitical balance of power but would also weaken U.S. credibility both 
domestically and internationally.    
          Kissinger, in particular, was concerned by the appeal of the social mobilization and 
justification for political power inherent in Marxist ideology to anti-colonial leaders. The 
Nixon Doctrine of 1969 advocated the pursuance of American strategic interests through 
military and other aid to friendly governments. These govenments could include 
unpalatable regimes provided they possessed vehemently anti-communist credentials. In 
sub-saharan Africa, in practical terms this meant closer ties with the ‘White Redoubt’.216  
            A second strategic issue was access to chrome. Prior to the Rhodesian UDI in 
1965, Rhodesia had been a major supplier of metallurgical chrome ore to the U.S. The 
chromium was a vital component in the manufacture of numerous essential products 
including stainless steel and was used in electric power generation, chemical 
manufacturing and by NASA in the space program. U.S. adherence to the UN sanctions 
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on Rhodesia led to a growing dependence on chrome ore from the USSR. This was not 
only deemed unwisely strategically but was also hurting U.S. businesses due to inflated 
prices and inferior quality of ore. By 1969, the scarcity of chromite ore was beginning to 
cause concern to several government departments’ including Commerce and the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness (OEP).217     
          It is also important to note that the administration, including both Nixon and 
Kissinger, were not immune to racial and cultural prejudices when formulating policy on 
Africa. In his biography, Nixon noted that he was discouraged and unimpressed by the 
quality of African leadership. Indeed, as pointed out by Andy DeRoche, Nixon repeatedly 
snubbed meeting Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda during his visits to Washington as 
well as emissaries from the Organization of African Unity.218  
      In the case of Kissinger, the former colonial nations of Africa remained at the bottom 
of his multi-polar global pyramid. For the new National Security Adviser, developing 
countries with a lack of political tradition, immature economies and little military might 
were ranked low in terms of importance and respect. On one notable occasion in 
September 1971, during a private conversation with the President, when Kissinger 
referred to the African delegation accompanying Mauritanian President Ould Daddah to 
Washington as ‘savages’ Nixon erupted with laughter.219   
                                                 
217 Memorandum for President Nixon from Maurice H. Stans. Rhodesian Sanctions: Response to NSDM-
47. May 15 1970. NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, NSDM -47. Box H-214. Nixon Library. 
218 Andy DeRoche (2011) KK, the Godfather, and the Duke: Maintaining Positive Relations between 
Zambia and the USA in Spite of Nixon’s Other Priorities, Safundi 12:1. p.97 DOI: 10/80/175.2011.533915, 
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978) 283. 
219 57. “Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Kissinger)” Washington, September 28 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, 
Department of State. (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011) 143-145.  
Suri, “Henry Kissinger and the Geopolitics of Globalization,” in The Shock of the Global” ed. Ferguson et 
al., 186, and Kissinger, White House Years, 69.  
 
 
126 
 
          Domestically, a key element in Nixon’s electoral success was the ‘Southern 
Strategy’. His campaign staff, notably political strategist Kevin Phillips, shaped an 
approach in which Nixon could win over white voters in the southern states, traditionally 
a stronghold for the Democratic Party, by assuring conservatives he would slow federal 
enforcement of civil rights laws and appoint pro-southern justices to the Supreme Court. 
In the election of 1968, several southern states, including Florida, Oklahoma and South 
Carolina, voted for Nixon providing the popular vote margins he needed for victory.220 
         Nixon himself was also reluctant on ideological grounds to push forced integration 
on the de facto segregated communities in the South and elsewhere. While Nixon 
believed that de jure segregation was inherently wrong, he nevertheless viewed de facto 
segregation as, in his own words, ‘the natural outgrowth of economic and social patterns 
within individual communities and neighborhoods.’ As President, while Nixon sought to 
remove the last vestiges of formal segregation he also opposed instant integration as 
fraught with social tensions.221      
          It has been argued that this nuanced slant on civil rights adopted by the Nixon 
Administration was mirrored by a similar attitude toward the white dominated nations of 
Southern Africa. Gerald Horne suggests that the Nixon Presidency ‘signaled the arrival of 
a remarkable double-barreled approach - a “Southern Strategy” and a “Southern Africa 
Strategy” - based on playing to the racial fears of Euro-Americans discomfited by the 
pace of racial change, be it south of the Mason-Dixon line or at the southern tip of 
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Africa.’ A key component of this dual strategy, in the view of Horne, was the positing of 
African-Americans and Africans as the allies or tools of communism.222  
          It is certainly fair to state that parallels existed between the White House’s 
domestic approach to civil rights and its relations with the white governments of 
Southern Africa. In both cases, Nixon publicly condemned racism and racially 
discriminatory laws yet was reluctant to push for instantaneous meaningful change. 
Indeed, many of Rhodesia’s most vocal supporters including Senators’ Harry F. Byrd (I-
Virginia) and Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) as well as Congressman James 
Collins (R-Texas) not only hailed from former Confederate states and held racialist views 
but many also enjoyed close ties to Nixon himself.223  
        The most notable example of this was Senator James Eastland, a man renowned for 
his opposition to civil rights and a strong supporter of white Rhodesia who was 
considered by Nixon to be a vital ally. In 1972, Nixon even forsook party allegiances and 
refused to endorse the Republican candidate challenging Eastland’s senatorial seat. The 
unsavory views of Senator Eastland on racial issues were noted by Ken Flower, the head 
of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. On a visit to Salisbury, Eastland, 
upon witnessing black and white Rhodesians mingling in a Salisbury hotel, rebuked his 
hosts stating ‘You’ve inserted the thin end of the wedge by allowing stinking niggers into 
such a fine hotel.’224    
        It should be noted, however, that the Rhodesian question continued to evoke strong 
opinions nationwide. The American Committee on Africa and other liberal groups 
opposed to the white regimes continued to agitate for stronger U.S. actions against 
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Pretoria and Salisbury and there was evidence of increasing congressional hostility 
towards the Smith government. Rhodesia, though, continued to enjoy strong political 
supporters including former Secretary of State and informal White House adviser Dean 
Acheson. 
      Although the claim by the Rhodesian Commentary, published by the RIO, that 
millions of U.S. citizens opposed sanctions on Rhodesia must be treated with skepticism, 
presidential correspondence certainly reflected also a pro-Rhodesia bias among many 
Americans. This attitude is typified by a letter from Dr. Leon Halsted, a chiropractor 
from El Paso, Texas who urged Nixon to recognize Rhodesia and end the ‘soft on 
communism’ State Department policy of hurting our friends and helping our enemies.225     
         On the question of how to deal with an increasingly confident and self-assured 
Rhodesian regime the U.S. government was as divided in its opinions as the public. The 
Department of State, especially the Africanists, and the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations favored a continuation of existing policy or further dissociation from Salisbury 
and closer identification with black Africa. Other government departments including 
Commerce, Defense, Treasury and the OEP favored some relaxation of posture towards 
the Smith government. This view was also supported by Kissinger and the National 
Security Council.226  
          The differences of opinion inevitably led to tensions over the administration’s tilt 
to the right towards Southern Africa. Indeed, Nixon himself, in late 1969, upon learning 
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that Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom had told a House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee that sanctions policy did not go far enough commented ‘Wow - this guy is 
a menace!’227  
          Overall, during the Nixon era, White House policy towards Salisbury was guided 
by strategic considerations linked to both geopolitics and commercial interests. Nixon 
demonstrated little moral interest on the question of majority rule in Rhodesia or ending 
UDI. Under President Nixon, America developed a policy of selective relaxation of its 
stance towards both Pretoria and Salisbury to protect U.S. interests based on the premise 
that the white minorities remained in firm political control and this was unlikely to 
change in the near future.    
 
NSSM 39: Closer ties to the ‘White Redoubt’ 
         The new administration came into office with a determination to broadly reshape  
foreign policy. Specifically, the President and his advisers wished to move away from the 
liberal reformist agenda of the Sixties notably crisis management and pouring energy and 
resources into the poverty stricken states of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the hopes 
of achieving political and social improvements. In their view, this had failed to deal with 
the deeper underlying causes of the global crises and had failed to stimulate greater 
democracy as demonstrated by the rise of totalitarian, often Marxist, regimes. In the 
words of Kissinger, when Nixon took office, it was imperative to ‘articulate a new 
foreign policy for a new era.’228 
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            In order to impose a new blueprint on foreign policy, Kissinger, beginning in the 
spring of 1969, began to inundate the State Department with requests for comprehensive 
policy reviews of U.S. relations and interests worldwide. On April 3, at the 
recommendation of the NSC staffer Roger Morris, Kissinger urged Nixon to order a 
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) on Southern Africa.229 
            In a memorandum for the President, Kissinger argued that a NSSM was necessary 
as there had been no comprehensive high level review of U.S. interests and objectives in 
Southern Africa since the Kennedy era of the early 1960s. Since that time, however, the 
situation had become increasingly volatile including the appearance of the USSR and 
China as patrons of the terrorist groups. Furthermore, as noted by Kissinger, the U.S. had 
meaningful yet potentially conflicting interests in the area which needed to be clearly 
identified and weighed. While there was a political stake in dissociation from the 
repressive policies of the white regimes there were also material interests which required 
involvement with those same governments. It was necessary for the NSC to be able to 
consider all the possible options open to U.S. policy in dealing with the white minority 
controlled nations.230  
           It is worth noting that Kissinger also identified that the heart of the problem lay 
with the powerful white South African Government whose effective military and 
prosperous economy bolstered its policy of apartheid. Rhodesia, in his view, lacked the 
doctrinal and instutional efficiency of its southern neighbor and merely stayed afloat due 
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to a lack of British political will to end UDI and the economic aid that Salisbury received 
from Pretoria.231 
            Nixon was clearly convinced by Kissinger’s arguments as well as those of Dean 
Acheson who met with the President in the Oval Office and stridently condemned the 
Rhodesian policy adopted by the LBJ Administration. On April 10, the National Security 
Adviser ordered the review in NSSM 39, the purpose was to examine the background and 
future prospects of the problems in Southern Africa, consider alternate views of U.S. 
interests and put forward the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the 
U.S. Government.232 
           On August 15 1969, the Interdepartmental Group completed its reponse to NSSM 
39. As an overview, the group noted the important U.S. strategic and economic interests 
in the white controlled states, notably South Africa, including the approximately $1 
billion dollar investments, a highly favorable balance of payments in trade, the important 
NASA tracking station and the key geographic position. In the case of Rhodesia, the 
group observed that before UDI Salisbury had provided between a quarter and a third of 
metallurgical chromite imports before sanctions, noted U.S. mining assets currently under 
Rhodesian Government control and the small overall investment amounting to around 
$56 million.233  
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            The study pointed out, however, that American interests in the white dominated 
states were seen as at least tacit acceptance of racism which affected U.S. standing with 
other African states and it was also considered as reflecting the American domestic 
stance on racism. The group also noted that U.S. investments in black Africa were valued 
at around $1.5 billion and trade relations were expanding. Increasing violence in the 
region stemming from black insurgency and white reprisal posed a real threat to 
American interests. It was noted, though, that ‘There is no likelihood in the foreseeable 
future that liberation movements could overthrow or seriously threaten the existing white 
governments.’234 
           The Interdepartmental Group critiqued the LBJ policy of trying to balance 
economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states with the political interest of 
dissociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial policies. 
According the study, policy decisions had been made on an ad hoc judgement of benefits 
and political costs at a given moment. The strength of the policy, its flexibility, was also 
its weakness. A failure to define an exact approach combined with the significant 
differences of view within the government led to decisions having been held in 
suspense.235  
           The group also commented on the increasing difficulties the U.S. would face at the 
UN. Although Washington played a leading role in the arms embargo on South Africa 
and the mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia these actions exhausted the store of 
measures the U.S. Government was prepared to take. The Afro-Asian bloc, however, had 
steadily increased its demands for stronger UN measures including sanctions on South 
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Africa and Portugal as well as the use of force, measures that U.S. was not prepared to 
countenance. In contrast, the tough line taken by China and the USSR in supporting the 
liberation movements both rhetorically and logistically had led to these geopolitical rivals 
making some gains in Africa and at the UN.236  
          In the case of Rhodesia, the group commented that the U.S. had continued to 
recognize British sovereignty, reduced staff at the consulate in Salisbury which continued 
to operate under exquatur from the UK Crown and maintained contact with the exiled 
Nationalist movements. Washington, though, had discouraged the use of violence by both 
sides. Although the liberation movements as yet posed no real threat and the communist 
powers had shown no interest in direct military involvement against Salisbury, the 
Rhodesian decision to become a republic could increase African hostility and in the case 
of the U.S., lead to greater pressure to remove the consulate.237 
           Regarding the effect of sanctions, the group observed that Rhodesia had with 
South African assistance averted an economic disaster although sanctions had restricted 
the economy, retarded economic growth, disrupted normal trade patterns and forced trade 
to be conducted on conditions somewhat unfavorable to Rhodesia. The sanctions and 
pariah status of Salisbury, however, were observed to have bolstered support for  Smith 
and the Rhodesian Front. ‘The isolation and “state of siege” feeling has helped solidify 
white support for the regime; Smith, himself, enjoys great personal popularity among the 
majority of the white electorate.’238   
           The NSSM study also discussed the growing Congressional interest in Southern 
Africa. According to the Interdepartmental Group a large majority on the Hill were 
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critical of South African policies but there existed a minority, not exclusively from the 
South, who favored closer relations with Pretoria and a more friendly attitude towards 
Salisbury. Insertions in the Congressional Record showed a definite linkage of Southern 
African issues with domestic civil rights by both supporters and opponents of the 
policies.239  
            The Interdepartmental Group response to NSSM 39 laid out a number of options 
for consideration by the NSC including closer relations with the white regimes, a broader 
association with both black and white states, limited ties to white Africa and dissociation 
from the Southern African region to avoid any form of formal U.S. involvement in the 
racial problems of the area.240 
             On October 16 1969, the NSC Review Group met to discuss the findings of the 
Interdepartmental Group Paper. On the day before the meeting NSC staffers Charles H. 
Hermann, Richard T. Kennedy and Roger Morris had suggested several talking points to 
Kissinger. Notably they focused on the fact that the white governments were in firm 
control and violence, which in any case the black states are ill equipped to engage in, 
would not bring change. Any change in white policies would be slow and modest and 
unlikely to satisfy black Africa. International attempts to isolate the whites had failed and 
led to the creation of a siege mentality not moderation. It was also noted that the black 
African reaction to increased relations with the white states would be limited to rhetoric 
alone as their nations needed American support and aid money.241  
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            At the meeting, chaired by Kissinger, it was agreed upon to reformulate the 
options proposed by the Interdepartmental Group prior to the upcoming NSC Meeting in 
December. The revised options fell into three broad categories of relaxation of relations 
with the white regimes, closer identification with black Africa and disassociation from 
white Africa. Within each broad posture there were two operationally different options 
which created a total of six possibilities for consideration.          
         The first, known at the time as the ‘Acheson Option’, was a normalization of U.S. 
relations with all states of the area, keeping a low profile on internal white policies and 
consulting U.S. interests in pursuit of economic and other relations. A similar but less 
politically explosive option was the selectively broadening of ties with both white and 
black states to encourage moderation and protect interests on both sides.242 
           The third and fourth possibilities involved increased identification with the black 
states to permit the U.S. to pursue minimum necessary interests in the white states. They 
differed in that in the former Washington would make a greater effort to win over the 
black nations. These options were broadly considered to be a continuation of LBJ’s 
policy towards the region.243 
           A fifth option was greater dissociation from the white regimes and considerably 
closer identification with black Africa to enhance standing on racial issues in Africa and 
internationally. The final choice was for the U.S. to engage in coercive measures short of 
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armed force to induce change in the racial policies of white states and to greatly increase 
aid including military assistance to the black ruled nations.244 
           In the weeks prior to the NSC meeting in mid December it became clear that there 
was a sharp division between the government departments over the policy choices. At the 
two extremes of the range, no agency favored the first or last options. Normalization was 
considered too costly domestically and internationally due to the political costs of 
repudiating the previous position in UN, encouraging white intransigence and potentially 
handing the initiative to communists. Option six was also discarded as it would lead to 
the U.S. forfeiting important strategic and scientific interests in white states, sacrificing 
economic interests to other nations like France and UK, hardening white resolve, and 
stimulating further demands by blacks while sanctions enforcement would pose serious 
military problems. 
          On the other hand, the second option, the selective broadening of ties with the 
white governments, appealed to a number of agencies. Commerce supported it as it 
would expand U.S. exports, Treasury liked the potential balance of payments, the OEP 
wanted access to Rhodesian chrome while Defense believed it would protect important 
strategic, scientific and economic interests. Kissinger and the NSC staff also broadly 
favored a relaxation of posture along the lines set out by the Interdepartmental Group. 
          The Department of State, however, favored limited association on the grounds that 
such an approach would protect some of the American interests in the white states but 
lead to only minimal damage to U.S. political goals and retain flexibility for the future. 
Officials feared the diplomatic repercussions of broadening ties with the white regimes as 
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any relaxation of relations with Pretoria and Salisbury was unacceptable to black Africa 
and the option also represented a potential withdrawal from UN commitments.  
           The U.S. Mission to the UN and some Africanists in the State Department, in the 
cases of South Africa and Rhodesia, preferred disengagement. It was argued that such a 
policy would greatly increase credibility in Africa and the UN, counter Soviet and 
Chinese influence in black states and liberation movements, put the white governments 
on notice they could expect no assistance in the event of a future conflict and counter 
Afro-Asian demands for greater actions. It was in their view the minimum posture which 
could protect political interests at home and abroad.245 
             It is important to note that while NSSM 39 primarily focused on the Republic of 
South Africa,  Rhodesia, was not included, as some commentators suggested, as a mere 
afterthought to the process. In fact, the Rhodesian problem was a far more difficult case 
for the U.S. to emphasize a policy of ‘communication’ given the international ‘illegality’ 
of the regime and the claim of de jure British sovereignty.246 
            Regarding Rhodesia, Nixon faced choices on three issues. First, whether to 
continue to implement the UN sanctions program against Salisbury. The normalization of 
ties, as laid out in option one would require phased withdrawal from sanctions which 
would aggravate relations with both the UK and black Africa.247  
           Secondly, whether to relax the ban on chrome or allow the importation of chrome 
by two American companies on hardship grounds. Chrome imports (which will be 
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covered in a later section) were becoming a major political issue and the UN embargo 
was seen as both ineffective and penalizing U.S. firms. Importing Rhodesian chrome 
would also avoid increasing dependence on the USSR for a strategic resource. Finally, 
whether the consulate in Salisbury should remain open to provide consular services for 
the approximately 1100 U.S. citizens in Rhodesia and intelligence collection despite its 
presence being seen as legitimizing the Smith government.248 
          The NSC Meeting on Southern Africa was held on December 17 1969. The 
minutes of the meeting clearly indicate the participants primary concern lay with the 
interests of their particular government departments. Commerce highlighted the large 
amount of trade and investment the U.S. had in Southern Africa and urged, along with the 
OEP Director General Lincoln, that the president should grant the hardship licences for 
the importation of chrome. On the issue of the consulate, U.S. Representative to the UN 
Charles W. Yost urged for its closure while this was opposed by CIA Director Richard 
Helms on the grounds that the U.S. would lose an important source of intelligence.249 
         President Nixon himself stated that Southern Africa had become important 
primarily due to the moral and domestic political issues involved. On the broader 
question of which policy option to follow it is clear that Nixon favored some form of 
‘relaxation’ of relations with the white regimes. The President stated that the U.S. ‘must 
analyze where our national interest lies and not worry too much about other peoples’ 
domestic policies.’ He also observed that 6% of the African population, the whites in 
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South Africa, produce 40% of the continent’s GNP and that they were they were there to 
stay. The ‘White Redoubt’ remained strong and firmly in control of its own destiny.250 
           On January 28 1970, President Nixon issued National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 38. On the advice of Kissinger, the President had selected a 
policy along the lines of partial relaxation. This included balancing U.S. relations in the 
area by compensating for as opposed to abandoning tangible interests in the white states, 
lowering the American profile at the UN, quietly relaxing bilateral relations with South 
Africa and avoiding pressure on the Portuguese.251  
            In the case of Rhodesia, regarding the chrome imports, the hardship case would 
be examined by State, Treasury, Justice and Commerce under the chairmanship of the 
Justice Department to clarify status under present regulations. This would be followed by 
a more general policy study on imports of Rhodesian chrome. The consulate was to 
remain in Salisbury provided the legal question of recognition did not arise.252 
            The presidential decision to opt for a policy of closer ties with the white 
governments represented a significant change in policy toward Southern Africa, As 
opposed to an adminsistration being guided by the principle of political dissassociation 
with the white regimes the White House now sought greater ‘communication’ with 
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Pretoria, the Portuguese Territories and to a lesser extent Salisbury. This shift in stance 
horrified many Africanists and others at the State Department. They also feared that the 
policy of tighter relations with the white states would once adopted become sticky and 
difficult to abandon. It was therefore dubbed the ‘tar baby option’ referring to the Uncle 
Remus story of how Brer Fox caught Brer Rabbit with a mix of tar and turpentine which 
he nicknamed a tar baby.253  
            It is significant that Nixon chose to keep this new policy approach highly secret 
and out of sight of not only the news media and the public but most government 
personnel as well. It was ‘on a need to know basis’ with scrupulous classification. White 
House officials apparently preferred that the shift towards the white regimes not be 
revealed because it was to be a quiet and protracted relaxation of American relations that 
would only become evident over time.  
          It is clear that Nixon and the NSC staff were aware of the potential political 
firestorm that such a shift in policy would cause among liberals and African-Americans. 
Southern Africa was the only area of the globe where the government policies 
represented a direct affront to the dignity of many Americans. The niceties of a foreign 
policy that proclaimed an abhorrence of apartheid but conducted business as usual with 
its practitioners would be lost on those who identified with the oppressed black 
population.254 
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U.S. Consulate: Nixon reluctantly concedes to British pressure 
          While the Inter-Departmental Group prepared their study in response to NSSM 39, 
a new headache was developing for the Nixon Administration regarding the continued 
presence of the consulate in Salisbury. The  U.S. Consulate which provided services for 
Americans in Rhodesia as well as being a useful listening post for intelligence gathering 
had continued to operate since UDI, albeit with a reduced staff,  under exquatur from the 
UK Crown. The existence of the consulate had therefore never implied U.S. recognition 
of the Rhodesian Government but in the event that the exquatur was withdrawn by the 
UK then its continued presence could be considered de facto and potentially de jure  
acceptance of the Rhodesian regime.255   
           By January 1969, Smith and the governing RF were increasingly buoyant and 
confident about the future of a white controlled Rhodesia. As noted by the CIA, the white 
Rhodesians felt they no longer needed any settlement with London or the Commonwealth 
to survive as a nation and overcome the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. The 
Rhodesian economy was relatively prosperous, with South African and Portuguese help 
imports and exports had increased since 1967, the country was well endowed with natural 
resources and UN sanctions had proved ineffective and were likely to become 
increasingly so.256 
              The Rhodesian military was more than capable, especially with South African 
support, of defeating any threat from the black African countries. The Front Line nations 
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would also suffer economically if trade with the the white controlled nations was to be 
cut off. Domestically, the black Rhodesian population was ‘quiescent’ and the externally 
based insurgent movements had been ineffective due in part to the strength of the security 
forces. In the white community there was very little political opposition to Smith, only 
limited dissatisfaction among tobacco farmers and unionized railroad workers.257            
               The Rhodesian Government, therefore, no longer felt any need to either 
maintain links to the UK and were increasingly firm in their belief they could chart their 
own future without talks with London. On January 20, the Head of the UK Residual 
Mission to Rhodesia was informed by CIO Director Flower that it was highly unlikely 
that Smith would seriously pursue further negotiations with the British Government. The 
Rhodesian Minister of External Affairs Jack Howman, reportedly assured Mozambique 
Governor General De Sousa in Lourenco Marques that there would be no further 
negotiations and Rhodesia would move along its own path. Consul O’Neill commented 
that; ‘We have recently reported mounting evidence of regime’s cockiness illustrated by 
deliberate actions calculated to rub British wrong way and worsen atmosphere for 
negotiations.’258 
                On February 13, the Rhodesian Government sent a memorandum to the UK 
which set forth the Rhodesian position on differences between the two parties. The 
British, however, noted that it did not contribute a new set of proposals and was 
described as ‘very disappointing’. Consul O’Neill informed Secretary of State Rogers 
that the UK Government appeared to be still interested in obtaining a settlement 
acceptable to all Rhodesians but unless Pretoria pressures Smith to negotiate it looks as if 
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the ‘two sides have just about reached end of road and that we are in for the longer 
haul.’259 
              As early as September 1968 the RF had drafted new constitutional proposals 
which, if approved by the primarily white electorate, would formally make a Rhodesia, at 
least in its own eyes, an independent republic. This move would of course sever the last 
official ties to the UK and also come close to eliminating any remaining possibility of 
settlement. An intelligence note to Rogers from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
described this as a ‘Great Leap Rightward’ and suggested that Smith had moved right to 
counter his critics in the RF by pre-empting their positions but in the process had burned 
bridges to London. Smith’s position offered very little to Harold Wilson that he could 
square with his six principles for settlement.260  
                On June 20 1969, the Rhodesian electorate voted overwhelming in the 
nationwide referendum to formally break with the UK and become a republic. Eighty 
percent of the eligible voters opted for the new constitution, a level of support which, 
back in London, reportedly stunned both the Labour Government and the Conservative 
opposition. Four days later, on June 24, the UK withdrew the Governor-General and 
residual mission from Salisbury thereby ending all diplomatic ties with Salisbury.261 
              Rhodesia was eager that Washington would not follow suit and sever its links 
with Salisbury especially after the formal declaration of republican status which would 
take place in March of 1970. As noted by the British, the continued presence of the U.S. 
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Consulate could be construed as recognition and would be a massive boost to the 
international aspirations of the Rhodesians. As the leading Western power, the American 
lead would also be followed by many other nations.262 
              On June 27, NSC staffer Morris lunched with Kenneth Towsey of the RIO at the 
Occidental restaurant in Washington. This was the first of three meetings between the 
two men over the course of the summer and fall of 1969. Towsey apparently assured 
Morris that the Rhodesia would not raise the issue of the legal status of the consulate and 
the U.S. could stay as long as it wished. Furthermore, Towsey also inferred that the 
continued presence of the consular mission might place Washington in a position to 
effect a mediating role between Rhodesia and UK. In the words of Tony Lake; ‘Over 
martinis, steaks and baked potatoes they discussed the future course of American policy 
toward Southern Rhodesia.’263 
             The Rhodesians had good reason to feel optimistic over the chances of the 
consulate remaining in Salisbury. While the State Department, especially the Africa 
Bureau, and Ambassador Yost favored closure, this view was far from univeral. Indeed, 
even Secretary of State Rogers was equivocal, due to the presence of 1,100 Americans in 
Rhodesia who needed consular representation. Other leading figures in Washington were 
far more vocal in support of maintaining the consulate. Influential presidential ‘adviser’ 
Dean Acheson argued that maintaining the consulate did not imply recognition of the 
regime and that to end all relations with Rhodesia was contrary to U.S. national interests 
and that the effect of sanctions, now that Salisbury had adopted a constitution precluding 
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majority rule, was to forment race war there. Kissinger also opposed closure and Nixon 
himself stated privately, regarding the consulate in Rhodesia, that ‘If we have a mission 
in Hungary, we’ll have one here. This is an order.’264 
            On July 17, Rogers, who had been reassured by the Legal Advisor’s Office of 
alternate ways to provide consular services for the Americans in Rhodesia, recommended 
to the President that the consulate be closed. Kissinger, however, advised against this 
decision on the grounds that the consular presence had an intelligence function, protected 
U.S. citizens and served an important political role to influence the regime or push for 
further negotiations with the UK. In a telegram on August 14, the State Department 
informed the Embassies in London, Lusaka and Pretoria, as well as the U.S. Mission to 
the UN that Nixon had rejected the departmental recommendation to close the consulate 
in Salisbury.265  
            To put the presidential decision in context, it is worth noting that early in August, 
Consul O’Neill informed the State Department that he had conducted an informal survey 
of the views of the other foreign consuls in Salisbury following the Rhodesian vote to 
become a republic. While the Italian Consul General was lobbying for all posts to remain 
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open the Swiss had long decided against closing and the consul even indicated a 
willingness to diplomatically recognize Rhodesia as a full nation state. There was of 
course no question that the South African and Portuguese posts would remain.266 
             As noted earlier, the question of the consulate was considered at the NSC 
meeting to discuss NSSM 39 on December 17, 1969. According to press reports at the 
time Nixon was being pressured by a number of southern Congressmen, representatives 
from the chrome industry and even Vice-President Agnew not to close the consulate.267 
            In NSDM 38, issued in late January, Nixon decided to keep the consulate in 
Salisbury so long as the legal question of U.S. recognition of the Rhodesian Government 
does not arise. If the question surfaced either through withdrawal of British accreditation 
or by the Rhodesians themselves raising the question of the consular status Nixon stated 
he would be forced to review policy. According to Lake, NSC staffer Morris reportedly 
informed Towsey of both the NSC meeting and the decision on the consulate in 
Salisbury. 268 
            The Rhodesian Government, which had set March 2 as the date that the new 
republican constitution would come into force, was delighted with the decision but the 
British were less pleased by the continued American consular presence. While meeting 
with Nixon at the White House in January, Wilson had urged the President to close the 
consulate. The following month, the UK Minister to the Embassy in Washington, Guy 
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Millard, informed the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, G. Robert Moore, 
that London  hoped  the U.S. Government would come to an early decision to close the 
consulate. The British view, as put forward by Millard, was that such a decision would 
have a good political effect in Africa and at the UN, cause other countries with consulates 
in Rhodesia to follow suit and forestall any other countries who might wish to recognize 
the new republic.269 
           At midnight on March 1-2, Smith declared Rhodesia to be an independent republic 
thus formally severing its last ties to the Britain and Commonwealth. An examination of 
presidential correspondence reveals that the new Republic of Rhodesia certainly enjoyed 
the support of many Americans. In one notable letter to Kissinger, Mrs. Robert R. Wolf, a 
naturalized American from Albion, Nebraska, urged the administration that before 
severing all ties with Rhodesia, ‘let us remember just who are our friends and who are 
our enemies.’270 
            At the higher echelons of international diplomacy, however, pressure was 
mounting on the President to remove the nettlesome diplomatic post. The UN Secretary 
General, U. Thant, called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council leading to 
possibility of a UN resolution requiring all nations to withdraw consulates from 
Rhodesia. The British Government also upped their demands that the U.S. withdraw its 
consulate. On March 5, Foreign Secretary Stewart met with U.S. Ambassador Walter 
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Annenberg and clearly signalled increasing British displeasure that Washington had not 
yet removed the post and wished for a firm announcement that the U.S. would not 
recognize the illegal regime. Lake states that the Foreign Secretary also threatened the 
possibility that the UK would withdraw exquatur if the consulate was to remain. 
Domestically, Secretary Rogers was increasingly insistent that the consulate must be 
removed.271 
           On March 9, President Nixon issued NSDM 47 which determined that the U.S. 
Consulate in Salisbury would be closed and commented that the maintenance of the post 
had in no way constituted recognition of the Rhodesian regime. A Department of State 
press release, issued the same day, stated that in response to the establishment of the 
Rhodesian Constitution on March 2, which replaced the British Crown with a Rhodesian 
President as head of state the U.S. would close the consulate in Salisbury on March 17. 
This action was necessary as the Rhodesian action constituted a final formal break with 
the British Government which Washington regarded as lawfully sovereign in 
Rhodesia.272  
              While the decision delighted President Nyerere of Tanzania and was praised by 
the liberal American Committee on Africa it caused consternation in Salisbury and 
among American supporters of Rhodesia. Senator Strom Thurmond and Congressman H. 
R. Gross (R-Iowa) strongly condemned the decision. Indeed seventy-seven Congressmen 
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signed a letter to Nixon expressing their shock and displeasure at his decision. The letter 
asked Nixon to reconsider his determination and further instruct the U.S. Mission to the 
UN to vote against against any British effort to impede or harass the Republic of 
Rhodesia. On March 11, Senator Eastland introduced a resolution in the Senate calling 
for recognition of Smith government and stated that ‘Once again…we are dancing to the 
tune of Whitehall’s Pied Piper in a game of follow-the-leader diplomacy. We are courting 
disaster when we let tiny African nations, through London, dictate our decisions.’273 
               The criticism aimed at the administration did not only originate from political 
figures. An editorial in the Dallas Morning News on March 14 offered a damning 
indictment of U.S. policy on Rhodesia which reflected the views of many conservative 
Americans. ‘If the black population had declared itself free March 2, the world would be 
laughing at any British pretensions of continued rule. If Salisbury had been burned in 
celebration of the new freedom, if half of the African born whites had been slaughtered to 
commemorate the event-if the new government immediately applied for handouts to keep 
itself afloat-we no doubt would have had a triumph of “democracy.” Rhodesia’s trouble 
is that there it has no immediate intention of turning over more than 50 years of 
achievement to a numerically superior but politically undeveloped people. Rhodesia 
exists, only because it was white-created and is largely white-governed.’274 
              It is worth noting, however, that the U.S. was still not willing to accede to the 
extremist demands of many African states at the UN. In early March, a number of 
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African delegates drafted a strict resolution which urged the UK to use force to end 
rebellion, called for the mandatory withdrawal of foreign consulates, extended sanctions 
to Portugal and South Africa and demanded the severance of all communication and 
transportation ties with Rhodesia. The British, in contrast put forward a milder resolution 
which merely called on all countries not to recognize the Rhodesian republic nor give it 
any assistance.275  
            On March 17, the very day that Consul O’Neill left Salisbury, the U.S. cast its 
first veto at the UN alongside the UK and subsequently voted for the resolution put 
forward by London. It was significant that the State Department recommended the veto 
as many officials there felt it was important that the African states realized that the use of 
force against Rhodesia, expansion of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal and 
severance of communications was unacceptable to Washington. The issue of the 
consulate in Salisbury had demonstrated the rifts within both the administration and the 
nation regarding future policy towards Rhodesia. The issue of chrome imports would 
exacerbate these divisions.276      
 
Chrome: Economic and strategic interests lead to the open violation of UN sanctions             
             Chrome, specifically the importation of Rhodesian chrome ore and chrome 
alloys, became the major political issue for the Nixon Administration in terms of relations 
with Salisbury. Chromium which can be commercially produced from chromite ore was a 
metal of high economic value due to its corrosion resistance and strength.  In the late 
1960s, chrome and chrome based products including ferro alloys and stainless steel were 
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vital components of a number of American industries including electric power generation 
and chemical manufacturing. Chrome was also used by NASA in its space program and 
its strategic importance was reflected by its inclusion on the OEP Strategic and Critical 
List.277 
             Chrome ore, however, is not widely distributed in the earth’s crust. The problem 
faced by Washington was that the U.S., indeed the whole Western hemisphere, contained 
no deposits of metallurgical chrome ore leaving the nation dependent on global imports. 
The primary deposits of ore were located in Southern Africa and parts of Asia. Prior to 
UDI, the U.S. imported the majority of its chrome and chrome alloys from Rhodesia, 
Turkey and the USSR.  Indeed, according to industry insiders, Rhodesia was the source 
of the finest metallurgical chrome ore on the planet. American mining interests were 
some of the principal investors in the Rhodesian chrome industry.278 
              Executive Order 11322, signed by President Johnson, had incorporated  UNSC 
Resolution 232 into domestic law. As a result, the U.S. was legally bound by the 
mandatory sanctions which prohibited the importation of Rhodesian chrome. This led to 
an increasing reliance on imports of chrome from the USSR. This dependency on the 
preeminent geopolitical rival for global hegemony was not only criticized on the obvious 
strategic grounds but also for economic reasons. The price of Soviet chrome swiftly rose 
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and the quality proved to be far inferior to that of Rhodesian chromite. Furthermore, it 
was suggested other Western nations, despite sanctions, were not averse to purchasing 
Rhodesian chrome.279   
                      By the time that Nixon took office in January 1969 the chrome issue had 
developed into a focal political question. In October of 1968, three months before 
Nixon’s inauguration, Congressman Thomas B. Curtis (R-Missouri) had warned that the 
U.S. was becoming overly dependent on the USSR for its supply of chromite ore and 
noting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, queried as to whether Salisbury was a 
greater threat to global peace than Moscow. In his early years in office,  Nixon was urged 
by a number a high profile political figures including Senators’ Thurmond and Eastland, 
Congressman Howard R. Pollock and Acheson to repeal sanctions and allow the flow of 
Rhodesian chrome back into the U.S. Commerce and the OEP also advocated the 
importation of Rhodesian chrome on strategic and economic grounds.280  
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               On April 16 1969, Union Carbide Corporation submitted an application to 
import 150,000 tons of chrome ore under the ‘hardship exemption’ which had 
accompanied the  Executive Order of 1967. Two other companies, Foote Mineral and 
Corning Glass also applied for exemptions to import chrome and petalite respectively. 
The ‘exemption’ allowed Rhodesian goods that had beeen paid for but not exported 
before January 5 1967 to be licensed for import on the grounds of undue hardship. The 
application of Corning Glass did not fall under this criteria and was easily dismissed. The 
other two cases would prove far harder to decide.281 
             Union Carbide had been active in Rhodesia since 1923. By 1969 the company 
had a gross investment of $17 million dollars in the UDI state. It operated through two 
affiliated companies Rhodesia Chrome Mines Limited and Africa Chrome Mines 
Limited. On November 14 1966 Union Carbide paid $2 million to Ruighoek Chrome 
Mines a subsidiary in South Africa. Ruighoek was responsible for the distribution of 
Rhodesia Chrome Mines. On December 16, a further $1 million was paid to Ruighoek 
which then five days later transferred $2,680,000 to Rhodesia Chrome Mines as payment 
for 150,000 tons of chrome ore for export to the U.S..282  
             The case of Foote Mineral was somewhat different. The company had been 
present in Rhodesia since 1932 as the sole owner of Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation. In 
January 1967, after the date of the Executive Order, the company orally requested the 
permission of the Treasury Department to transfer $74,000 a month for the maintenance 
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of a mine owned by its subsidiary in order to keep minimum production going otherwise 
the mine would flood. The transfer of the funds was solely for the maintenance of the 
mine and the ore produced was kept stockpiled above ground. On January 2 1968, the 
Rhodesian Government took over the operation. On the grounds, that there would no 
further financial benefit to the Smith regime as the chrome had already been paid for, 
Foote Mineral submitted two applications, on September 27 1967 and August 28 1968 to 
the Treasury Department to import 57,000 tons of chrome ore mined after January 1967. 
Both were refused by Treasury.283  
          In the spring of 1969, on the advice of White House staffer, Patrick Buchanan, 
Nixon overruled State Department objections to the importation of the ore by Union 
Carbide and Foote Mineral and asked Kissinger to implement the decision. Kissinger, 
however, guided by the recommendation of Morris, successfully convinced Nixon that it 
would be more prudent to wait and only consider specific actions in light of the 
upcoming NSC review on Southern Africa. Morris and Kissinger were concerned that not 
only were the legal aspects of the case in dispute but that neither the black African 
nations nor the Rhodesians would see it as a simple deal. Morris described it as ‘not only 
an economic benefit to U.S. firms but a clear political windfall for Rhodesia.’ There were 
also fears acceptance would leave the administration open to domestic criticism from the 
political left.284  
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             The August report of the Interagency Group tasked with NSSM 39 concluded 
that the Union Carbide application was prohibited by the Executive Order and violated 
the intent of UN sanctions but could be justified under the hardship exemption. The Foote 
Mineral application, though, could not be granted under the terms of the Executive Order 
or hardship provision.285  
            Following the NSC Meeting in December 1969, Nixon agreed to a proposal from 
Kissinger that as the two cases involved potentially intricate legal issues then the 
application should be submitted to a further interagency group for study. In NSDM 38, 
Nixon ordered that representatives from State, Treasury and Commerce should study the 
Union Carbide case under the chairmanship of the Justice Department to clarify status 
under present regulations. On January 28, Deputy Attorney-General Richard Kleindienst 
submitted to the White House the opinion that Union Carbide should receive approval. 
The State Department, however, disagreed and submitted its own negative report.286 
          NSDM 47 which closed the U.S. Consulate also directed an urgent review of all 
existing regulations implementing UN sanctions against Rhodesia and all pending 
applications for imports especially chrome ore. The comprehensive review was 
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conducted by personnel from State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, the Attorney 
General’s Office, the OEP and the NSC. At the end of April, the group report was 
submitted to the White House by Secretary Rogers.  The group concluded that that U.S. 
security was not adversely affected by sanctions at the present time and that observation 
of sanctions should be consistent with the anti-apartheid and pro-sanctions policy 
statements of the government.287   
              Regarding chrome imports and the Union Carbide application, State continued to 
oppose an exemption on the grounds that the company had paid the monies after the UN 
had passed mandatory sanctions and would also lead to accusations that Washington had 
brought about the collapse of the embargo. On the other extreme, Commerce and the 
OEP were opposed to the overall embargo on chrome imports as it left the U.S. 
excessively dependent on the USSR for chrome and vulnerable to Soviet manipulation of 
prices. Justice and the Treasury took a middle ground favoring the approval of the Union 
Carbide application as an exception to general approval of denying all license 
applications.288  
            The White House also began to feel increased pressure from key political allies to 
approve both the Union Carbide and Foote Mineral applications. On March 19, Senator 
Eastland in a letter to the White House expressed concern about the American refusal to 
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protect its own strategic interests. He argued that strict compliance with sanctions was 
cutting U.S. off from an abundant and dependable source of high grade chrome ore in 
Rhodesia leaving Washington now heavily dependent on Moscow.289  
            One month later, Strom Thurmond informed Nixon that he would gain greater 
support from Republican voters by rescinding the Executive Order which banned chrome 
imports. According to the senator, the embargo threatened national security due to 
dependence on Moscow for chrome, it was imposed without sufficient basis in law as the 
UN Charter forbade interference in internal affairs of states and as the basis of embargo 
was to support the UK, now that Rhodesia was a republic there was no reason to accept 
crown jurisdiction over that nation. Finally, he argued that the embargo had only served 
to alienate Rhodesia leading to the adoption of more extreme policies.290 
            On August 7,  the NSC reviewed the issue of chrome imports and specifically the 
two cases for hardship exemptions. Two days later on August 9, Nixon issued NSDM 75. 
On the advice of Kissinger, Nixon chose to take a middle ground on the issue of the 
chrome imports. The NSDM approved the Union Carbide application, contingent upon 
the confirmation by Treasury of the facts stated by the company on their application, and 
further approved  licenses for U.S. firms to sell their assets in Rhodesia to any buyer.291  
          The President, however, ordered a more active effort to ensure better compliance 
by other industrial nations with the UN sanctions and continued the embargo of the 
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importation of Rhodesian goods from any firm which entered into the transaction after 
the effective date of the Executive Order. Treasury was also to inform U.S. firms of tax 
relief provision if affected by sanctions or Rhodesian currency restriction. It is significant 
to note that Kissinger himself approved drafting of the NSDM in such a way as to 
minimize the possibility of the directive being misinterpreted as a liberalization or 
relaxation of the Rhodesian embargo 292 
          Treasury informed Union Carbide of the decision and  subsequently granted the 
exemption on September 18 1970. Foote Mineral was notified of the failure of its own 
application but remained defiant, stating in the Johannesburg Star on September 26 that 
the company had no plans to sell its chrome assets in Rhodesia. It would not be long, 
however, before the Byrd Amendment allowed Foote Mineral, Union Carbide and any 
other American company to import as much chrome as they wished from their interests in 
Rhodesia.293   
          As early as the fall of 1968, the question allowing the importation of Rhodesian 
chrome had been raised in Congress. This issue took on a new urgency in 1970 when 
Senator Eastland advocated for S.R. 367 which aimed to restore trading relations with 
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Rhodesia. While the bill failed to pass, by early 1971, pro-Rhodesia supporters in 
Congress had devised a new formula to obtain Rhodesian chrome.294 
           On February 22, Representative Collins, introduced H.R. 4712 which sought to 
amend the UN Participation Act of 1945 to prevent the prohibition of the importation of 
any metal bearing ore from a free world country so long as the importation of the same 
ore from a communist country was not prohibited by law. In other words, Collins sought 
to legitimize chrome imports from ‘free world’ Rhodesia by a legal justification that the 
U.S. was importing chrome from the ‘communist’ Soviet Union. On March 3, the term 
‘metal bearing ore’ was deleted and replaced by ‘strategic and critical material’. Within 
weeks Senator Harry F. Byrd  proposed a similar bill as S.R. 1404.295  
            In June, the House Foreign Affairs Committee met to consider H.R. 4712. Collins 
made an impassioned argument which not only noted the danger of the Russian 
monopoly on chrome but also observed that on the issue of race the proportion of blacks 
in the Rhodesian House and Senate was far higher than in the U.S. House or Senate. The 
Congressman further asked  ‘Why should Rhodesia be singled out when there is not a 
single democracy in the whole continent of Africa. If self-determination is a United 
Nations feature, why do we do business with Russia, Red China, Latin-American 
dictatorships or any other authoritarian country?’ The committee, though, was 
unconvinced and the measure failed. On August 5, the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations also disposed of S.R. 1404. 296 
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          It is important to note that the State Department strongly opposed the anti- 
sanctions bills and worked openly to defeat them. On May 14 and June 17, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, David Abshire sent strongly worded 
letters to the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee opposing the legislation. 
Assistant Secretary of State, David Newsom and John Armitage, the Director of the State 
Department Office of UN Political Affairs testified at House Foreign Affairs 
subcommittees and Senate Foreign Relations subcommittees urging the defeat of the 
sanctions busting bills.297  
          The dual Congressional rejection should have ended the question but Senator Byrd 
proved to be a wily and determined political operator. Byrd was aware that the Military 
Procurement Act had already been passed by the House and was being considered by the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. Fellow conservatives Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) 
and Strom Thurmond, as well as Byrd himself, were members of the committee. Byrd 
introduced most of the language of S.R. 1404 as an amendment to the act and 
successfully attached Section 503, or the Byrd Amendment, to the bill by a vote of 13-0. 
In the words of Lake, ‘Byrd caught the liberals totally by surprise with a parliamentary 
masterstroke’.298  
          The appearance of the Byrd Amendment on the legislative scene divided the 
administration. On September 13, Secretary of State Rogers advised the President that 
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‘adherence to the U.N. sanctions continues to be sound and in our national interest. It 
meets the basic considerations of maintaining our credibility in Africa, observing our 
international obligations, and upholding the authority of the United Nations.’299  
           In contrast, Nixon was determined that the amendment should succeed. On 
September 28, he told Kissinger; ‘I am for the Byrd Amendment…Don’t let State pucker 
out of this and sink the goddamn-we want to continue to buy that chrome.’ The President 
was urged, however, by Kissinger, to demonstrate, at least publicly, opposition to Section 
503. While Kissinger was not enamored by the sanctions on Rhodesia and would have 
been pleased to be rid of them he felt that it could only happen at the right time and under 
the right circumstances. In his view, the Byrd Amendment could lead to excessive 
political costs both domestically and internationally. Kissinger felt that it was in Nixon’s 
best interests to indicate opposition and let Congress take the heat.300 
         Section 503 faced significant Congressional resistance from liberals and Africanists 
as well as opposition from the State Department. The bill, though, now had the backing 
of the powerful Armed Services Committee and its influential Chairman John C. Stennis 
(D-Mississippi), a man who held similar racialist views as Byrd himself. Many believed 
business interests, including Union Carbide and Foote Mineral, as well as the RIO 
actively pressed on Capitol Hill for the passage of this legislation.301 
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                On September 23, an amendment introduced by Senator Gale McGee (D-
Wyoming), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, which would have deleted Section 
503 was defeated on the floor. A second proposal by Senator Fulbright (D-Arkansas) 
which would have given the President the power to refuse to implement the legislation if 
national interest or a treaty obligation required him to do was defeated on October 6. On 
November 5, a committee comprising of members from both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate filed a report in favor of the amendment highlighting the 
urgent national need for Rhodesian chrome. Five days later, on November 10, the 
Military Procurement Act was passed by the House and the following day was approved 
by the Senate.302  
                 The White House, prior to the passage of the bill, had asked Senators’ Peter H. 
Dominick (R-Colorado) and William E. Brock (R-Tennessee) to propose an amendment 
which would delay the execution of the Byrd Amendment. On October 28, the Brock 
Amendment, pushed the effective date of the Byrd bill to January 1 1972. The 
presidential action was done to aid the British in their upcoming negotiations with Ian 
Smith. British officials had signaled concern that the enactment and implementation of 
the Byrd Amendment could have a negative effect on the talks with the Rhodesians.303 
                 The Military Procurement Act was signed by Nixon on November 17, 1971. 
Under Section 503, the act authorized the importation of seventy-two strategic and 
critical minerals from Rhodesia. The most important of these minerals were chrome, 
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ferrochrome and nickel. Secretary of State Rogers had expressed concern, informing 
Nixon that ‘It will be valid and effective legislation under the constitution but will 
constitute a clear violation of our international legal obligations’. At the suggestion of 
Rogers, endorsed by Kissinger, in an attempt to mitigate the harmful political impact of 
the provision, Nixon gave a public statement which explained the limited character of the 
chrome ore exemption and reaffirmed overall Rhodesia policy including support of 
sanctions pending a satisfactory negotiated settlement.304  
            The Department of State remained anxious at the potential international 
ramifications of Section 503. In late December, Rogers urged Nixon to circumvent the 
Byrd Amendment by using Section 5 (a) of the UN Participation Act to prohibit the 
import of Soviet chromite which in turn would allow the U.S. to continue to prohibit 
Rhodesian chrome. He also suggested the possibility of removing chrome from the list of 
critical and strategic minerals or asking Congress for a six month delay before 
implementation.305 
            The proposals by State were strongly opposed by other government agencies. The 
Treasury disputed the legality of using Section 5 of the UN Participation Act to prohibit 
importation of Soviet chromite. It also noted that there was no UN ban on Russian 
chromite. Commerce feared that such a move would put at risk overall trade with the 
USSR while the OEP condemned the concept of delisting chrome. The OEP insisted that 
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not only was chrome a strategic material but that tampering with the standards 
jeopardized the whole stockpile policy and furthermore was an evasion of Congressional 
intent. The third option, a delay in implementation was difficult logistically given that 
Congress was out of session.306  
             Kissinger also signaled his opposition to the State Department proposals and 
recommended the implementation of Byrd Amendment as Congress intended. Nixon 
concurred and instructed Treasury to draw up the necessary changes in regulations to 
allow the importation of Rhodesian chrome. On January 25, the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control at the Treasury Department issued a General License allowing the importation of 
Rhodesian chrome, ferrochrome as well as any other material deemed to be strategic and 
critical.307   
           The passage of the Byrd Amendment was celebrated by the Rhodesian 
Government. The legislation would not only provide much needed foreign exchange but 
was a huge psychological boost to the embattled Smith regime. In December 1971, the 
RIO held a Christmas party at which the invitees revelled in the success of Section 503. 
According to Lake, there was even a special festive song enitled the ‘503 Club Marching 
Song’ to the tune of ‘O Tannenbaum’. U.S. mining interests were also quick to take 
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advantage of the new law. The first chromite shipment of 25,000 tons arrived at 
Burnside, Louisiana in March 1972. The consignee was the Foote Mineral Company.308                                             
           African countries, however, expressed dismay and the UNSC approved a 
resolution which included clauses expressing deep concern over the Congressional action 
and urged Washington to co-operate fully in effective implementation of sanctions. 
Domestically, liberals and supporters of the UN were horrified that the U.S. would be 
doing business with the white controlled pariah regime. President Nixon was publicly 
critical although he laid the blame on Congress for passing the controversial legislation. 
In private, however, he remained supportive of the Byrd Amendment and was so 
infuriated by UN criticism that he even threatened to cut off financial support to the 
international organization.309 
             Congressional opponents of Section 503 moved swiftly to remove the 
amendment. As early as April 17 1972, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to 
repeal the Byrd Amendment but the subsequent floor motion by Senator McGee was 
defeated by Byrd and his supporters. In July, an attempt by Representative Donald Fraser 
(D-Minnesota) to convince the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to amend the 
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foreign aid bill to include a section which would have repealed the Byrd Amendment was 
also unsuccessful.310 
               The attempts at repeal enjoyed strong support at the State Department but the 
White House, on the advice of Kissinger, while taking the public line that U.S. legislation 
should be in line with its international treaty obligations, also highlighted the fact that 
responsibility lay with Congress. In May, presidential spokesman Jerry Warren stated 
‘The Congress enacted the Byrd Amendment. And the Congress is now reviewing the 
legislation to seek conformity with the United States’ international obligation. So it is up 
to the Congress.’311 
                In the words of Kissinger, such an approach ‘would relieve us of responsibility 
for the Byrd Amendment and its treaty violations, put the monkey squarely on the 
Senate’s back where it belongs and help defuse criticism in Africa and UN.’ The 
administration did not wish to antagonize Senator Byrd and the chrome lobby by 
supporting repeal but equally wished to evade any blame for the treaty violations. This 
approach evoked the ire of Senator McGee who claimed that he had been misled by the 
White House which had promised to call key senators to press for repeal but never did.312 
              On May 25 1973, Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced repeal legislation which 
was then considered at the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa in September. 
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Both the U.S. Representative to the UN, and Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs Newsom testified in support of S.R. 1868. The motion moved to the floor where 
on December 18 despite a a ‘silent filibuster’ by Senator Byrd the bill successfully passed 
54-37. The House Foreign Affairs Committee also approved the repeal legislation but the 
issue was not scheduled for action until August 1974.313               
             By the fall of 1973, the administration had adopted a slightly stronger approach 
on repeal. On September 7, at his hearing for the nomination to be Secretary of State, 
Kissinger stated that the White House supported repeal legislation. Tangible actions on 
behalf of repeal remained lacking though and the new posture appears to have 
represented little more than lip service to ending the importation of Rhodesian chrome.314 
           Following the Senate’s approval of repeal the fight had moved to the House of 
Representatives. The legislation, however, did not reach a floor vote during Nixon’s 
tenure in office. The Byrd Amendment, which allowed U.S. companies to openly violate 
UN sanctions, would become a problem for his successor in the Oval Office, President 
Gerald R. Ford.315 
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The Smith-Home Agreement: how to handle an independent but pariah Rhodesia? 
          In November 1971, the British and Rhodesian Governments’ signed the Smith-
Home Agreement which both parties hoped would lead to a fully independent Rhodesia. 
The White House, while supportive of the settlement, nevertheless fretted over the 
implications for the United States of any deal which allowed an independent Rhodesia to 
remain under white minority rule. It was feared that American support of the settlement 
and recognition of Rhodesia, as urged by London, would cause an hostile reaction in 
black Africa affecting U.S. strategic, political and economic interests and create an 
opening for Chinese and Soviet exploitation. Nixon therefore privately backed the British 
position but ordered a comprehensive review to gauge the probable international reaction 
and the options available to Washington in dealing with an independent but 
internationally ostracized Rhodesia. 
         On June 18 1970, the Conservative Party triumphed in the British general elections. 
The Conservatives, typically more amenable towards Rhodesia, stated that they sought a 
new initiative to solve the issue. It was also brought to the attention of President Nixon 
that the Conservative leaders were in favor of relaxing sanctions and the arms embargo. 
The new Prime Minister, Edward Heath, indicated to Salisbury that his Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, would be the key player in any future negotiations.316 
            As early as April 1971, unofficial British emissaries Sir Max Aitken and Lord 
Goodman were in Rhodesia for informal negotations with Smith and the RF. The 
tentative preliminary discussions on a potential settlement continued over the summer 
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months and by early November British Ambassador Cromer informed Rogers that the 
British were confident the negotiations had reached a stage where a settlement on the 
basis of the five principles was possible.317 
            On November 15, Douglas-Home flew into Salisbury to finalize the potential 
agreement. London informed Washington that two elements remained in dispute between 
the parties. First, the insistence that Rhodesia rolled back the racially discriminatory laws 
enacted since UDI and secondly the British wish to establish that they have 
independently confirmed that the settlement was acceptable to all Rhodesians regardless 
of skin color. Douglas-Home would not agree to any settlement that did not reflect the 
wishes of the population.318 
            The Rhodesians were also confident of achieving a successful settlement. In 
September, while on a private hunting trip in Mozambique, NSC staffer Kent Crane was 
contacted by a senior Rhodesian Foreign Ministry official. The Rhodesian stated that 
Salisbury was confident of its ability to reach an agreement with UK and believed that 
most black ruled neighboring countries would accept a reasonable settlement. He 
expressed hope that the U.S. would not oppose any deal worked out.319  
            Kissinger, however, believed that it was extremely naïve of London to consider 
that any agreement that the UK made with Smith would be satisfactory to the majority of 
UN members. He viewed the negotiations as an opportunity for the Chinese to assert 
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leadership among non-white states and allowed the USSR to be ‘super virtuous’  in 
supporting inevitable African criticism of the sell out. Nevertheless, the U.S. was in favor 
of a settlement and did not wish to place obstacles in the path of the British in achieving 
this goal. While keeping a low public profile on the negotiations, Nixon sent a message to 
the Rhodesian leadership via a South African intermediary stating that he believed a 
settlement was in Rhodesia’s interests.320 
          On November 21, the Home-Smith Agreement was formally signed in Salisbury. 
The settlement provided for unimpeded progress to majority rule albeit through a 
complex two phase formula. First, the creation of a new African voting roll with the same 
qualifications as for whites and more liberal procedures to permit Africans gradually to 
increase their representation in House of Assembly to parity. In the second phase, a ten 
additional seats created for representatives from the common voting roll making possible 
an African majority. The agreement also provided guarantees against retrogressive 
amendment to the constitution.321 
              The settlement also demanded an immediate improvement in the political status 
of the African population through an expanded franchise. The UK would provide 50 
million pounds in development aid over 10 years to be matched ‘appropriately’ by the 
Rhodesians for education, job opportunities and other resources to allow increasing 
numbers of Africans to the meet educational and property qualifications to vote. There 
would also be progress towards ending racial discrimination through a new and stronger 
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Declaration of Rights enforceable in the courts. Furthermore, a commission would review 
existing racially discriminatory laws and regulations including the notorious Land Tenure 
Act and recommend changes to the Rhodesian Government. Finally, London would need 
to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of 
Rhodesia as a whole.322  
                The British were pleased with the outcome of the negotiations. Prime Minister 
Heath wrote to Nixon that the UK believed that the agreement with Smith could be 
demonstrated to be in full accordance with the first four principles and we hope to show 
can be acceptable to the Rhodesian people under the fifth principle comprising of the test 
of acceptability. Heath stated that ‘I am sure that the settlement offers the Africans in 
Rhodesia a real prospect of political, social and economic advance. It is moreover likely 
to be the last opportunity for achieving this.’ The prime minister, though, highlighted the 
importance of gaining international acceptance and asked for American help in achieving 
this.323 
               British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Joseph Godber 
was subsequently dispatched to Washington by Heath to explain the mechanics of the 
agreement and elucidate U.S. support. He met with both Under Secretary of State John N. 
Irwin and U.S. Ambassador to the UN George Bush. While noting that under the terms of 
the settlement it could take up to thirty years until majority rule, this could be accelerated 
if the Africans accepted the plan and the white Rhodesians lived up to their promises. The 
British realized that Sithole and Nkomo would reject the agreement but felt that many 
                                                 
322 Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from Marshall Wright. Rhodesian Agreement. November 27 1971. 
NSC Country Files, Rhodesia Vol 2 (1970-1974) Box 743. Nixon Library. 
323 Text of Message to President Nixon from Prime Minister Edward Heath via British Embassy, 
Washington D.C. November 24 1971. NSC Country Files, Rhodesia Vol 2 (1970-1974) Box 743. Nixon 
Library. 
 
 
172 
 
Africans realized that the deal was the only hope of preventing the slide of Rhodesia into 
the embrace of apartheid South Africa.324 
                In Rhodesia, Smith stated that, with the exception of the extreme right wing of 
the RF, both white and black Rhodesian communities were happy with the outcome of 
the Smith-Home Agreement. In his view, the settlement enshrined the principle of 
majority rule but ‘there would be no mad rush into a one man one vote with the resultant 
corruption, nepotism, chaos, and economic disaster which we had witnessed in all the 
countries around us.’ He noted, however, the danger of extremists mounting a ‘no’ 
campaign based on intimidation and urged that the test of acceptability take place before 
Christmas.325 
                President Nixon, upon the announcement of the Home-Smith Agreement, 
indicated American acceptance of the deal if all the Rhodesian parties agreed. The 
administration, however, was deeply concerned about the potential impact of the 
settlement on U.S. interests. In November, Nixon ordered NSSM 142 which directed that 
the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa prepare a review of the implications for 
Washington of a British-Rhodesian settlement that acknowledged independence and 
termination of sanctions. Specifically the NSSM was to assess the probable reaction at 
the UN, the legal, political and economic implications involved in U.S. recognition of an 
independent Rhodesia, identify alternate courses of action and the probable consequences 
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of each possible action on American interests at UN and bilateral relations with the 
countries concerned.326  
             On December 22 1971, the Interdepartmental Group for Africa sent Kissinger the 
NSSM 142 study on the Rhodesian settlement. The report noted that the UK believed that 
it had achieved the best possible settlement under the circumstances and that it would 
provide better prospects for the African population than if Rhodesia continues to follow 
the South African model. The Interdepartmental Group, though, warned that the 
proposals fell short of the standards set earlier by the British. The study also noted the 
widespread opposition among African states and at the UN condemning the settlement 
and calling on the UK to reassert control and grant independence only after majority 
rule.327  
              In terms of American interests the report observed that economically a 
Rhodesian settlement would allow the U.S. to resume control over $56 million worth of 
U.S. investments. In addition, while the passage of the Byrd Amendment allowed the 
importation of chrome, only with a settlement would the American businesses actually 
gain access to the mines. On a strategic level, the U.S. would gain overflight and landing 
rights.328 
             Rhodesia, however, under continued minority rule, would remain a point of 
instability and racial conflict. This would also be in conflict with U.S. policy which 
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opposed continued white control and supported the earliest possible achievement of 
majority rule. American support of the settlement and recognition of Rhodesia would also 
cause an adverse reaction in black Africa affecting strategic, political and economic 
interests and create an opening for Chinese and Soviet exploitation. The study also 
pointed out that legally the U.S. needed to fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter 
regarding Security Council decisions already in force.329                       
           The British Commission, led by Lord Pearce, arrived in Rhodesia in early January. 
As noted anxiously by the liberal American Committee on Africa, the Pearce 
Commission was an all white group made up of British lords and peers who were 
unlikely to sympathize with the black population. Smith, though, was also displeased as 
he had hoped that the whole agreement would be finalized by the New Year. He 
complained bitterly that British procrastination had allowed the African Nationalists to 
establish cells in all districts and create a nationwide campaign of intimidation. It was 
soon clear that the test of acceptability was not going as well as the British and 
Rhodesians had hoped. As early as January 20, the White House was receiving reports of 
riots in Rhodesia against the settlement.330              
              In May, the British Government published the official report of the Pearce 
Commission which stated that while most of white Rhodesians were in favor of the 
Home-Smith Agreement the majority of the black population opposed the deal. London 
honored the findings of the commission leading to the collapse of the settlement. White 
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Rhodesians blamed the failure of the test of acceptability on a small minority of activists 
who coerced the black population into opposing the agreement. In the words of an Air 
Rhodesia stewardess; ‘It is all those bloody agitators. Africans wouldn’t turn down all 
those schools we’re offering them unless there was intimidation’.331   
              For the White House, however, mired in the conflict in Vietnam and concerned 
with the upcoming presidential election, the failure of the the Home-Smith Agreement 
simply removed a potential headache from the international picture. Rhodesia would be 
of little significance to Nixon for the remainder of his term in office. For the beleagured 
president, the controversy over the Watergate scandal would prove to be the time 
consuming and exhausting legacy of his second term. Furthermore, in terms of foreign 
policy, Nixon, facing conservative criticism over détente with the USSR, a crisis in the 
Middle East and the repercussions over the withdrawal from Vietnam had little time or 
interest to deal with Southern Africa.332                
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The Nixon Years 
             The Nixon Administration came into office determined to formulate a new 
foreign policy based on a pyramid of cooperation and balance between the strongest 
nations with the United States at the apex. The Nixon years were further characterized by 
the solidification of alliances with regional powers who could voluntarily shoulder 
responsibility for their area of the globe. In the case of Southern Africa, the White House  
opted to develop closer relations with Pretoria and to a lesser extent ‘communication’ 
with Salisbury despite their racialist policies. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that the 
U.S. needed to prioritize the protection of its own strategic and economic interest and not 
worry about the domestic agenda of its global partners.  
            On a strategic level, the White House was concerned about potential communist 
expansion in the region and American access to the mineral wealth of Rhodesia notably 
reestablishing a steady supply of free-world chrome. Salisbury also enjoyed considerable 
support on Capitol Hill including a number of highly influential senators with close ties 
to Nixon himself. Furthermore, as noted by Horne, the ‘Southern Africa Strategy’ of 
closer relations with Pretoria and Salisbury both reflected and harmonized the domestic 
‘Southern Strategy’ of public condemnation of racially discriminatory legislation but a 
private lack of vigor in pushing for meaningful change. On an electoral level, this dual 
approach had the perceived benefit of appealing to a large percentage of the American 
electrorate especially in the southern states. 
             The apparent success of Rhodesia in continuing to prosper, albeit with South 
African support, despite the UN sanctions and the fact that the Rhodesian military 
appeared more than competent enough to defeat any internal or external security threat 
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also affected decision making. This of course led to the further line of argumentation 
from supporters of Rhodesia that as the whites would remain firmly in control for the 
foreseeable future then surely the U.S. should accept this and deal with them as the de 
facto government of that nation.  
              The White House, though, was also aware of the potential political costs of 
appearing too ‘friendly’ with white controlled regimes of Southern Africa. By 1969, The 
Afro-Asian bloc was becoming increasingly powerful at the UN and national interest 
dictated the avoidance of any actions which would overly aggravate these new nations. In 
addition, on a geostrategic level, closer ties with apartheid South Africa or Rhodesia 
would hand the moral initiative to the China or the USSR who were staunch supporters of 
the Nationalist movements. In the case of Rhodesia, overt American support would also 
antagonize ties with London, the de jure authority, potentially weakening the transatlantic 
alliance. At home, any association with the white minority governments would be taken 
as reflective of the adminsistration’s domestic stance on racism with the inevitable liberal 
backlash.        
             The White House was thus faced with three broad choices as identified in NSSM 
39. First, a relaxation of relations leading to increased communication and involvement 
with the authorities in Pretoria and Salisbury in order to protect national strategic and 
economic interests as well as placating the domestic ‘Rhodesia Lobby’. Secondly, limited 
association with both the white states and black Africa that which would protect some of 
the American interests in the white states but lead to only minimal damage politically. 
Finally, dissociation from the white regimes and closer ties to black Africa which would 
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give Washington greater credibility among the African states, at the UN, counteract 
Chinese and Soviet influence and avoid domestic criticism from liberal Americans.   
              Nixon, of course opted for the relaxation of relations with South Africa and 
Rhodesia. As the President himself observed at the NSC meeting of December 1969, the 
U.S. must focus on its own national interest and not worry about the domestic policies of 
other nations. It is significant, though, that the White House stopped short of the 
‘Acheson option’ of full normalization of ties with the white states. Full diplomatic 
relations was considered too damaging in terms of political costs both globally and 
domestically. 
              When geostrategic and economic interests coincided, though, as was the case 
with obtaining access to Rhodesian chrome, then Nixon demonstrated no qualms in 
placing Washington in direct violation of UN sanctions and incurring the ire of the world 
community in order to achieve his objectives. In the geopolitics of the Cold War, the 
White House was troubled by the perception of a growing U.S. dependence of Soviet 
chrome both politically and commercially. For the Nixon Administration, ensuring a 
supply of free world chrome from a vehemently anti-communist nation trumped the 
domestic and international ramifiations of doing business with the practitioners of white 
minority rule.    
            Nixon, however, like his predecessor Lyndon B. Johnson, continued to support 
the British efforts to return Salisbury to ‘legality’. On the question of the U.S. Consulate, 
there was little doubt that Nixon on a personal level favored the continued presence of a 
consul in Rhodesia. The increasing diplomatic pressure from London, however, led to its 
closure. It is important to note that the continuing presence of the consulate would have 
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been a boost to the diplomatic aspirations of the Rhodesians as most Western nations 
looked to Washington to provide the lead on the potential recognition of the new 
republic. The private support that Nixon gave to the Home-Smith Agreement, despite 
concerns over the international reaction, further demonstrated that the administration was 
content to leave the political aspects of the Rhodesian issue in the hands of the former 
colonial power in London.           
        During the Nixon era, geostrategic Cold War concerns dominated presidential 
thinking on Southern Africa. While supportive of British efforts to achieve a political 
settlement, Nixon and Kissinger also sought closer ties with the vehemently anti-
communist Rhodesians for both strategic and economic reasons. U.S. interest in a 
political solution for Rhodesia would change dramatically under his successor in the Oval 
Office, President Gerald R. Ford. The catalyst, though, was not the presence of a new 
Commander in Chief but events thousands of miles away in southwestern Africa.      
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CHAPTER 3. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE: PRESIDENT 
GERALD R. FORD 
    
         On August 9 1974, as a result of the widely publicized Watergate scandal, President 
Nixon resigned from office, his successor in the White House was Vice President Gerald 
Rudolph Ford. The new president had previously served as a congressman for Michigan 
and House minority leader before his elevation to the Vice Presidency following the 
resignation of Spiro Agnew due to criminal charges of tax evasion and money laundering. 
Ford remains to this day the only individual to assume the presidency without having 
been previously voted into either the presidential or vice presidential office.333 
          President Ford brought to the White House a fundamental sense of integrity, 
decency and morality that had been missing under his predecessor in office. A pleasant, 
engaging and honest man ‘Jerry’ Ford was, according to the Washington Post, ‘the most 
normal, sane, down-to-earth individual to work in the Oval Office since Harry Truman 
left.’ In his memoirs, Secretary of State Kissinger praised Ford for providing purpose and 
leadership to a nation in torment following the angst of Vietnam and Watergate.334 
          Kissinger himself remained a major influence on foreign policy decision making 
acting as both National Security Adviser, until November 1975, and Secretary of State 
for the duration of the Ford Presidency. The primary objective for Kissinger remained 
preventing of the growth of communist influence. Kissinger, though, as noted earlier, 
reacted to events on the ground and was quite prepared to revise his previous positions if 
circumstances dictated that it was in the American interest to do so.  
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           In the case of Southern Africa, the realities on the ground led the Secretary of 
State to become aware that on a pragmatic level the continued presence of the 
increasingly embattled Rhodesian regime, despite its vehement anti communism, 
weakened the U.S. on a geopolitical level. In the view of Kissinger, the changing 
situation in the region, notably the Cuban military intervention in Angola, demonstrated 
the necessity of ending white minority rule in order to prevent further communist gains in 
Africa.     
         The Ford era witnessed the first serious attempts by the U.S. to both actively engage 
in Southern Africa and resolve the longstanding issue of white minority rule in Rhodesia. 
In April 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger reiterated U.S. opposition to white 
domination of Rhodesia stating unequivocally that ‘We support self-determination, 
majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa – in 
the name of moral principle, international law and world peace.’ The Secretary of State 
further laid out a detailed policy designed to end white control and provide a just and 
durable solution. The Lusaka speech symbolized a dramatic departure from previous 
American policy of merely supporting British attempts to end UDI.335 
         In September, following several months of shuttle diplomacy with the British, 
South Africans and Front Line leaders in black Africa, the Ford Administration was able 
to convince Smith to publicly commit to a constitutional settlement based on the principle 
of majority rule. While the subsequent conference in Geneva proved acrimonious and 
failed to produce an agreement, nevertheless, Smith’s public endorsement of majority 
rule denoted a first step along the road to ending the conflict. Furthermore, Kissinger’s 
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personal involvement in the diplomatic mediation, the first time a Secretary of State had 
done so, represented the growing importance that the White House placed in resolving 
the Rhodesian issue.336        
         The stance adopted by the Ford Administration on Rhodesia was shaped by a 
number of factors. First of all, the new president entered the White House with a genuine 
commitment to moral principles that was notably absent from the agenda of his 
predecessor in the Oval Office. Ford was a man of integrity who possessed a sense of 
fairness and justice that on a moral level opposed any form of racial discrimination as 
fundamentally unjust. In the case of Rhodesia, the Smith regime represented a flagrant 
violation of the principles that Ford stood for.    
          It is worth noting that within days of taking office, Ford, at his own request, 
organized a meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus. In the words of its chairman, 
Charles Rangel (D-NY) the invitation was indicative of the seriousness of Ford to ‘open 
his administration to the advice and counsel of those of us who represent people whose 
views and needs were ignored by the Nixon administration.’ The new approach of the 
White House to engage with African-Americans on a meaningful level was observed by 
the press in Washington DC. It is also worth noting that the primary item on the agenda at 
the presidential meeting with the Black Caucus was American foreign policy in Africa.337 
           It is clear that Ford’s dedication to racial justice extended beyond America itself 
and constituted a new moral approach to the issue of white rule in Rhodesia. In March 
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1976, in Illinois, Ford stated, regarding U.S. policy towards Salisbury; ‘We have to be on 
the right side morally, and the right side morally is to be for majority rule.’ A few weeks 
later in Tyler, Texas the president reiterated his commitement to ‘self-determination’ for 
Rhodesia. The public prouncouncements were mirrored by a private determination to 
achieve a just settlement. At an NSC meeting on Rhodesia later the same year, the 
president stated that it was important to do what was morally right regardless of the 
domestic political consequences. The determination of the Ford Administration to ‘do the 
right thing’ and achieve majority rule in Rhodesia has been highlighted by Carl Peter 
Watts.338    
           The White House was also well aware of the continued need to maintain good 
relations with black Africa. Access to strategic resources and markets remained important 
but there was also growing concern over increasing communist interest in Africa, 
especially Southern Africa. The continued existence of white minority rule in Rhodesia 
was an irritant to maintaining good relations with prominent African countries such as 
Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire and further provided an opportunity for greater communist 
influence on the continent. The White House was well aware of the need to reinforce the 
message that America supported the aspirations of the black independence movements 
for self-determination and majority rule.339 
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            These factors led to presidential support for repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Ford 
and Kissinger believed that repeal of the legislation was necessary on both moral and 
geopolitical grounds. As early as August 20 1974, the White House publicly advocated 
repeal and for the U.S. to cease the importation of Rhodesian chrome. While 
congressional attempts to pass legislation to revoke Byrd ended in failure, nevertheless, 
the adoption of a public posture in favor of repeal represented a marked shift from the 
policy of the previous administration.340 
         Broader active intervention in seeking a viable settlement to the Rhodesian 
problem, however, stemmed primarily from the course of the civil war that erupted in 
Angola as competing factions vied for power following Portuguese decolonization. 
Angola descended into vicious bloodletting as external powers including South Africa, 
with CIA support, and Cuba intervened militarily on behalf of their favored factions.  
         The White House feared the development of a similar situation in Rhodesia would 
have even broader geopolitical complications. Indeed, CIA reports at the time indicated 
that by 1978 the guerrilla forces would have effectively challenged white Rhodesian 
control causing an escalation in hostilities. Ford believed that this could lead to a major 
racial conflict in the region, including a potential South African invasion to prevent the 
establishment of a radical regime hostile to Pretoria, followed by Cuban intervention at 
the behest of the Front Line states.341  
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         The victory of the communist sponsored MPLA, with Cuban military support, in 
Angola and the subsequent establishment of a Marxist oriented government under 
Agostinho Neto heightened anxiety in Washington regarding the Rhodesian situation. 
The White House feared that unless decisive action was taken to provide a negotiated 
solution to the conflict the end result could be the establishment of another radical black 
African state backed by Soviet support and Cuban military power. Such an outcome 
would place the U.S. in the unenviable position of intervening militarily on behalf of the 
white regimes or acquiescing to another communist take over in Southern Africa.342 
          During the Ford era, both the U.S. public and Congress continued to be deeply 
divided on the Rhodesian question and it is important to note that the approach adopted 
by Ford proved to be extremely controversial and damaging to the White House. While 
certain congressional figures such as Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-Michigan) and the Black 
Caucus urged strong measures against Salisbury, presidential correspondence indicated 
widespread support for white Rhodesia and opposition to the imposition of majority rule. 
The attempt by Kissinger to achieve a viable settlement during the summer of 1976 gave 
a major boost to Ford’s opponent in the Republican primaries, former California 
Governor Ronald Reagan, and invoked extreme suspicion among senior Republican 
leaders in Washington.343     
                                                 
342 Minutes of NSC Meeting, May 11 1976, NSA/NSC Meeting File, 1974-1977, Box 2, Ford Library,  
National Security Council Memorandum of Conversation, May 12 1976, NSA Memoranda of 
Conversations, 1973-1977 Box 19, Ford Library, White House Memorandum of Conversation, September 
29 1976, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977 Box 20, Ford Library and Kissinger, Years of 
Renewal, 908-909. 
343 Letter to Florence Lauckner from Press Secretary Ron Nessen, June 30 1976, TA 1, WHCF, Box 4, Ford 
Library, Letter to Congressman Charles B. Rangel from Assistant to the President William E. Timmons, 
August 19 1974, Rhodesian Chrome, Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 Box 19, Ford Library, Letter to 
Special Assistant to the President Stanley S. Scott from Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr. August 14 1974, 
Black Caucus – Meeting with the President, August 1974: General (1), Stanley S. Scott Papers 1971-1977 
Box 3, Ford Library, Letter to President Ford from Chairman of the Harrison Republican Club, Harold P. 
 
 
186 
 
          Overall, the Ford White House adopted a more humane and moral approach to the 
Rhodesian issue than the Nixon Administration. Within weeks of taking office Ford 
publicly announced his support for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and officials from 
the Departments’ of Commerce, State and Treasury testified at congressional hearings in 
favor of repeal. Both Ford and Kissinger publicly endorsed the principle of majority rule 
and called for an end to white control of Rhodesia. Nevertheless, White House interest in 
settling the Rhodesian question was primarily stimulated by the broader geopolitical 
implications of the communist triumph in Angola leading to the fear that the Rhodesian 
conflict could cause a full scale racial war in the region and the creation of a communist 
oriented bloc across Southern Africa.    
 
Repealing the Byrd Amendment: Ford supportive but not prepared to risk 
Republican ire 
            
           As noted in the previous chapter, the so called Byrd Amendment, was an 
attachment to the Military Procurement Act that was passed by Congress in November 
1971 and subsequently signed into law by Nixon. The amendment, provided for the 
importation of any metal bearing ore from a free world country so long as the importation 
of the same ore from a communist country was not prohibited by law. It essentially 
authorized the importation of seventy-two strategic and critical minerals from Rhodesia 
in direct violation of UN sanctions.  
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           For liberals and  advocates of majority rule in Rhodesia, the Byrd Amendment was 
perceived as a symbol of American support of white supremacy in Africa. Among ardent 
foes of the Rhodesian Government, including Congressman Diggs, the Chairman of the 
House Subcommittee on Africa, repeal of the amendment had become an issue of major 
importance. 
            On December 18 1973, while President Nixon was still in office, the Senate 
approved the passage of S.1868 to restore full U.S. compliance with UN sanctions by a 
vote of 63-26. Just over six months later, on June 27 1974 the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee voted 25-9 to report S.1868 to the House floor paving the way for a full vote 
on repealing the Byrd Amendment. In a strong speech the following month Congressman 
Diggs exorted his colleagues to support the passage of S.1868 arguing that it was in the 
long term strategic interests of the U.S. due to the inevitability of political change in 
Southern Africa given the overwhelming black majority and the increasing importance of 
raw materials and other imports from black Africa. Furthermore, it would place 
Washington back in adherence with its international legal obligations which was 
important for a nation which argued for sanctions against other international law 
breakers.344   
         For the White House, the issue of taking a stance on the repeal of the Byrd 
Amendment was an immediate concern. A vote had been scheduled in the House of 
Representatives which would take place on August 20. Indeed, within days of assuming 
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office Ford received a telegram from the Congressional Black Caucus urging him to 
facilitate full administration support for repeal.345  
         Kissinger advised Ford that supporting repeal would be in the best interests of the 
U.S. especially in terms of maintaining good relationships with global partners and 
retaining legitimacy at the UN. Kissinger observed that the British Government was 
under increasing pressure to stop tolerating the U.S. violation of sanctions against 
Rhodesia while for black African countries the Byrd Amendment was seen as reflecting 
American support for white minority rule and was thus an increasing irritant in relations 
with prominent African nations such as Nigeria and Zaire.346  
        The Secretary of State also agreed with Representative Diggs that the continued 
violation of UN sanctions weakened U.S. credibility as a prominent supporter of the UN 
role in peacefully settling international disputes. Kissinger further pointed out that in 
terms of the strategic and economic implications, if the amendment was to be repealed 
the U.S. could meet its chrome requirements from other suppliers including South Africa 
and Turkey. He also noted that according to the Department of Defence the existing 
chrome stockpiles were fully adequate to meet security needs.347 
        Nevertheless, it is clear that Kissinger’s support of repeal was purely rhetorical and 
aimed to deflect any potential international criticism of the White House. At this point he 
expressed no desire to end white political control of Rhodesia or even any great concern 
whether repeal actually succeeded. For Kissinger it was a question of how the 
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administration was perceived over what it might actually achieve. As he expressed to 
Ford, ‘There is no question but that repeal of the Byrd Amendment would be well 
received in the international community. At the same time, were repeal to fail, there 
would be no critical damage either to our bilateral relations or to the role we seek to play 
in the United Nations.’348 
        On August 20, Ford publicly stated that he favored repeal, invoking the ire of Harry 
F. Byrd who reminded the White House that the Byrd Amendment enjoyed widespread 
national support as demonstrated by the fact that it had received the backing of 
Congressman and Senators representatives from forty-six of the fifty states. White House 
correspondence also indicated that the presidential decision proved divisive for the 
American public.349 
       Despite the public declaration of support from the White House the bill was never 
joined on the floor of Congress during the fall of 1974. On a number of occasions a vote 
was scheduled but the forces of repeal backed down fearing defeat. Finally, on December 
19 1974, just minutes before the bill was due to be taken up it was suddenly withdrawn. 
Events in Southern Africa itself had provided a new argument for opponents of repeal. In 
December, under pressure from South Africa, which was engaged in a policy of détente 
with black ruled Africa, Rhodesia had released Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and 
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Joshua Nkomo from detention leading to the prospect of serious negotiations with the 
black Nationalists.350 
        Supporters of the Byrd Amendment therefore argued that if the Rhodesian issue 
would soon be settled then why should Congress penalize American companies by 
forcing them to cancel contracts now which would the require them to compete for new 
contracts when sanctions were lifted. This line of reasoning, together with the increasing 
fears of both the Ford Administration and the Democratic leadership that the bill would 
be defeated causing a major diplomatic embarrassment, led to the brief abandonment of 
repeal.351 
         The New Year, however, saw a resurgence of the efforts in favor of repeal 
legislation. On January 14, Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-Minnesota) introduced a 
new bill to prevent the importation of chrome and other strategic minerals from Rhodesia. 
The bill was bipartisan in nature and co-sponsors included Congressman Diggs. On 
March 18, the bill was approved by the Subcommittee on International Organizations of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. An additional amendment by Fraser, however, that 
required that any imports containing chrome include certification that the chrome did not 
come from Rhodesia caused the bill to be returned to the subcommittee for further 
consideration.352  
           On June 19, the Subcommittee on International Organizations held additional 
hearings which included testimony from the Departments’ of Commerce, Defence, 
                                                 
350 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 204, Lake, The “Tar Baby” Option, 275 and Smith, Bitter Harvest, 
161-165. 
351 DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 204 and Lake, The “Tar Baby” Option, 275. 
352 H.R.1287 (Committee Print) 94th Congress 1st Session, March 18 1975, 6/19/75 – Hearings on 
Rhodesian Chrome (2), David R. MacDonald Papers, 1973-78 Box 18, Ford Library and DeRoche, Black, 
White and Chrome, 207. 
 
 
191 
 
Treasury and State. The testimony of the administration officials, however, was 
indicative of the reluctance of the White House to press the issue of repeal.  While the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles A. James, strongly 
endorsed both the proposed bill and the concept of a certificate of origin, the 
representatives of Commerce, Defence and Treasury, while officially advocating repeal, 
also highlighted U.S. reliance on Rhodesian chrome and criticised the idea of a certificate 
of origin as unenforeceable and potentially damaging to trade interests. The weak 
testimony of administration officials infuriated supporters of House Resolution 1287 who 
observed that the spokesmen couldn’t have been any worse in their testimony had they 
been opposed to repeal.353 
         Nevertheless, the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended the bill to the House in 
July where it met strong opposition from most Republicans as well as the powerful 
Armed Services Committee. During the deliberations, the White House, despite the press 
secretary reiterating support for repeal, made no demonstrable effort to sway Congress 
and Ford himself made no public statements regarding the issue of chrome. For the 
supporters of the H.R. 1287 the lack of support they received from the administration 
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raised further questions about the bona fide nature of presidential commitment for the 
legislation.354   
         On September 25, the House of Representatives rejected the proposed bill by a vote 
of 209-187. While a number of factors contributed to the non-passage of H.R. 1287 
including concerns over access to chrome, the adverse trade implications of the certificate 
of origin and the continued presence of the Rhodesia Lobby on Capitol Hill, nonetheless, 
the lack of tangible White House support for the legislation was clearly a major factor in 
the failure of the bill. Congressman Edward Derwinski (R-Illinois), a prominent defender 
of the Byrd Amendment credited the White House for preserving Section 503 while 
Fraser and Diggs blamed the lack of presidential involvement for the failure of their 
bill.355    
        In early November, Ford consulted with Derwinski and later the same day held a 
meeting with opponents of Section 503 including McGee and Fraser regarding the 
feasibility of reopening repeal legislation in the existing Congressional session. When 
meeting the latter group Ford assured them that he still fully supported repeal but warned 
that the passage of such legislation would be unlikely in the existing Congress. Following 
the meetings the President requested that his aides conduct a check on the possibility of 
reviving the Byrd Amendment and any potential for opponents of repeal to switch votes. 
The subsequent report, however, noted that only four representatives would even 
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consider changing their votes and more ominously the very mention of renewing the 
issue raised a red flag among the majority of Republicans. Based on these findings, the 
White House informed Fraser and the other co-sponsors that they hold off any further 
attempts at repeal until a more favorable congressional situation had arisen.356   
             In terms of the efforts to end the Byrd Amendment and prevent the continued 
importation of Rhodesian chrome the attitude of the Ford Administration is ambiguous. 
Both Ford and Kissinger clearly saw the moral, strategic, political and economic 
advantages of publicly favoring repeal legislation thus placing the U.S. not only back in 
compliance with UN sanctions but also sending the message that Washington shared the 
aspirations of the liberation movements in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia.  
            The White House, however, while openly stating that the administration backed 
H.R. 1287, was unwilling to exert any substantive influence on legislators to force 
through the passage of the legislation. While the documentary record provides no clear 
answer explaining this inaction it likely stemmed from a combination of factors including 
a degree of apathy, an unwillingness to press Republican representatives on a minor issue 
yet one that aroused strong feelings and the calculated recognition that an overt 
declaration of support for repeal would reap global political benefits for the White House 
whether the actual legislation secured passage or not.  
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The crumbling ‘White Redoubt’ sparks anxiety over the potential for communist 
expansion        
              
        While the efforts to end the importation of Rhodesian chrome continued to be 
frustrated in Congress, events far away in Portugal not only posed a far greater threat to 
continued white domination of Southern Africa but also directly stimulated U.S. 
involvement in the seeking a resolution to the Rhodesian problem.   
             As noted in previous chapters, the Portuguese Territories along with Rhodesia 
and South Africa formed a ‘White Redoubt’ against the rising tide of black nationalism. 
The Portuguese military and intelligence services collaborated closely with their 
Rhodesian and South African counterparts and Lisbon along with Pretoria played an 
integral role in assisting Rhodesia circumvent the UN sanctions. Portugal relied on her 
African possessions as an important source of trade for her economy and during the 
autocratic Estado Novo regime was determined to maintain control over the territories 
despite the cost in blood and treasure.357   
             On April 25 1974, the Portuguese Government was overthrown in a military coup 
subsequently supported by a public campaign of civil resistance. The so called ‘Carnation 
Revolution’ stemmed from military opposition to continuing the prolonged colonial wars 
in Africa and the revolutionary forces made an immediate announcement that the new 
government would pursue a negotiated path to independence with the black liberation 
groups. The coup not only brought democracy to Portugal itself but caused a major shift 
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in the balance of power in Southern Africa and opened the door to far reaching changes 
affecting the entire region.358                
           Over the following months Portuguese representatives met with Samora Machel 
the leader of the Mozambican liberation movement FRELIMO. On September 7, in 
Lusaka, Zambia, an agreement was signed giving FRELIMO full power and setting an 
independence date for June 25 1975. On January 15 1975, following negotiations held in 
Portugal, the Alvor Agreement was signed by the Portuguese and the three main Angolan 
guerrilla groups (FNLA, MPLA and UNITA) establishing a transitional government and 
granting full independence on November 11 of that year.359             
.       In Rhodesia, the collapse of the Estado Novo regime and subsequent Portuguese 
retreat from empire, dramatically upped the pressure on the already embattled white 
controlled government. Salisbury not only lost a key ally in the fight against black 
nationalism but the new FRELIMO regime in Maputo allowed the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU, a safe haven just 
across Rhodesia’s porous eastern border. The Rhodesian military were aware of the threat 
and attempts to secure the border included the construction of a ‘Cordon Sanitaire’ 
comprising of a long fenced minefield fitted with an alarm system, however, the over 700 
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mile border was almost impossible for the military to secure and guerrilla units were able 
to cross the frontier with virtual impunity.360 
             The Portuguese withdrawal also left the white Rhodesians increasingly isolated 
in the global community and ever more dependent their southern neighbor across the 
Limpopo river. South Africa provided the sole conduit of note for Rhodesian trade 
including the vital oil supplies and Salisbury relied heavily on the financial and military 
aid provided by Pretoria. As noted by Smith, however, by the early 1970s the South 
African leadership, notably Prime Minister B.J. Vorster had concluded the necessity of 
accomodation with the black nationalists, outside of South Africa itself.361 
            This policy of détente was given greater impetus following the Portuguese retreat 
from Mozambique and Angola. The South Africans sought the transition to power of 
moderate black nationalist leaders who could be controlled or manipulated by the more 
powerful apartheid state. In the case of Salisbury, Pretoria possessed both the desire and 
the leverage to bring about majority rule, albeit as a way to ensure the continued survival 
of white minority control in South Africa. Indeed, despite enjoying military success in 
containing guerrilla activity, South African pressure forced the Rhodesian Government to 
agreed to attend the ultimately futile conference with the Nationalists on the Victoria 
Falls bridge in August 1975.362 
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             In Washington, the White House was aware that the Portuguese coup and 
Lisbon’s subsequent decision to divest itself of its African territories opened the door to 
far reaching changes across Southern Africa. The primary concern of the Ford 
Administration was that the USSR and China would view it as an opportunity to develop 
and extend their influence in the region. In Mozambique, the FRELIMO liberation 
movement was avowedly Marxist while in Angola one of the most influential guerrilla 
groups, the MPLA, was backed by the USSR.363 
              It is worth noting, however, that while Ford and Kissinger were apprehensive 
over the the spread of Marxism in Africa, the administration displayed even greater 
anxiety over the potential of intervention by Moscow and the projection of Soviet 
military power into the region. In spite of its ideologically leftist philosophy, once 
Mozambique gained independence under FRELIMO, Washington offered immediate 
recognition and began the process of establishing diplomatic relations. In contrast, in 
Angola, an escalating civil war and overt Soviet aid to the MPLA led to U.S. involvement 
in yet another guerrilla conflict in an attempt to thwart Moscow and reassert global 
authority in the aftermath of Vietnam. The fact that the White House failed to do so had 
major ramifications not only in Washington but also for white rule in Rhodesia.364 
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Angola: Cuban military power changes the political realities of Southern Africa 
        American intervention in Angola stemmed from the geopolitics of the Cold War. 
The White House was troubled by the possibility that a Marxist government, backed by 
Soviet military strength, could seize political control in Luanda fundamentally altering 
the balance of power in a region that eighteen months before had seemed to be firmly in 
the Western orbit. The failure of the U.S. to prevent the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA 
from gaining power made Washington appear weak globally and collusion with South 
Africa damaged American aspirations to be perceived as a supporter of black liberation.  
        The Angolan debacle also fundamentally altered U.S. policy towards Salisbury. The 
Ford Administration, notably Kissinger, was alarmed at the potential for further 
communist expansion in Southern Africa and believed that the continued existence of the 
increasingly beleaguered white minority regime could encourage Soviet or Cuban 
military intervention on behalf of the Nationalist factions. It was therefore imperative to 
bring an end to the Bush War and establish a moderate pro Western black led government 
in Salisbury. 
           From the late 1960s, as noted by Gerald Bender, Washington had pursued two 
mutually exclusive aims in Angola. First, to express sympathy for the aspirations of the 
right of the Angolan people to self-determination but secondly to support Lisbon which 
was a key NATO ally. Until the Portuguese coup in April 1974, the latter goal assumed 
far greater importance due to Lisbon’s claim of facing a Soviet backed insurgency in its 
African territories and the American desire to maintain the strategically important air 
base on the Azores. Washington along with other NATO countries gave Portugal 
hundreds of millions in military and economic aid. While it was stipulated that U.S. 
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military hardware could not be used in Africa, Portugal routinely broke the agreement 
dispatching tanks, helicopters and planes to its territories while Washington turned a 
blind eye. Under the Nixon White House even this prohibition was relaxed by officially 
allowing the use of dual-use hardware in Portuguese Africa.365  
             In terms of aid to the liberation movements, the CIA had been supporting Holden 
Roberto, the leader of the anti-communist FNLA and brother in law of President Joseph-
Desiré Mobutu of Zaire, a key U.S. ally in the region. Following the Carnation 
Revolution, the U.S. increased aid to the FNLA on the grounds that the group  would 
provide the most stable pro Western government. On January 22, the 40 Committee 
approved a CIA request to increase support for FNLA to $300,000 annually.366 
             On the ground in Angola, however, the Marxist oriented MPLA, armed by the 
USSR and aided by Cuban military instructors, was rapidly emerging as the dominant 
power. By April 1975, according to Kissinger, the MPLA possessed an army of 10,000 
fighters equipped and trained by the communist nations. The level of Soviet intervention 
not only concerned the U.S. but also African nations troubled by the precedent of great 
power interference in the internal affairs of Angola. On April 19, Zambian President 
Kaunda travelled to Washington and urged the White House to oppose the Soviet 
intervention.367 
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             In May, Ford ordered NSSM 224, a comprehensive review of policy towards 
Angola which included the political, economic and military strengths as well as 
ideological orientation of the independence movements, the extent of Soviet involvement 
and the potential role that could be played by neighboring states including South Africa. 
The review reported that while the MPLA had not as yet achieved military superiority 
over the other factions, recent evidence suggested that the USSR had stepped up military 
aid to the movement.368 
          The administration, notably Kissinger, was convinced that American intervention 
in Angola was necessary in order to prevent the MPLA from gaining a military victory 
and thus expanding Soviet sway in Southern Africa. As formal involvement would not 
meet the approval of the black ruled nations, a covert operation backing the anti-
communist groups was seen as the best approach. On July 18, Ford approved a six 
million dollar CIA plan for covert assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA. By 
November, the U.S. had contributed approximately $32 million to ensure the failure of 
the MPLA .369 
          The primary rationale for intervention was Cold War realpolitik. The White House 
feared that establishment of an avowedly Marxist regime in Luanda would not only 
provide a communist sphere of influence in the region but also send a signal to 
neighboring countries that Washington did not possess sufficient interest or will power to 
                                                 
368 105. National Security Study Memorandum 224, Washington, May 26 1975, FRUS, Volume XXVIII 
and 109. Paper prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Washington, 
June 13 1975, FRUS, Volume XXVIII. 
369 111. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington. June 20 1975, FRUS, Volume XXVIII, 115. 
Memorandum for the Record, Washington, July 14 1975, FRUS, Volume XXVIII, 118. Memorandum of 
Conversation, Washington, July 18 1975, FRUS, Volume XXVIII, Bender, “Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy 
of failure”, in American Policy in Southern Africa, ed. Lemarchand, 83-87, DeRoche, Black, White and 
Chrome, 209, Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 258 and 293, Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 802-808 and 
Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, 95. 
 
 
201 
 
prevent the spread of communism globally. An even greater concern was that if the 
USSR was seen as being able to successfully intervene in a civil war thousands of miles 
from Moscow this would demonstrate the global reach of the Soviet military and increase 
the perception of a weakened U.S. in the aftermath of Vietnam. Angola also offered an 
opportunity to reassert American global authority following the morale sapping 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia.370 
           The U.S. was not the only nation which feared the implications of a MPLA 
victory. Pretoria not only opposed the movement on ideological grounds but also feared 
that the MPLA would provide a safe haven for SWAPO guerrillas to attack South-West 
Africa (Namibia) which was administered as a de facto South African possession based 
on a UN trusteeship. On July 14, Prime Minister Vorster approved $14 million of aid to 
the FNLA and UNITA, a few weeks later South African troops crossed into Angola to 
protect the SA financed Cunene River hydroelectric project, this was then followed by a 
second incursion in pursuit of SWAPO fighters.371                        
          In July, U.S. intelligence agencies began to work closely with their South African 
counterparts in a joint endeavor to thwart the MPLA. Washington also pressed Pretoria to 
intervene militarily if the tide of battle continued to flow against their chosen factions. In 
early September, the South African Government authorized the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) to give military assistance and logistical support to the FNLA and UNITA. 
On October 22, Pretoria launched Operation Savannah which sought to eliminate the 
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MPLA from the border region then move north to capture Luanda. The South African 
advance was initially a spectacular success but the SADF was halted by the dramatic and 
unexpected intervention of Cuban combat personnel.372 
          In the spring of 1975, the possibility of Cuban intervention did not occur to either 
policy makers or the CIA. As noted by Gleijeses, however, Havana had a history of 
military involvement in Africa dating back to the mid 1960s. Furthermore, Cubans had 
already fought alongside the MPLA against the Portuguese in Angola. He argues that 
Cuban African policy was driven by a messianic vision to lead revolution, protect Cuba 
itself by creating ‘Cubas’ elsewhere and a special empathy for the Third World. Schmidt 
also points out that Cuban engagement in Africa stemmed from both a desire to challenge 
imperialism but also an ‘emotional link to Africa’ due to nearly one third of Cubans 
boasting of African blood ties.373 
          On November 4, in response to the South African invasion, Cuban President Fidel 
Castro approved Operation Carlota which dispatched military personnel to Angola in 
support of the MPLA. The influx of Cuban troops, which reached between 3,500-4,000 
by the end of the year, along with a massive increase in Soviet arms deliveries which 
dwarfed American aid, boosted the resistance of the MPLA and halted the South African 
advance. Indeed, as early as mid November, the Director of the CIA, William E. Colby 
observed the the tide had begun to turn in favor of the MPLA.374  
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          In November, evidence of the covert American involvement and collusion with 
South Africa, was leaked  to the media causing a public uproar. A furious Kissinger raged 
that the ‘Department is leaking and showing a stupidity unfit for Foreign Service.’ The 
exposure led to criticism in many quarters but most significantly on Capitol Hill.375 
          On December 19, the Senate passed an amendment to the Defence Appropriations 
Bill, which prevented any further clandestine support in Angola. The amendment was 
endorsed by the House of Representatives on January 27. Ford described the legislation 
as ‘deplorable’ while Kissinger, in his memoirs, noted that Congress had been fully 
aware of the operation and was merely acquiesing due to the public outcry. As pointed 
out by Bender and Gleijeses, however, the Congressional decision stemmed from the 
belief that the U.S. backed factions could not win by simply providing them with a few 
million in arms especially when compared to massive Soviet aid and the arrival of Cuban 
combat troops.376 
           Pretoria, already concerned by the situation on the battlefield was dismayed by the 
Congressional decision. In December, the South African National Security Council 
decided to order the military to gradually withdraw from Angola. By early February, the 
South Africans had retreated to a line just north of the Namibian border and on March 27, 
following Angolan assurances not to sabotage the Cunene River hydroelectric project, the 
SADF crossed back into Namibia. Without the military backing of Pretoria, FNLA and 
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UNITA resistance collapsed leaving the MPLA in control of Luanda and the majority of 
the country.377     
            The covert intervention in Angola was a costly failure for the White House. The 
inability of the U.S. to prevent the establishment of the Marxist government in Luanda 
made Washington appear weak especially when contrasted with the ability of Moscow 
and Havana to project their power on a global scale. The success of Operation Carlota 
gave Cuba a base of operations in Southern Africa from which to expand its influence 
while the exposure of American cooperation with apartheid South Africa undermined 
U.S. claims to be a supporter of majority rule. Paradoxically, the South Africans 
themselves, were also angered at being abandoned by Washington and left as the 
scapegoat to be denounced by the international community. The fiasco in Angola directly 
led to a reevaluation of policy towards Southern Africa with ominous implications for the 
embattled white regime in Salisbury. 
 
The legacy of Angola: Ford and Kissinger take aim at Salisbury 
 
           In the aftermath of the Angolan debacle the Ford Administration radically changed 
its outlook on the situation in Southern Africa. The conflict in Angola brought the 
geopolitics of the Cold War into the heart of the region and the success of the MPLA, 
backed by Soviet military aid and Cuban combat troops, gave Moscow and Havana a 
vital foothold from which to expand their influence. In particular, U.S. policy makers and 
intelligence agencies feared that the Cuban success in Angola had strengthened Castro’s 
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belief that the global balance of power had shifted in the wake of Vietnam and reinforced 
his vision of Havana as a potential power broker in Africa.378 
           Thus, following Angola, the primary goal of the White House became the 
prevention of any expansion of Cuban and Soviet influence on the continent and 
especially their potential emergence as a decisive factor in Southern African affairs. In 
order to achieve this objective, Ford adopted a two pronged strategy of seeking to resolve 
existing or potential conflicts to avoid further Cuban military intervention and for 
Washington to demonstrate a greater identification with the black liberation movements 
to demonstrate solidarity with African aspirations for self government and majority rule, 
thus undermining the Soviet claim to be the principal supporter of African freedom.379 
             To Ford and Kissinger, Rhodesia appeared increasingly vulnerable following the 
collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique. Although militarily the Rhodesian 
Government remained in control and the war seemed restricted to the border regions, 
nevertheless, the growing guerrilla insurgency appeared to be the next viable mark for 
Cuban involvement in the region. In early March 1976, information from a Mozambican 
military source indicated that Havana had already established a base camp near Beira, 
supplied MIG aircraft to Maputo and combat troops would soon arrive. Furthermore, the 
State Department warned that the peculiar legal status of Rhodesia made it uniquely 
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vulnerable to a Cuban attack due to the UNSC declaring Salisbury a threat to world peace 
and the widespread support Cuba could obtain to support its case for intervention.380  
           An active American role in achieving a settlement leading to majority rule would 
not only remove a potential target for Havana and Moscow but would also show the 
black African nations that the U.S. was vehemently opposed to continued white control in 
Southern Africa. As noted by DeRoche, however, it is likely Kissinger was also 
influenced by the realization that the clock was ticking on white rule in Rhodesia and it 
was therefore in the best interest of the U.S. to start supporting the black liberation 
movements who would eventually control the nation.381         
           Kissinger also believed that Britain no longer possessed the requisite power and 
leverage to achieve a settlement without American support. In his opinion, this was 
clearly demonstrated by the swift Rhodesian rejection of the proposals put forward by 
Prime Minister Jim Callaghan. On March 22, Callaghan had publicly offered British 
assistance in reconvening the Rhodesian settlement negotiations under the preconditions 
that the Rhodesian Front accept the principle of majority rule, elections leading to a black 
African government within two years and no independence before this government took 
power. Privately, the proposals offered an ‘entrenched clause’ in the constitution to 
protect minority rights. For Kissinger, the fact that Smith dismissed the offer within less 
than a day highlighted the British inability to resolve the impasse and exacerbated the 
                                                 
380 National Intelligence Bulletin, Intelligence Documents February 27 1976, Dale Van Atta Papers 1975-
1978-Intelligence Chron File Box 12, Ford Library, Department of State Briefing Memorandum to the 
Secretary of State from Monroe Leigh, March 5 1976, NSSM 241 – United States Policy in Southern 
Africa (1), U.S. National Security Council Institutional Files 1974-1977, Box 44, Ford Library,  
INR Afternoon Summary, March 8 1976, Rhodesia, NSA Country Files for Africa 1974-1977, Box 5, Ford 
Library, 186, Report prepared by the Working Group on Angola. Washington, April 21 1976, FRUS, 
Volume XXVIII and Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 42.  
381 White House Memorandum of Conversation, February 26 1976, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 
1973-1977 Box 18, Ford Library, DeRoche, Black, White and Chrome, 210 and Kissinger, Years of 
Renewal, 903-904. 
 
 
207 
 
chances of Soviet or Cuban intervention. The U.S. appeared to be the only Western 
nation with the requisite strength and leverage to decisively alter the course of the 
Rhodesian crisis.382  
          The Ford Administration was also aware that sentiment among a number of black 
African leaders, including the Front Line states, favored a greater American role in 
resolving the Rhodesian impasse. Both Zambian President Kaunda and Tanzanian leader 
Nyerere urged the White House to take a strong stance against Salisbury to prevent a 
further escalation of Cold War rivalries in the region and a repetition of events in 
Angola.383 
           In Pretoria, the South African leadership, engaged in its own exercise of détente 
with black Africa, was also in favor of U.S. participation in formulating an acceptable 
Rhodesian settlement. On April 15, at a meeting with Kissinger, the South African 
Ambassador, Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha, agreed that Pretoria shared the concerns of the U.S. 
regarding a Cuban invasion of Rhodesia and that the RF government needed to accede to 
majority rule. Indeed, Botha bluntly stated that ‘We agree that Smith is beyond recovery.’ 
South Africa also possessed greater leverage over Salisbury following the Mozambican 
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decision to close its border with Rhodesia in early March as virtually all Rhodesian trade 
now flowed through south across the Limpopo.384  
           The White House decision to vigorously embark on a quest to slay the ‘Rhodesian 
Dragon’ was reflected in the public statements of the President himself. On March 13, in 
an interview with the Chicago Sun-Times, Ford publicly committed his administration to 
giving unequivocal support for majority rule in Rhodesia stating that ‘We have to be on 
the right side morally, and the right side morally is to be for majority rule.’ Over a month 
later, in Tyler, Texas, the President observed that the American people gained their 
freedom through self-determination and that America throughout its two hundred year 
history strongly believed in self-determination for the people of a country and this was 
certainly the case in supporting majority rule for the black Rhodesians.385 
           The most significant and well publicized pronouncement, however, was made by 
Kissinger on April 27 during an address in Lusaka, Zambia. In his speech, which was part 
of a broader trip through black Africa, Kissinger stated that the U.S. was committed to 
working with independent African nations to help build their countries, develop their 
economies, keep the peace and achieve racial justice. In a veiled warning to the 
communist world, he also stressed the importance for African solutions to African 
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problems and highlighted the danger of outside powers pursuing hegemonial aspirations 
or bloc policies on the continent.386 
           In the case of Rhodesia, Kissinger strongly reaffirmed that the U.S. opposed 
minority rule, did not recognize the existing regime and both voted for and was 
committed to UN sanctions. He then revealed the basic elements of White House policy 
to achieve a just and durable solution; support for the Callaghan proposals, informing 
Salisbury that it would receive no American aid in the existing guerrilla war or any future 
conflict and stressed the need for a rapid negotiated settlement leading to majority rule. 
The U.S. would repeal the Byrd Amendment, would discourage its citizens from private 
travel or residence in Rhodesia, aid Mozambique due to hardship suffered by its border 
closure and offer help to any other neighboring nations which closed their borders to 
enforce sanctions as well as humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing the conflict. 
Finally, Washington was ready to help fund  a program of economic, technical and 
educational assistance to an independent Zimbabwe as well as assist in the development 
of a constitutional structure that protected minority rights as well as establishing majority 
rule.387  
          The Secretary of State highlighted the importance for all parties who wished for a 
negotiated solution to make clear to Salisbury that the world community was united in its 
determination to achieve rapid change. He declared that the U.S. Government was ready 
to work closely with the governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia 
and urged that Pretoria showed its dedication and contribution to Africa by using its 
influence in Salisbury to push for a swift transition to majority rule. In a powerful 
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emotive statement the Secretary of State avowed that ‘the United States is wholly 
committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia’ 
and stressed that facilitating a solution where ‘blacks and whites live together in harmony 
and equality is a moral imperative of our time. Let us prove that these goals can be 
realized by human choice, that justice can command by the force of its rightness instead 
of by force of arms.’388 
            The Lusaka address and the broader shift in policy towards an active U.S. role in 
attaining majority rule received widespread acclaim across the globe. In his first House of 
Commons appearance as Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland strongly endorsed the 
Lusaka statement on U.S. policy while black African leaders praised the American desire 
to play a more vigorous role in ending white control over Rhodesia. Indeed, President 
Kaunda warmly embraced Kissinger following the speech which, according to Zambian 
Foreign Minister Siteke Gibson Mwale, demonstrated his ‘total support’ for the American 
objectives. South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller noted with appreciation the 
increase in American interest in Southern Africa and concern with the ‘Russian-Cuban 
imperialism’. He also observed that Kissinger had left no doubt over the key role that 
South Africa could play and that détente efforts would not succeed without serious and 
intensive discussions with Pretoria.389 
                                                 
388 Address by Secretary of State Kissinger, Lusaka, Zambia, April 27 1976, CO 1-1 Africa 1/1/76-1/20/77, 
WHCF Country Files Box 4, Ford Library. 
389 Telegram to President Ford from President Tolbert of Liberia via Embassy Monrovia, March 1976, CO 
124 Rhodesia 8/9/74-5/31/76, WHCF, Box 43, Ford Library, White House Memorandum for the President 
from Brent Scowcroft, April 26 1976, April 23-May 7 HAK Messages for the President, NSA Trip Briefing 
Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-1976 Box 32, White House Memorandum for the President 
from Brent Scowcroft, April 28 1976, April 23-May 7 HAK Messages for the President, NSA Trip Briefing 
Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-1976 Box 32, White House Memorandum for General 
Scowcroft from the Situation Room, April 29 1976, NSA White House Situation Room Noon and Evening 
Notes, 1975-77, April 10 1976 Box 7, Ford Library, Unofficial translation of an extract from the statement 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the South African Senate, May 1 1976, as attachment to letter to Brent 
 
 
211 
 
              Interestingly, the actions of the Ford Administration also had the ironic effect of 
uniting the white Rhodesians and the USSR in mutual condemnation of U.S. policy. In 
Salisbury, Smith expressed dismay that Rhodesia not been given chance to explain its 
position and in his memoirs denounced the American use of Rhodesia to gain favor with 
the Organization of African Unity and compensate South Africa for Washington’s 
abandonment of Pretoria in Angola. On the opposite side of the geopolitical spectrum 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the speech a combination of ‘political 
gimmickry and financial handouts’ while the press in Moscow described it as an attempt 
to undercut and weaken the black liberation movements.390  
                While the international reaction was predominantly positive, domestically, 
however, the White House decision proved to be highly controversial. While the 
Republican administration was commended by Democrats including Congressman 
Rangel and diverse liberal groups such as the National Black Veterans’ Organization and 
the United States Catholic Conference it also led to a torrent of criticism from American 
conservatives.391 
            In the New York Times, former Nixon adviser and conservative commentator 
Patrick J. Buchanan observed that ‘In Zambia, the Secretary placed the moral authority of 
the United States behind the militant Marxist regime of Mozambique, and against the 
beleaguered pro-Western Government of Rhodesia.’ George F. Kennan, also writing in 
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the Times questioned whether majority rule in Rhodesia would be beneficial noting the 
chaos following independence in other African states and critiqued the need for the 
‘grudging approval by African leaders’ that policymakers seem to find so crucial to 
American interests.392 
             On May 13, an irate Harry F. Byrd confronted Kissinger at a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee meeting and accused him of ‘embracing communist Russia with 
great vigor’. Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan decried the Ford policy as 
promoting a ‘massacre’ in Rhodesia, indeed reports from the South African Embassy in 
Washington informed Pretoria that Dr. Kissinger’s Africa trip swung the conservative 
wing of the Republicans in favor of Reagan. White House correspondence and media 
reports also reveal an overwhelming opposition to U.S. interference in Rhodesian affairs 
among the public.393  
           While the shift in the outlook of the White House towards Rhodesia in the spring 
of 1976 was primarily stimulated by the Angolan fiasco it is worth noting the differing 
rationale applied by Ford and his Secretary of State. For the President while it was 
imperative to prevent the expansion of further Cuban or Soviet influence the moral 
implications of achieving majority rule were also significant. Indeed, at the NSC meeting 
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on May 11, Ford acknowledged that the administration had suffered a ‘little political 
flack’ due to its new approach towards Southern Africa but regardless of the effect on the 
outcome on Republican primaries the White House would ‘continue to do what is 
right’.394      
             In contrast, Kissinger, the real architect of the new approach, was entirely 
motivated by geopolitical considerations. The human rights of the black Rhodesians or 
the morality of majority rule was of little consequence, indeed, the Secretary of State told 
Ford that ‘Basically I am with the whites in southern Africa’. His empathy for the 
situation of white Rhodesians, however, was offset by the need to find a platform to resist 
the growth of communist power in the region. Ending minority rule in Rhodesia would 
arrest the armed struggle, stop the rationale for Cuban intervention and win the trust of 
the black African nations.395  
               The hopes of achieving a viable settlement were boosted by South African 
support for change in Rhodesia. As recognized by the State Department in NSSM 214, 
Salisbury had become an international liability for Pretoria and a drain on its resources. 
Prime Minister Vorster sought to install a moderate black government in Rhodesia both 
to advance his détente with black Africa and to stem the tide of radicalism before it 
reached South Africa’s borders.396  
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              Black African leaders, despite their animosity towards Pretoria, urged the White 
House to enlist the help of the apartheid state to use its leverage to force a settlement on 
Salisbury. In his memoirs, Kissinger noted that ‘Incongruously, pariah South Africa, the 
citadel of apartheid, was emerging as the key to progress toward majority rule in 
Southern Africa. All black African leaders castigated it, and all of them urged us into a 
dialogue with South Africa’s leaders. Condemned as archenemy of African freedom, 
South Africa nevertheless provided the immediate hope for a rapid breakthrough toward 
majority rule…’397                
            On May 14, Kissinger met with Ambassador Botha and reminded him that it was 
in South Africa’s own interests to push for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia as such an 
agreement would prevent Cuban involvement and buy time for Pretoria resolve its own 
racial question. Kissinger also offered to meet with Vorster or Foreign Minister Muller, 
itself a major incentive for the diplomatically isolated regime in Pretoria, to discuss the 
issue and suggested Europe as a neutral venue. Four days later Ford, in a television 
interview, stated he would be prepared to meet with Vorster and even Rhodesian Prime 
Minister Smith if it would help resolve the Rhodesian problem.398 
            The South Africans publicly welcomed the opportunity to work with the U.S. on a 
peace settlement although Foreign Minister Muller observed that the West needed to 
show more initiative than in the past and make any deal more attractive to both white and 
black Rhodesians. It was agreed that Kissinger and Vorster would officially meet in West 
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Germany in late June. It was a measure of the importance of the meeting that despite the 
eruption of the Soweto Uprising on June 17, the black African states along with Britain, 
France and Germany urged Kissinger to go ahead with the talks. The U.S. did, however, 
censor Pretoria by voting for UNSC Resolution 392 which strongly condemned the 
incident and South African practices.399          
             On June 23-24, despite a terrorist threat from a group calling itself ‘The United 
Black Liberation Committee’, Kissinger met with Vorster and Muller in Grafenau. It was 
a historic moment as no Secretary of State had held talks with a South African Prime 
Minister since Edward Stettinius met with Jan Smuts in 1945 at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization which created the UN Charter. Vorster agreed 
that if the U.S. could put together a package with sufficient guarantees offering a just and 
honorable solution for the economic prospects of the white community then Pretoria 
would use its influence with Salisbury to push for a settlement. The South Africans 
warned Kissinger, however, that morale was high in Rhodesia and that Salisbury would 
not accept a deal without viable guarantees for the future of the white population.400  
        The Rhodesian Government was well aware of the Kissinger-Vorster summit 
meeting and were cognizant of the fact Kissinger sought to achieve a negotiated solution 
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to end the Bush War and achieve majority rule. The South African Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, Brand Fourie informed the American Embassy that the Rhodesians were 
desperate to find out what had taken place during the talks in Grafenau. Indeed, the 
Rhodesian Diplomatic Representative to South Africa, Harold Hawkins had told Fourie 
that if the ‘moribund Rhodesian patient is to be disposed of, he has right to know what is 
to be done with his remains.’401 
          The White House also sought the assistance of the British in obtaining a viable 
settlement. Kissinger was aware that London had limited leverage over the rebel colony 
but felt that a British role was crucial in aiding the transition to majority rule, working out 
the guarantees for the white community and reassuming the colonial administration to 
allow the successor regime to evolve in a moderate direction. According to Kissinger, the 
British, however, were initially unwilling to get involved as Prime Minister Callaghan 
and Foreign Minister Crosland possessed little enthusiasm for negotiations with Smith or 
playing a transitional role in Rhodesia.402  
            In May, though, London did reluctantly agree to the creation of a working group 
of high-level British and American officials charged with a constant review of African 
policy. On June 25, when Kissinger met with Callaghan in London, the British leader 
indicated that the UK would be willing to assume responsibility during the transitional 
period but expressed a fear of being drawn unwillingly into a military conflict. The 
British also distrusted Pretoria and urged the U.S. to consider a coup against Smith, an 
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idea that was dismissed by Kissinger on the grounds that the Rhodesian leader was a 
‘bargaining chip’ and his removal would complicate the situation.403 
             On July 5, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William E. Schaufele 
embarked on a trip through Africa to consult with key leaders including Front Line 
Presidents’ Kaunda and Nyerere. Kissinger instructed Schaufele to play down the 
possibility of South African co-operation in order to gain greater flexibility from Dar es 
Salaam and Lusaka. During the talks Kaunda agreed to the general outline of a program 
of majority rule, a two year transitional government and minority guarantees. Nyerere 
concurred but stated the need for the transitional government to be backed by the 
‘freedom fighters’ in order for the fighting to end. Both leaders also expressed the fear 
that Mozambican leader Samora Machel would be unwilling to end guerrilla 
operations.404 
               By the end of July, however, Nyerere had become increasingly negative about 
any peace settlement and informed U.S. Ambassador James Spain that he rejected the 
idea of British transitional rule in Rhodesia. As noted by Kissinger in his memoirs, the 
White House, faced by domestic Republican opposition and intransigence on the part of 
the Front Line leaders was strongly tempted to simply give up on the Rhodesian question 
and let nature take its course. Ford, however, was well aware that if the black Africans 
backed away from the idea of a peace settlement and refused to rein in the insurgents then 
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the whole process would fall apart with the likelihood of an escalating conflict and Cuban 
intervention. It was agreed that a new approach was required which involved producing a 
detailed proposal with the British, obtaining the support of South Africa who would 
pressure Smith to agree to the terms and finally presenting it to the black leaders for their 
approval.405          
              On August 5, Kissinger met with Callaghan and Crosland in London. A joint 
economic program for Rhodesia was agreed upon which included a system of financial 
assurances designed to maximize incentives for white Rhodesians to stay rather than 
leave, the development of foreign investment resources for Rhodesian private and public 
undertakings and benefits for the independence government from the European 
Development Fund and the World Bank to improve the situation of the black population 
with an emphasis on skill development and agriculture.406  
             In Southern Africa, however, it appeared as though the Front Line states, 
insurgent groups and the Rhodesian Government had little interest in a political solution. 
Both Lusaka and Maputo allowed insurgents to operate within their territory and cross 
the international frontier with impunity. On July 23, Mozambican troops invaded 
Rhodesia, but were repulsed south of Umtali. On August 9, the Selous Scouts, an elite 
Rhodesian counterinsurgent unit, struck the Nyadzonya guerrilla camp in Mozambique 
killing several hundred people. Furthermore, when presented with the economic program 
by Under Secretary of State William D. Rogers, both Kaunda and Nyerere while urging 
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the U.S. to proceed also expressed doubts that any settlement would work. Rogers also 
noted the apparent lack of unity among the Nationalist factions.407   
             In early September, Kissinger travelled to London to finalize the political 
program. The British had proposed a blueprint for a the transitional period which 
replaced a British governor with a two tiered government made up of a white dominated 
Council of State with a black blocking veto and a black controlled Council of Ministers 
with a white blocking minority. The Council of State would be responsible for 
implementing majority rule as well as defense and internal security, the cabinet would 
oversee day-to-day administration and London would handle foreign relations. The 
document became known as Annex C and was accepted as the working proposal by U.S. 
officials.408 
           On September 4, Kissinger met with Vorster for the second time in two months. 
The meeting place was the Dolder Grand Hotel near Zurich, Switzerland. The South 
African delegation approved the Anglo-American political and economic package, with 
the minor alteration that the Rhodesian community choose the members of the Council of 
State not the British Government (this was later approved by the UK) and assured the 
Secretary of State that Pretoria would press Smith to accept Annex C. In fact, the South 
African Government had already begun to exert its leverage over Salisbury demonstrated 
by the withdrawal of helicopter crews on August 26 and even forced Smith to dismiss 
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Rhodesian Defence Minister P.K. Van der Byl over his criticism of Pretoria following 
their removal.409   
           The Secretary of State, then embarked on the final phase of his shuttle diplomacy 
to obtain the agreement of the Front Line leaders and the guerrilla movements before 
presenting it to the Rhodesians as a fait accompli. On September 14, Kissinger arrived in 
Dar es Salaam for talks with Nyerere. Despite a hostile atmosphere and public criticism 
from the Tanzanian president, in private Nyerere encouraged the U.S. to continue the 
facilitation of an agreement. In Lusaka, Kissinger received a much warmer welcome from 
Kaunda who publicly praised the ‘humanistic policy’ of the Ford Administration towards 
Southern Africa. During private talks with Kissinger the Zambian leader agreed that the 
proposed settlement should move forward but warned Kissinger to be careful of Smith as 
he was ‘slippery and extremely dangerous.’ While in Zambia, Kissinger also met with the 
head of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo who Kissinger described as ‘unquestionably the best and 
most moderate Rhodesian Nationalist leader.’410 
            On the evening of September 17, Kissinger travelled to Pretoria to present the 
Anglo-American proposals to Ian Smith. Two days later, the Secretary of State met with 
Smith for the first time. In the words of Kissinger, ‘No senior American official had ever 
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met with Smith. British leaders detested him, and the front-line African Presidents 
resented him. Yet the eight Rhodesian leaders who appeared at the American Embassy 
looked more like British provincial middle-class businessmen or farmers than practicing 
Machiavellians.’411    
          The Secretary of State, warned the Rhodesian delegation that while they might find 
the proposals unappealing they were nevertheless represented the best offer they would 
receive. If Salisbury chose to reject the settlement the military situation would get worse, 
they could expect to receive no help from the West and any future agreement would be 
considerably less beneficial for the future of the white population. Vorster also urged the 
Rhodesians to sign the agreement and in a veiled threat stated that Pretoria was no longer 
willing to continue to support Salisbury either financially or militarily.412 
         While the Rhodesians were dismayed by the proposals, the Salisbury delegation 
nevertheless recognized that they had little choice but to acquiesce to the Anglo-
American plan. In the words of Smith, ‘Having a gun pointed at one’s head leaves no 
room for equivocation.’ The Rhodesians agreed, subject to the approval of their cabinet 
and RF parliamentary caucus, to what became known as the ‘Five Points’. These 
included a constitutional conference with the black Nationalists to create an interim 
government that would comprise of a black majority in the cabinet but give the whites 
parity in the Council of State that would draft the new constitution. The British would 
pass legislation allowing majority rule and independence. During the interim era, the U.S. 
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and UK would diplomatically press for an end to sanctions and the guerrilla struggle as 
well as economic aid for Rhodesia. Smith also requested that the portfolios of the 
ministers of defence and law and order would remain in white hands for duration of the 
interim government.413 
          It is clear that Kissinger felt a great degree of empathy for the white Rhodesians. In 
a telegram to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger stated that ‘This 
outcome gives me no pleasure. It is extremely painful for me to be the instrument of their 
fate-which could turn out to be disastrous. That they have accepted it with good grace 
only makes it harder.’ In his memoirs, Smith recalled that Kissinger told him privately 
that his role in the demise of Rhodesia was one of the great tragedies of his life. In spite 
of his sympathy for white Rhodesia, however, the Secretary of State did not allow his 
personal feelings to interfere with the realpolitik of the Cold War. In his view, the 
geopolitical reality remained that unless the U.S. could force majority rule in Salisbury 
then the door stayed open for further Cuban and Soviet expansion in Southern Africa. If 
the white Rhodesians needed to be the sacrificial lamb to prevent the spread of 
communism then he was prepared to wield the knife.414                                  
          On September 20, Kissinger flew to Lusaka where he informed a ‘grateful and 
astonished’ Zambian leader that Smith had agreed to majority rule within two years. 
Kaunda assured him that he would push the agreement with the other Front Line leaders 
but expressed anxiety whether Nyerere would go along with the deal. At a meeting the 
following day Nkomo also stated his concern that Nyerere favored ZANU and was 
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determined to keep him from power. In Tanzania, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, 
Nyerere acceded to the agreement but wanted to reduce the U.S. role in the negotiations 
so that the settlement would give greater credit as a ‘moral victory extracted by radical 
Africa.’415  
           On September 24, Smith, in a broadcast to the nation, announced that the 
Rhodesian Cabinet and RF parliamentary caucus had accepted the Anglo-American 
proposals including the principle of majority rule within two years. In the speech, he 
sought to assuage the anxiety of the white population by assuring them that under the 
interim government the conflict as well as international sanctions would end and that 
white ministers would hold the key positions of defence and law and order.416                 
            In response to the Rhodesian announcement, the White House issued a press 
release conveying satisfaction that Salisbury had accepted the proposals designed to avert 
escalating conflict and bring peace to Southern Africa. The statement also expressed 
pride that the U.S. had been able to contribute and praised the efforts of the British, South 
Africans and Front Line states in achieving this breakthrough. Ford also sent personal 
messages to Callaghan and Vorster thanking them for their assistance and in 
correspondence with the black African presidents voiced his hope that ‘advantage will be 
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taken of this unique opportunity by all the parties, and that the negotiations will be 
pursued in the spirit of magnanimity.’417   
            Two days later, the Front Line leaders, attending a summit meeting in Lusaka 
issued a statement hailing and congratulating the heroic Zimbabwean fighters whose 
struggle has forced the white government to ‘recognize and accept the inevitability of 
majority rule.’ The statement dismissed the proposals as outlined in Smith’s speech as 
‘tantamount to legalising the colonialist and racist structures of power’ and asserted that 
the details relating to the structure and functions of the transitional government should be 
left to the constitutional conference. The presidents, however, called on the UK to 
convene a conference immediately and declared that such an event would be a victory for 
all Africa and mankind.418 
              In Washington, both the White House and the State Department released 
statements welcoming the acceptance of the Kissinger proposals by the Front Line 
leaders and highlighting the fact that the path to a negotiated solution to majority rule was 
now open. The Ford Administration also dispatched messages to both Smith and Vorster 
to placate the concerns raised by both Salisbury and Pretoria that the black Africans 
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appeared to be backing away from the deal. The White House reminded the Rhodesians 
and South Africans that the Front Line states had agreed to a constitutional conference 
and assured them that the only way to avoid a more radical solution was to move forward 
with the conference and subsequent installation of a moderate government.419  
             On September 29, British Foreign Secretary Crosland addressed the UN and 
stated that all parties had now accepted the objective of majority rule in Rhodesia within 
two years and that to consolidate this London was prepared to hold a conference to 
address the formation of the interim government and related matters. Crosland also 
named the British Ambassador to the UN, Ivor Richard as chairman for the conference. 
Over the following weeks it was agreed by the British, the Rhodesians and the black 
Nationalist groups that Geneva would serve as the location of the historic meeting.420              
             Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy had achieved the primary objective of a 
constitutional conference which it was hoped would lead to the creation of a black led 
moderate government in Salisbury and deny the communists the opportunity for a further 
foot hold in Southern Africa. Domestically, however, many Americans were aghast at 
what appeared to U.S. connivance in the destruction of a vehemently anti-communist pro-
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Western government. In a particularly worrying development for the White House in an 
election year, many leading Republicans expressed dissatisfaction with the Secretary of 
State. A Ford campaign official, James A. Baker III publicly urged Kissinger to resign for 
the good of the president while an eminent Republican told the Washington Star that 
many in his party hoped the Secretary would be ‘eaten’ during his ‘safari’ through 
Africa.421      
             The fact the White House was prepared to countenance a domestic backlash 
which would imperil Ford’s electoral campaign highlights how important the Rhodesian 
issue had become to the incumbent administration. Key figures including Kissinger, 
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush as well as Ford himself feared that the 
conflict if left unchecked could escalate into a broader war involving Pretoria and the 
communist powers and potentially could lead to the creation of a radicalized bloc in 
Southern Africa which would impact the geopolitical balance of power across the globe. 
The peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem had thus become a highest priority for 
the Ford Administration.422    
 
The Geneva Conference and its aftermath: Kissinger’s dismay at British ineptitude 
but his foundations for peace remain in place  
 
              On October 28, Chairman Ivor Richard formally opened the Geneva Conference. 
In addition to the Rhodesian Government delegation, led by Smith, all the major 
Nationalist leaders attended the conference including ZAPU leader Nkomo and ZANU 
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Secretary General Robert Mugabe. Mugabe and Nkomo had formed a  coalition known as 
the Patriotic Front (PF) just weeks earlier to present a united front during the 
negotiations. Other Nationalist leaders present included Bishop Abel Muzorewa, James 
Chikerema and Ndabaningi Sithole. The conference, however, proved to be an abject 
failure. On December 14, after nearly two months of fruitless and often tension filled 
discussions Chairman Richard formally adjourned the conference. It would never be 
reconvened.423  
            Kissinger blamed the British for the failure of the negotiations. He criticized 
Richard for beginning the conference with the question of the independence date when 
majority rule and independence within two years had already been agreed upon. He also 
observed that it would be politically impossible for Smith to agree on an exact date 
without an agreement on the composition of the transitional government. Kissinger along 
with other U.S. officials also grew increasingly frustrated by the apparent British catering 
to the radical Nationalist demands while ignoring the reality that any settlement would 
need to be accepted by all parties including the Rhodesian delegation. In December, 
during a conversation with Ford, Kissinger described the British behaviour as 
‘unbelievable’ and ‘a prescription for another Angola’.424  
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             It is clear that the British presided over an exceptionally poor conference, indeed 
as pointed out by Mugabe, the choice of a relatively junior official in Richard to chair the 
conference was bizarre given the personal involvement of Prime Minister Wilson in the 
talks on both HMS Tiger and HMS Fearless. The failure of the talks, however, was not 
entirely due to British ineptitude but also stemmed from an inherent unwillingness to 
compromise on both sides of the negotiating table.425 
             The Rhodesian delegation came to Geneva with the view that the talks would be 
limited to a implementation of the ‘Five Points’ as agreed with Kissinger in Pretoria and 
specifically the establishment of the interim government. As observed by a U.S. 
diplomatic official in Switzerland, the Rhodesians were well aware that any concessions 
beyond the Kissinger agreement would prove very difficult to sell to the white 
community and security forces back home. He stated that as a result the ‘Rhodesians are 
sticking like adhesive tape to the five points and have not developed any well-thought-out 
fallback positions.’426 
           In contrast, the black Nationalist delegations viewed the proposals as a mere 
starting point for the negotiations. The leaders, especially the PF, sought greater 
concessions and pressed the British to force Salisbury to acquiesce to their demands. The 
Botswanan Foreign Minister Archie Mogwe warned the U.S. that the PF and their Front 
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Line sponsors wished for an interim government that was a total transfer of power with 
nothing more than token white representation. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of 
State Schaufele, Mugabe bluntly informed him that he sought full political and military 
power in an African dominated, not multi-racial society.427       
            The vast gulf in negotiating positions was exacerbated by inflammatory conduct from 
both sides. As early as  the opening statements, the PF leaders engaged in political diatribes 
and offered no constructive contribution of how all sides could work together to achieve a 
settlement. The public behavior of the Rhodesian delegation, notably Foreign Minister Van 
der Byl, was also particularly unhelpful. On one occasion, Van der Byl informed the media 
that there was no point discussing the recent executions in Rhodesia as the individuals 
involved were already dead. In another memorable quote he described the Mugabe 
delegation as ‘itinerant, temporarily unemployed terrorists’. The departure of Smith to 
Rhodesia leaving Van der Byl in charge of negotiations also heightened tensions. In 
December, during meetings on the interim government Mugabe labelled the foreign minister 
‘foulmouthed’ and ‘a bloody fool’ while Van der Byl responded ‘You don’t deserve your 
independence until you learn some manners’. 428 
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        Among the Nationalist delegations themselves there existed a deep undercurrent of 
mistrust and tensions. The U.S. Mission in Geneva informed Kissinger that the more 
moderate figures of Muzorewa and Sithole were willing to compromise but the problem was 
the instransigence of Mugabe and the Front Line presidents. The PF itself despite the façade 
of unity remained bitterly divided. Indeed, during a squabble over the independence date 
Mugabe and Nkomo almost came to blows during a meeting with Richard. The Rhodesian 
representative in South Africa also complained to U.S. Ambassador Bowdler that the 
Mugabe deputation were bullying and intimidating the other Nationalist factions.429  
        While the Geneva Conference was primarily a British affair, the Ford Administration, 
nevertheless, played a crucial role behind the scenes. U.S. officials including Assistant 
Secretaries of State Schaufele and John E. Reinhardt met frequently with the Rhodesian and 
Nationalist delegations as well as other interested parties including the representatives from 
the Front Line states and other African nations urging the delegations to work toward a 
compromise. Kissinger also pressed Richard, much to his annoyance, to be more decisive and 
prevent the Nationalists from derailing the negotiations through excessive demands and 
radical posturing.430   
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        Following the Geneva fiasco the prospects dimmed for a negotiated settlement. In the 
view of the Rhodesians, Salisbury had made a ‘firm contract’ with London and Washington 
that the conference would be held to a discussion of the Five Points. This had turned out to 
be not the case and Smith in particular felt misled and betrayed. As noted by Assistant 
Secretary of State Reinhardt the intransigence of the Nationalists had also buttressed the 
Rhodesian belief that ‘you can’t do business with this crowd.’ In addition, in Rhodesia itself 
the security forces were enjoying increasing success against the guerrilla movements and 
there was a growing belief that the tide of the conflict was turning in their favor. As early as 
December 8, Smith warned Richard that if the conference was adjourned then all ‘all will be 
up again for negotiation, even my commitment to majority rule.’ The Nationalist movements, 
bolstered by the mass disaffection of blacks within Rhodesia, a growing flood of recruits and 
increasing aid from Mozambique and Tanzania also felt no need to return to talks.431                                
          In the aftermath the British Government proposed a new plan and dispatched Richard 
to Washington and then Southern Africa on a mission to revive the peace settlement. As 
observed by Kissinger, however, the deal went ‘95% of the way to blacks’ and it was highly 
unlikely either Salisbury or Pretoria would find it acceptable. The package included a British 
appointee as chairman of the transitional administration and reduced Rhodesian Government 
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representation. It was a significantly worse offer for Salisbury than the terms which they had 
agreed to in September. In early January, Richard met with Vorster, whose electorate 
increasingly opposed any Rhodesian settlement, and the South African leader expressed great 
pessimism over the deal. Salisbury was equally unimpressed by the proposals and on January 
24 they were publicly rejected by Smith.432 
           By this point, however, a new president was in the White House. In early November, 
Jimmy Carter had defeated Ford in a tight election. Kissinger believed that the Carter’s 
electoral victory ended any hopes of achieving a settlement based on the the Five Points he 
had agreed with Smith. The Secretary of State was well aware that he had become a ‘lame 
duck’ and world leaders were waiting for the new administration to take office before 
committing to any initiatives launched by the previous White House. In private, Kissinger 
also expressed a fear to Ford that with the ‘Carter people all catering to the blacks, it 
encourages the radicals’ thus making any agreement far harder for the departing 
administration.433 
        The aim of the Ford Administration to achieve a viable Rhodesian settlement stemmed 
directly from the geopolitics of the era. The triumph of the Marxist MPLA in Angola owing 
to massive Soviet aid and Cuban military muscle brought Cold War rivalry into the heart of 
Southern Africa. For Kissinger, it was imperative that Moscow and Havana were prevented 
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from expanding their sphere of influence in the region. In the view of the White House, the 
continued existence of the embattled white minority regime in Salisbury provided an excuse 
for communist intervention and therefore it was essential that the U.S. broker a transition to a 
moderate black government. 
        While Kissinger ultimately failed in his quest, in part due to circumstances beyond his 
control, his actions nevertheless initiated a process that culminated in an end to UDI and the 
establishment of majority rule. Kissinger not only coerced Smith into accepting and publicly 
endorsing the principle of majority rule but for the first time brought the power and prestige 
of the U.S. Government into actively seeking a resolution to the Rhodesian problem. This 
high level mediation would continue under the subsequent administration and would 
eventually lead to an independent black controlled Zimbabwe. As observed by DeRoche, 
Kissinger had not slain the ‘Southern Rhodesian Dragon’ but he had ‘led the Carter 
Administration to the dragon’s lair’.434 
 
The Ford Years 
        The Ford era represented a distinct shift in policy on Rhodesia. President Ford himself 
entered the White House with a sincere commitment to moral principles, including racial 
justice, both domestically and globally. Both publicly and privately the president stated 
unequivocally his commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia. This alone signified a major 
change from the calculating realpolitik of his predecessor. Even more importantly, under his 
leadership, the U.S. engaged, for the first time, in a serious diplomatic effort to resolve the 
longstanding Rhodesian question and achieve a just and peaceful settlement.    
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         While Nixon strongly opposed, at least in private, any attempt to repeal the Byrd 
amendment, President Ford advocated repeal and the cessation of the trade in Rhodesian 
chrome. The White House decision to support the repeal legislation was both moral and 
strategic in nature. Ford was well aware that repeal would send a strong message to Salisbury 
that his administration opposed the continuation of white minority rule and that he shared the 
aspirations of the liberation movements. On a geopolitical level, repeal would place the U.S. 
back in compliance with UN sanctions and gain credit with black African leaders. 
           It is important to note, however, that while the Ford Administration was prepared to 
publicly back repeal legislation, the White House was not yet willing to exert any substantive 
pressure on Republican legislators or risk losing grassroots support over an issue that aroused 
strong feelings for many conservative Americans. Indeed, supporters and opponents of the 
Byrd Amendment attributed the failure of the repeal bill to the inaction of the President on 
the controversial issue. Eighteen months later, however, Ford was prepared to risk 
considerably greater conservative ire by embarking on a major diplomatic push to force a 
breakthrough in the Rhodesian problem. 
         The Lusaka Address and subsequent shuttle diplomacy signaled a dramatic change in 
the American approach towards the RF government in Salisbury. While previous 
administrations publicly condemned UDI and white minority rule in Rhodesia, LBJ had been 
content to primarily follow the British lead while Nixon had quietly sought closer ties to 
Salisbury on economic and strategic grounds. Under Ford, the U.S. became the key player in 
seeking a peaceful resolution of the Bush War and shaping the future of an independent 
Zimbabwe. Even though the Kissinger settlement ended in failure at the acrimonious Geneva 
Conference, nevertheless, the Secretary of State had successfully coerced Smith into a public 
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acceptance of majority rule and had firmly placed Washington behind the objective of 
achieving a black African government in Salisbury.      
        While the White House had consistently advocated majority rule in Rhodesia on moral 
grounds, broader involvement in formulating a viable Rhodesian settlement over the course 
of 1976 arose directly from the geopolitics of the Cold War. The victory of the leftist MPLA 
in Angola backed by Soviet aid and Cuban combat troops led to fears of further communist 
expansion in the region and the potential creation of a radicalized bloc in Southern Africa 
affecting the balance of power worldwide. It was the judgement of both Ford and Kissinger, 
that it was imperative to remove any pretexts for further Cuban or Soviet intervention and 
thus it became of the highest priority to end white rule in Rhodesia and assist in the 
establishment of a pro Western black government. 
         The importance to the President of resolving the Rhodesian issue was highlighted by 
the fact that the administration was well aware of the domestic repercussions of the Kissinger 
peace initiative. Presidential correspondence demonstrated considerable support for Ian 
Smith and extreme criticism towards U.S. involvement in any forced imposition of black rule 
on Salisbury. The fact that an incumbent administration in an election year was prepared to 
countenance a policy that would almost inevitably cause a voter backlash among key 
electoral supporters thus imperiling his reelection campaign underscores how crucial the 
attainment of a viable Rhodesian settlement had become to the White House. 
        Overall, the Ford years marked the beginning of an era of greater American 
involvement in ending UDI and achieving majority rule. In part this stemmed from 
Ford’s own sense of compassion and humanity which pushed the White House away 
from the cold realpolitik of his predecessor. Ford believed that the U.S. should oppose 
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white minority rule in Rhodesia because it was the right thing to do on moral grounds. 
Nevertheless, greater intervention was directly fueled by the geopolitics of the Cold War 
specifically a desire to thwart further communist expansion in Southern Africa. While the 
Kissinger peace initiative failed to provide an immediate breakthrough, more importantly 
it set a precedent of high level American involvement in the Rhodesian crisis and laid the 
groundwork for a future settlement. 
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CHAPTER 4. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COLD WAR: PRESIDENT JIMMY 
CARTER 
 
            On November 2 1976, Jimmy Carter triumphed over Gerald Ford in a closely 
fought presidential election. The former peanut farmer and one term governor of Georgia 
revived the former New Deal coalition including African-Americans and urban labor to 
achieve a narrow electoral college majority of two hundred and ninety-seven to two 
hundred and forty. The folksy candidate who campaigned against the ‘imperial 
presidency’ broke with modern tradition by walking up Pennsylvania Avenue from the 
Capitol to the White House.435  
             For white Rhodesia, the election of Carter would prove to be a pivotal moment 
which heralded the end of minority rule. The new administration played a critical, 
perhaps even irreplaceable, role in bringing an end to the UDI era. Even before taking 
office, Carter had determined that he would not only seek to bring majority rule to 
Rhodesia but actively use U.S. power to achieve this objective. The Byrd Amendment 
was swiftly repealed and in partnership with the British, Washington pressured Rhodesia 
to accept the Anglo-American Plan which proposed immediate majority rule. The White 
House decision not to recognize the Internal Settlement or remove sanctions following 
the election of Bishop Abel Muzorewa sounded a death knell for Rhodesian hopes of a 
deal excluding what they labelled  the ‘terrorist’ factions. In his memoirs, Ian Smith 
termed the election as  the ‘disaster of Carter’.436    
          The vehement opposition of President Carter to the continuance of the Rhodesian 
regime was shaped primarily by his deeply held ideological belief in the importance of 
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democracy and human rights. In his inaugural address, Carter stated that the 
‘commitment to human rights must be absolute’ and that Washington had a special 
obligation to take on these moral duties which are invariably in its own best interests. 
This ideological commitment to human rights, racial equality and majority rule was 
shared by many leading figures in the Carter Administration including Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young.437   
          The new president attached central importance to human rights when formulating 
foreign policy. This was demonstrated by the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of 
State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and concern over human rights abuses 
led the president to end or reduce aid to a number of vociferously anti-communist 
regimes including Argentina, Chile, South Korea and the Philippines.438 
          This policy shift had especially profound implications for the white dominated 
governments of Southern Africa. In the view of the White House, the refusal of the Smith 
regime to grant equal rights to all its citizens and its obduracy in rejecting majority rule  
was a flagrant example of racial discrimination and a violation of the basic human rights 
of the Zimbabwean people. The importance of this issue to Carter was reflected in the 
National Security Council Memorandum of February 5, 1977, which clearly stated that  
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the achievement of self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia was a major foreign 
policy objective.439  
           The background of the new president was also of key importance in shaping his 
approach to foreign affairs. Carter grew up in rural Georgia during the depression era 
1930s and witnessed the injustices of Jim Crow segregation in the Deep South. As a 
member of the ‘New South’ generation he came to the Washington with a sense of 
responsibility and a degree of guilt over the treatment of African-Americans. For 
President Carter, there was a direct correlation between the Civil Rights movement and 
black liberation struggle in Southern Africa.440  
             The influence of the president’s domestic racial stance on foreign policy was 
reflected by his appointment of veteran civil rights campaigner, Andrew Young of 
Georgia, as U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Young, like the president, frequently drew 
comparisons between Southern Africa and his childhood experiences in the southern 
states. The White House further feared the detrimental impact that a prolonged and bitter 
racial war in Rhodesia would have on an American society still wracked by its own racial 
difficulties.441  
              The new President was also concerned by the geopolitical Cold War realities of 
the late 1970s. In the view of Carter and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
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the continuing conflict in Rhodesia created a volatile tinderbox in Africa providing fertile 
conditions for the steadily increasing Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. The 
Cuban military presence in Africa was of particular concern following Havana’s 
successes in Ethiopia and Angola. In addition, as noted by Brzezinski, perceived U.S. 
indifference to communist involvement could lead to greater fear and intransigence on 
the part of the South Africans who were of course a key broker in any Rhodesian deal.442   
               The Cold War policy of the White House toward Southern Africa, however, 
differed greatly from the Ford era. The Carter Administration viewed the presence of 
white dominated governments in Southern Africa as the causal factor of the violence in 
the region and as providing a rationale for Soviet and Cuban intervention. The White 
House therefore sought to provide what it saw as a stable peaceful settlement to the 
Rhodesian problem believing that a only a fully democratic Zimbabwe under majority 
rule would curtail communist operations in the region.443 
             The White House was also swayed by the domestic factors of maintaining the 
increasingly important African-American vote. In the presidential election of 1976, 
Carter had won ninety-four percent of the black vote which proved critical in his electoral 
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triumph. While Carter won every southern state except Virginia, the majority of white 
voters in those states had opted for Ford and the Democratic victory had been achieved 
on the back of the black vote. It is also important to note that black civil rights figures, 
including those close to the White House, were some of the most implacable foes of 
white Rhodesia.444   
           The new administration, though, did experience divisions in opinion over the 
approach to be adopted regarding the Rhodesian situation. Carter’s primary ideological 
focus on human rights and specifically black majority rule was embraced by State 
Department figures including Cyrus Vance. In contrast, National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski and most of the NSC staff, while supportive of the idea of majority rule, 
argued that the U.S. should push for a slow transformation and also continue to oppose 
the USSR and insist black Africans join in that opposition to convince the white 
population that social change did not necessarily mean Marxist revolution.445  
           Congress was far more polarized by political differences over U.S. policy towards 
Salisbury. This division would also lead to tensions with the White House especially 
following the Internal Settlement and the establishment of the Rhodesian Government of 
National Unity (GNU). While Carter enjoyed the support of allies such as Congressmen 
Charles Diggs and Cardiss Collins (D-Illinois) as well as many members of both the 
House Subcommittee on African Affairs and the Congressional Black Caucus, a powerful 
                                                 
444 Memorandum on South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia for the Vice-President, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defence, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States 
Representative to the United Nations February 5th 1977, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-18-4-6-
1-1, Mitchell, “Terrorists or freedom fighters?”, in Cold War in Southern Africa, ed. Onslow, 179, 
DeRoche, Black White and Chrome, 244-245, Flower, Serving Secretly, 198 and Smith, Bitter Harvest, 
306. 
445 R. Benneson DeJanes, "Managing Foreign Policy: Carter and the Regionalist Experiment toward Africa, 
January 1977-May 1978," in eds. Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrensky, Jimmy Carter: Foreign 
Policy and Post-Presidential Years, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 258-259, Brzezinski, Power and 
Principle, 139 and 143 and Vance Hard Choices, 263. 
 
 
243 
 
pro-Rhodesia lobby nevertheless remained active on Capitol Hill. Leaders of the new 
right including Senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), S.I. Hayakawa (R-California) 
favored better relations with Salisbury while Strom Thurmond and Harry F. Byrd 
remained strong supporters of Ian Smith.446                          
                            
Presidential Directive 5: Increasing hostility towards Salisbury  
               President Carter, within days of taking office, made clear his intentions to shape a 
new approach to Southern Africa. On January 21, Carter issued Presidential Review 
Memorandum 4 which instructed the Policy Review Committee under the chairmanship of 
the Department of State to undertake a review of U.S. policy towards Rhodesia, South 
Africa as well as Namibia. The principal aims of the review were to examine the status of 
Rhodesia negotiations including the level of indigenous support for parties, the positions 
of the Front Line states, review relations with Pretoria, and identify the potential policy 
options open to Washington. The President also ordered that the committee assess the 
options to repeal the Byrd Amendment.447 
             In early February the Policy Review Committee submitted its report. The members 
of the committee argued that the primary goal of the U.S. must be the pursuit of self-
determination and majority rule in Rhodesia and an end to the apartheid system in South 
Africa. This recommendation alone represented a major change from the focus on strategic 
and economic interests inherent in the days of the Nixon and to a lesser extent Ford 
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Administrations. The committee concluded that American support for majority rule was 
necessary both for humanitarian reasons and to prevent the intensified violence that would 
encourage communist infiltration into the region. A successful settlement of the Rhodesian 
issue would also have an effect on the future of apartheid South Africa.448   
              The study noted that while the majority of whites were united behind Smith and 
the RF, morale was falling and significant numbers were emigrating. In the short term, 
though, this was not considered a significant problem regarding Salisbury’s ability to fight 
the guerrilla insurgency. The committee observed that South Africa was the key to gaining 
white acceptance of any deal. Prime Minister Vorster wanted to end the conflict on his 
northern border and restore his ‘outward’ policies towards black Africa. Pretoria, however, 
desired a moderate black government and would not stand back if conditions severely 
deteriorated for the white population.449  
             Regarding the black Nationalists, the committee observed that they were divided 
on ideological differences, tribal lines and political ambitions for power. A failure to reach 
a negotiated settlement that included the major African groups would almost certainly lead 
to internecine warfare. It was also noted that while the Front Line states advocated the 
accomplishment of majority rule as peacefully as possible, if  negotiations broke down 
they would continue to support the guerrilla insurgency. The Front Line and Nationalist 
movements accepted communist aid although were wary of provoking South Africa or 
causing a great power conflict in their region.450 
             In terms of U.S. policy, the study recommended three possibilities. The first option 
was to press actively and immediately for a new set of proposals in consultation with all 
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parties as this would demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to the cause of majority rule. 
A second possibility would be to suspend efforts for a ‘cooling off’ period to allow the 
Rhodesians time to realize that time was against them but also show the Nationalists that 
independence through violence would be later rather than sooner. Finally, Washington 
could simply abandon the situation allowing the U.S. to extricate itself from an 
irreconcilable state of affairs and dissociate America from any solution which could 
eventually lead to civil war among black factions. The committee warned, however, that 
the latter two options could lead to escalating violence and increased potential for active 
Cuban combat involvement and greater Soviet influence.451   
           As to the Byrd Amendment, the review committee postulated that a vigorous 
campaign by the White House for repeal would improve the prospects especially in the 
House. A successful vote for repeal would send a message to the Rhodesians that they 
could not expect any help from the U.S. and would also be symbolically important to black 
Africa reaffirming American commitment to majority rule. The study also suggested that if 
Washington could increase pressure on Salisbury by the closure of the RIO as well as the 
repeal of the Byrd Amendment then the White House could pursue a general tightening of 
international sanctions which had to this point only been slackly enforced.452 
            On March 3, the NSC met to consider the findings of the Policy Review Study. The 
minutes of the meeting reveal not only that Carter was determined that the U.S. would take 
an active role in ending white minority rule in Rhodesia but there was little NSC opposition 
to this approach whether on strategic or economic grounds. The President discussed his aim 
of providing U.S. power to aid the British and using leverage on Pretoria to pressure Smith 
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to make concessions. Vance urged the President to push for repeal of the Byrd Amendment 
and enquired what additional sanctions could be placed on Salisbury to encourage 
moderation. Both Carter and Ambassador Young drew a direct parallel between the success 
of the domestic civil rights movement in Georgia and the question of human rights, 
specifically political rights, in Southern Africa.453 
            Six days later, Carter issued Presidential Directive 5. The directive clearly 
represented a major shift in U.S. policy towards Southern Africa. Carter not only 
committed his administration to the repeal of the Byrd Amendment but also directed the 
intelligence community to study the effectiveness of any further sanctions which the U.S. 
could impose on Rhodesia to prevent oil shipments by U.S. subsidiaries or other nations. 
The directive further reflected a growing hostility towards the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. Carter called for a new focus in foreign policy regarding relations with Pretoria and 
explicitly stated that ‘Our aim will be to promote a progressive transformation of South 
African society.’454 
 
Carter’s initial measures meet with limited success  
          The repeal of the Byrd Amendment was a key objective of the Carter 
Administration regarding policy towards Rhodesia. It was seen as not only ideologically 
important but also politically expedient and a pyschological and economic strike against 
the Rhodesian regime. For President Carter and key advisers including Vance and Young 
it was symbolic as signaling an inherent commitment to majority rule and would also 
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appease black African leaders including Zambian President Kaunda who was 
increasingly vocal in his calls for American adherence to the UN sanctions.455 
           The White House was also aware that the repeal of the legislation would send a 
clear psychogical message to white Rhodesia that Washington wanted an immediate end 
to white rule and Salisbury could not count on any American assistance to continue the 
status quo. In the words of Ambassador Young; ‘I think a repeal of the Byrd Amendment 
is important in giving a signal to Ian Smith that he cannot count on U.S. support 
regardless of what he does.’ The RF leadership also counted on the sales of chrome and 
ferrochrome to provide the country with badly needed foreign exchange, closing off this 
avenue would, it was hoped, lead to greater fiscal difficulty for the embattled 
government.456  
            In addition, as Vance pointed out to President Carter, the relative health of the 
Rhodesian economy was testimony to the fact that many other nations simply paid ‘lip 
service’ to UN sanctions but otherwise engaged in trade with Rhodesia. In addition to 
South Africa, which provided false certificates of origin and hidden trade channels, other 
sanctions busters included Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and West 
Germany. Vance advised the President, to continue to push for repeal of the Byrd 
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Amendment because unless ‘we get our own house in order then it will be difficult to 
persuade allies to observe sanctions’.457 
             On January 10, ten days before Carter took office, Congressman Young (D-
Georgia), soon to be the Ambassador to the UN, introduced House Resolution 1746 
which amended the UN Participation Act of 1945. The resolution sought to add the 
following language to the act; ‘Any executive order which is issued under this subsection 
and which applies measures against Southern Rhodesia may be enforced, notwithstanding 
the provision of any other law.’ In the Senate, Dick Clark (D-Iowa) introduced the same 
legislative proposals in Senate bill 174.458 
            Although widely viewed as repeal legislation, technically, and as noted by R. 
Sean Randolph, the proposed legislation did not actually repeal Section 503 but 
circumvented it so as to reimpose the embargo on Rhodesian chrome and other minerals. 
A secondary provision of the bill demanded a certification process in which all steel 
products entering the U.S. required a ‘certificate of origin’ stating that they contained no 
chrome from Rhodesia.459 
             The dual legislative resolutions received strong backing from the White House. 
On February 10,  Vance stated in a speech to Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Africa that ‘The Carter Administration attaches the highest importance to repeal. In 
testifying today, on behalf of the Administration, I speak for the President, who strongly 
supports this initiative. We welcome your bill and hope the Congress will give it the very 
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full measure of support it deserves. We will work with you to this end.’ Ambassador 
Young also heavily lobbied his former congressional colleagues describing the vote as a 
referendum on racism in America.460 
             Logistically, by introducing the bills as amendments to the UN Participation Act, 
the proponents of the proposed legislation had the benefit of being able to place the 
resolutions before the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations 
Committees. Both these committees were far less conservative than the Senate Armed 
Services Committee which had passed the original legislation.461  
             In addition, as observed by Carter himself in a letter to Liberian President 
Tolbert, America was increasingly aware of the situation in Southern Africa and the 
absolute necessity to make steady progress toward majority rule. Economic 
circumstances also favored repeal. Rhodesian ferrochrome had flooded the American 
market and harmed domestic production. Ironically, Foote Mineral, a key sponsor of the 
Byrd Amendment, suffered heavy losses and was forced to close its ferrochrome plant in 
Steubenville, Ohio in 1973. Furthermore, Argon-Oxygen De-Carbonization (AOD), a 
technical innovation in the steel industry, allowed American companies to use lower 
grade ore from South Africa for a higher percentage of their total ferrochrome 
requirements.462 
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             On March 14, the House of Representatives passed the repeal legislation by two 
hundred and fifty votes to one hundred and forty-six. The following day the Senate also 
voted in favor by a margin of sixty-six to twenty-six. On March 18, President Carter 
formally signed the legislation and officially placed Washington back in compliance with 
UN sanctions. On signing the bill Carter proclaimed ‘This legislation has as high a 
symbolic importance in international affairs as anything that I will do this year…its puts 
us on the side of what is right and proper…It puts us in strategic position to help with the 
resolution of the Rhodesian question.’ Later in March, during his address to the UN in 
New York, the announcement that the U.S. fully supported sanctions against Rhodesia 
was met with cheering by the UN delegates. At a UN sponsored conference on African 
liberation in Maputo, Mozambique, ZANU General Secretary Robert Mugabe also 
expressed appreciation for the repeal before paradoxically launching into a tirade against 
any American involvement in Rhodesia.463 
             While the White House was delighted at success of the repeal legislation, others 
doubted that the actual circumventing of the Byrd Amendment would have any strategic 
effect on Rhodesia. The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, 
observed that not only did numerous European nations, along with Japan, fail to enforce 
or simply ignored Rhodesian sanctions but with South Africa as a conduit it was almost 
impossible to identify products containing Rhodesian chromium. Both Rhodesia and 
South Africa exported chrome ore and ferrochrome and it was difficult to detect and 
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legally impossible to substantiate when Rhodesian chrome was mixed in with South 
African chrome. Turner also criticized the legislation on the grounds that it also removed 
the small remaining American economic leverage over Salisbury.464 
              The Department of Treasury also received strenuous complaints from key 
trading partners concerning the certification procedures leading to a dramatic reduction, 
at least initially, of the importation of chrome bearing products. Randolph observed that 
the legislation forced the U.S. to abide by dubious certificates of origin when nearly 
every other steel producing nation continued to covertly import chrome. State 
Department attempts to convince trading partners in Western nations and Japan to 
increase enforcement were stonewalled by polite responses stating full compliance 
already with the sanctions program.465 
            The Rhodesian Information Office was another early target of the White House in 
its desire to use all possible avenues of sanctions against the authorities in Salisbury. The 
organization had been legally established and registered with the Justice Department, 
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act since February 1966. The RIO had 
successfully avoided the financial provisions of Executive Order 11322 in 1968 by 
financing its activities though monies ostensibly paid by charitable groups.466 
             The RIO, a quasi-governmental organization with no official diplomatic status, 
was nevertheless actively engaged  in lobbying on Capitol Hill, notably for the passage of 
the Byrd Amendement and distributed pro-Rhodesian propaganda including Rhodesian 
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Commentary and Rhodesian Viewpoint, both periodicals with a distinct bias towards 
Salisbury. The office also provided lists of goods and products available from Rhodesia. 
It was also alleged that employees of the RIO were actively involved in the recruiting and 
processing of American mercenaries to fight in the Rhodesian armed forces.467  
             In early March, at the UN, Washington together with the British, formulated and 
co-sponsored a Security Council resolution to expand sanctions against Rhodesia to 
include overseas offices of the RF Government. If able to secure its passage the White 
House intended to instruct the Treasury Department to take action to end the functioning 
of the RIO and to prevent establishment of any quasi-official Rhodesian offices in the 
future.468 
            On March 18, the Anglo-American resolution was adopted for consideration by 
the UN. Its passage was delayed, however, by an attempt by several black African states 
to impose a far more aggressive amendment which sought to direct all UN member states 
to apply against Rhodesia the full range of sanctions under Article 41 Chapter 7 of  the 
UN Charter. If passed it would have cut off all forms of contact, communication, travel or 
commerce with Rhodesia. The U.S. opposed such an extreme measure on the grounds 
that it was contrary to a free flow of ideas and discussion as well as a poor precedent for 
UN.469 
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            Finally, on May 27, after almost two months of wrangling, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 409. The U.S. sponsored resolution stated that ‘all states members of the 
United Nations shall prohibit the use or transfer of any funds in their territories by the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, including any office or agent thereof, or by other 
persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia, for the purposes of any office or agency of 
the illegal regime that is established within their territories other than an office or agency 
so established exclusively for pensions purposes.’ In August, President Carter signed an 
executive order which authorized the Secretary of Treasury to enforce the provisions of 
UNSC Resolution 409.470  
            The presidential action against the RIO was criticized in Congress not only by 
supporters of Rhodesia but also on the grounds that cutting off avenues of 
communication with Salisbury made little sense given the American desire to open 
negotiations to bring about majority rule. In a letter to National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski, Congressman Derwinski and twelve of his colleagues noted the inconsistency 
of engaging in discussions with the socialist Republic of Vietnam and an exchange of 
low-level diplomats being worked out with Cuba yet issuing an executive order 
suppressing the RIO. The congressmen also noted that the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and various other quasi-governmental entities maintained offices in 
the U.S.471 
           The RIO, however, did not prove to be an easy entity for the White House to 
remove. While the documentary record does not provide a complete picture, it appears as 
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though the RIO was able to remain open due to private donations from Rhodesian 
sympathizers in the United States thus avoiding a direct violation of UN Resolution 409 
which called for states to prevent the transfer of funds from Rhodesia to any office or 
agent. The RIO would remain in Washington, in violation of the spirit if not the letter of 
the UN resolution, until the conclusion of the Rhodesian issue.472 
          The issue of American citizens fighting as mercenaries for the Rhodesian armed 
forces was also investigated by the White House. By the late 1970s the dwindling 
manpower available to the Rhodesian military had led to an increasing dependence on 
foreign mercenaries to bolster the strength of the security forces. The estimates of the 
number of American citizens serving in Rhodesia during the final years of the Bush War 
ranged from several hundred to over two thousand.473  
         One notable figure, known as ‘Big John’ Murphy, served with Rhodesian Light 
Infantry, SAS and eventually commanded the elite Selous Scouts strike force. The 
mercenaries were recruited openly in magazines such as Soldier of Fortune, Shotgun 
News and Shooting Times. According to Gerald Horne, the mercenaries, many of whom 
were veterans of Vietnam, came to Rhodesia to fight for the doctrines of anti-communism 
and white supremacy as well as a romanticized vision that linked fighting Native 
Americans in the Old West with battling black insurgents in Rhodesia. ‘Rhodesia evoked 
                                                 
472 Memorandum for Tom Thornton from Henry Richardson. The Approaching Smith Visa Issue 
September 22 1978, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Zimbabwe: 4-10/77 through Zimbabwe: 7-
11/79, Box 119, Carter Library and Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski. Your 
Meeting with Muzorewa, July 10 1979. NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Zimbabwe: 4-10/77 
through Zimbabwe: 7-11/79, Box 119, Carter Library.  
473 Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Department of State. Report of Interagency Group on 
Rhodesia, 16 April 1977, Carter Library, RAC Project NLC-132-3-9-2-0, Memorandum for Zbigniew 
Brzezinski from Peter Tarnoff, June 23 1977, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-132-25-2-4-1, 
Zimbabwe News, Vol. 10, No.4. Zimbabwe African National Union, Maputo, Mozambique August 1978, 
http://www.aluka.org/action/showmetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197807, Southern 
Africa Vol. 11 No.8 November 1978  Southern Africa Vol. 11 No.8 November 1978 7, 
http://www.aluka.org/action/showmetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nusa197811, and Horne, 
From the Barrel of a Gun, 28.  
 
 
255 
 
resonant nineteenth-century images of the forts of the Old West being besieged by 
Indians. It was difficult for the U.S. military to ride to the rescue, so U.S. mercenaries 
took their place.’474 
         The presence of U.S. citizens openly serving with the Rhodesian military was a 
potential political embarrassment for the White House as well as prolonging the life of 
the Smith regime. In the spring of 1977, the administration examined the legality of 
Americans enlisting in the Rhodesian forces. It was noted that while U.S. law prohibited 
any citizen from enlistment for service in foreign armed forces or the recruitment of an 
American citizen for such service this only applied within the United States. If a citizen 
wished to enrol in a foreign military while outside of the U.S. he or she could do so and 
remain immune from prosecution under the legal system.475  
           Furthermore, the Department of Justice reported that magazine advertisements, as 
found in Soldier of Fortune, concerning service in foreign armies, were permissible as 
long as they are purely informational in nature. Internationally, an attempt to persuade the 
British Government to jointly sponsor a UNSC resolution that every member state should 
take measures to prevent its citizens serving in the Rhodesian armed forces met with a 
tentative response from the UK which pointed out that large numbers of the Rhodesians 
possessed dual nationality. American mercenaries continued to serve in Rhodesia until 
the end of the Bush War.476 
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           During the presidential campaign of 1976, the Director of the American 
Committee on Africa, George M. Houser, had addressed the Democratic Party Platform 
Committee urging the closure of the Rhodesian trade outlet through South Africa. Ever 
since the imposition of sanctions South Africa had openly defied the UN by allowing oil 
to flow north into Rhodesia and it was suspected that many of the three hundred and fifty 
subsidiaries of American oil companies in South Africa, notably Caltex and Mobil, 
engaged in business as usual with Salisbury. Indeed, Caltex and Mobil, were named in a 
lawsuit by the Lonrho Corporation which alleged that both companies were in breach of 
contract by continuing to transport oil to Rhodesia via other methods after Lonrho closed 
its pipelines from South Africa in accordance with sanctions.477 
            At the NSC meeting on March 3, Carter instructed the intelligence community to 
consider all possible options to prevent oil deliveries to Rhodesia by U.S. subsidiaries. In 
the view of the White House this represented both an ideological statement reiterating 
support for majority rule and a practical means to pressure the Smith government. In 
addition, the closure of the South African pipelines would certainly have greatly 
increased U.S. standing in black Africa, indeed, President Kaunda had already urged the 
administration to stop the oil flow into Rhodesia.478   
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              The White House discovered, however, that in the world of transnational 
corporate conglomerates and subsidiaries, enforcing sanctions according to U.S. law was 
no simple matter. The Department of State reported that under the existing regulations 
issued by the Departments’ of Commerce and Treasury the restrictions prohibiting trade 
with Rhodesia did not apply to foreign subsidiaries. No action could be taken unless U.S. 
citizens or goods of U.S. origin were involved.479  
               While, theoretically, it could have been possible to amend the existing laws, 
State questioned the ability of the U.S. to realistically enforce the regulations and noted 
that non-American third party violations would be impossible to detect or prevent. 
Unenforceable regulations would of course make a mockery of the sanctions program. It 
was also noted that in the case of South Africa new stricter regulatory measures could 
force companies to choose between breaking South African or U.S. law. A recent 
Department of Treasury investigation regarding the alleged establishment of a covert 
series of corporate intermediaries by Mobil to supply oil to Rhodesia had been thwarted 
by the application of Official Secrets Acts in both Rhodesia and South Africa. As with 
the issue of American mercenaries, legal and logistical difficulties prevented the White 
House from fulfilling its aims.480 
              The first months of the new administration produced mixed results in terms of 
increasing the pressure on the rebel regime in Salisbury. While the Byrd Amendment 
was, for all intents and purposes, effectively repealed, the RIO was able to continue its 
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lobbying on Capitol Hill and the flow of American mercenaries and oil into white 
Rhodesia continued unabated. These actions did, however, send an important signal to 
Smith and the Rhodesian Front that the Carter Presidency was far more hostile to white 
Rhodesian rule than any of its predecessors. Meaningful change in Rhodesia and the 
attainment of majority rule, though, would only come from a renewed initiative with the 
UK to achieve a peaceful solution.  
               
Conflicting Visions: The Anglo-American Initiative and the Internal Settlement 
             The inauguration of Carter as President had coincided with the failure of another 
British diplomatic iniative to resolve the longstanding Rhodesian issue. Following, the 
shambles of the Geneva Conference, the British Government dispatched Ivor Richard to 
Salisbury on January 1 in an attempt to restart negotiations. Richard met with Ian Smith 
and advanced a new interpretation of the Kissinger agreement which proposed a British 
appointee as chairman of the transitional government as opposed to a black representative 
and also reduced Rhodesian Government representation in the transitional administration 
from half to one third of members. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the RF was unimpressed by 
the new offer which was significantly worse, from their perspective, than the deal offered 
at Geneva. Justice Minister, Hilary Squires, commented that it placed the destiny of 
Rhodesia in the hands of the British Government which for over ten years had been their 
deadly enemy.481 
            On January 24, in a radio and television address Smith rejected the latest British 
proposals and stated he would only negotiate on the basis of the deal conveyed to him by 
Kissinger. The Rhodesian leader also called for whites and blacks to produce a settlement 
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among themselves but exclude those who ‘support terrorism’. This heralded a move 
toward what would become known as the Internal Settlement. By this point the British 
were at a loss on how to proceed with the Rhodesian question. London lacked both 
authority and credibility in the former colony. This was compounded by the fact that the 
newly independent black nations had lost confidence in the UK while the Afrikaner 
leadership in Pretoria remained inherently suspicious of any moves made by the British 
in the their sphere of influence. The issue was further complicated by the death of 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland on February 19.482 
             On February 24, Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan appointed David Owen 
as foreign secretary. Owen was aware that it was time at act on the thorny problem but he 
believed he needed American power and diplomatic leverage. In his memoirs, Owen 
noted that U.S. influence was a necessity in obtaining a peaceful resolution. ‘Africa 
needed American strength and American commitment. The British attempt to keep 
responsibility for Rhodesia to ourselves had always been a mistake and the outcome of 
Wilson’s posturing on HMS Fearless and HMS Tiger only revealed our weakness.’483  
            The White House, welcomed the opportunity to work with Britain on the 
Rhodesian question. As early as the first week of February, Vance had met with Ivor 
Richard and agreed to work with British to develop a new set of ‘propositions’, based on 
the more generally accepted elements in previous British proposals, as a basis for a 
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framework for a return to all party negotiations. These included a genuine transition 
period of limited duration from minority to majority rule, an interim government to be 
established by agreement between all the parties, free and fair elections before the 
granting of legal independence and a constitution guaranteeing the protection of 
property.484   
              On March 9 1977, Callaghan and Owen flew to Washington. During a series of 
meetings Carter agreed that the U.S. would work with the British in preparing a new 
basis for talks. Over the course of the next two months a basic strategy was formulated 
for the new Anglo-American peace initiative. The British, specifically Owen, had initially 
hoped that Washington would engage directly in a potential all parties conference. Black 
African leaders, however, urged Vance not to participate in a constitutional conference as 
they believed it would ease pressure on the UK, lead to the USSR demanding to be 
represented and feared Washington would try to impose a ‘moderate’ Western oriented 
government.485  
               In May, a compromise agreement was reached in which London and 
Washington would engage in bilateral consultations with the various factions on both 
constitutional and transitional arrangements. The White House made clear to all parties 
that the aim of the peace initiative was not to impose its own vision on the settlement but 
merely facilitate in moving all sides towards a common ground. Nevertheless, a distinct 
bias should be noted in the approach recommended by Vance and approved by President 
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Carter. Vance proposed building black African confidence by using solely the Nationalist 
views as the basis of proposals to take to Smith. Furthermore, no agreements were to be 
made with the Rhodesians that had not been previously approved by the Nationalists.486 
              The White House interest in assisting the British in the spring of 1977 was not 
solely motivated by a committment to the cause of human rights. The administration was 
also concerned by the black African reaction to the Rhodesian rejection of the latest 
British offer and the growing communist presence in the region. In a letter to the State 
Department, Zambian President Kaunda argued for the necessity of violence and 
commented that ‘We have no choice but to support the nationalists fully in their 
intensification of the war of liberation.’ Tanzanian President Nyerere actually welcomed 
the failure of the talks as it allowed the insurgent groups to proceed with the military 
solution.487 
               U.S. concerns were heightened by the increased communist aid to the guerrillas 
in Rhodesia during the early months of 1977. By February, there were several hundred 
Cuban military ‘advisers’ in Mozambique whose role included assisting and training the 
Rhodesian guerrillas. On March 31, the USSR and Mozambique signed a friendship 
treaty which, as noted by Vance, could potentially allow Moscow to participate in any 
future Mozambican strategy on Rhodesia.488   
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             President Carter and his key advisers were also aware of the important role that 
Pretoria would have to play in any Rhodesian settlement. Only South Africa possessed 
the necessary political and economic leverage over Salisbury that could pressure Smith to 
accept an agreement leading to majority rule. This salient fact was also recognized by the 
other players involved included the black African states, the UK and the white 
Rhodesians.489  
              The fact that Prime Minister Vorster, sought to end the destabilizing conflict on 
his northern border and restore his ‘outward’ policies towards the black ruled nations was 
also well known in Washington. America also possessed both ‘political and 
psychological leverage’ over Pretoria. The apartheid state was vehemently anti-
communist and viewed the U.S. as the only power able to confront the USSR. In 
addition, Pretoria actively sought better relations with Western nations and American 
‘friendship’ was extremely important to the South Africans.490 
                 Nevertheless, Carter’s highly publicized commitment to human rights and 
ultimate pursuit of majority rule in South Africa itself led to hostility from Pretoria. The 
president clearly viewed apartheid as inherently wrong and stated in Presidential 
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Directive 5, issued in March, that the goal must be a ‘progressive transformation of South 
African society.’ In addition, as laid out in an April memorandum by Vice-President 
Walter Mondale, Washington would not trade progress on Rhodesia for a ‘free ride on 
apartheid’.491    
               On May 19-20, Mondale met with Vorster and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
‘Pik’ Botha in Vienna, Austria. In a bitter and tense meeting it became clear that there 
was a vast gulf of differences between Washington and Pretoria especially on South 
African domestic racial issues. On Rhodesia, Vorster acknowledged the need for majority 
rule and signaled that he would not support white Rhodesia indefinitely. The South 
Africans, however, resented being intimidated into pressuring Smith for concessions.492 
               The U.S.-UK Consultative Group was formed in May and comprised primarily 
of the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Stephen Low, and Deputy Under Secretary of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, John Graham. American involvement was privately 
encouraged by Smith and the Front Line presidents Machel and Nyerere.493 
               In early June, the Consultative Group completed a first round of talks with the 
the Rhodesian Government and the Nationalist factions. The group concluded that there 
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was sufficient room for progress although the parties remained far apart. Smith informed 
them that if the settlement package included an end to hostilities and sufficient protection 
of minority rights then the RF might be prepared to accept universal suffrage. 
Specifically, Smith requested legal protections and constitutional guarantees to safeguard 
the position of the white community.494  
               The Patriotic Front, however, were opposed to any constitutional structure that 
permitted any special position for whites. It was also oberved by the CIA that while the 
PF were participating in the discussions, in reality, both Mugabe and Nkomo were highly 
critical of the initiative for a negotiated settlement. The PF instead sought independence 
to be imposed on Zimbabwe following bilateral talks with the UK as Portugal had done 
with FRELIMO in Mozambique. The potential composition of the post independence 
Zimbabwean military also posed a serious difficulty for both sides.495      
               On July 23, Owen came to Washington to discuss progress with Carter and 
Vance. The basis of the Anglo-American Proposals (AAP) were agreed upon and a 
decision was reached to put forward the ideas to Tanzanian President Nyerere. Carter met 
with Nyerere in early August and to the dismay of the British agreed that the Zimbabwe 
National Army should be based on the forces of the PF. Owen feared that this agreement 
would cause the the AAP to fail as it would be rejected by both Salisbury and Pretoria. 
Indeed, South African Foreign Minister Botha would later comment that the plan 
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‘amounted to unconditional surrender.’ The Tanzanian leader, though, reacted positively 
and in a letter to Carter expressed support for the Anglo-American initiative.496  
                In late August, Owen together with Ambassador Young engaged in a joint 
diplomatic tour of Southern Africa. The aim was to gain approval of the proposals from 
the Front Line states, the Nationalist groups and the South Africans before presenting to 
the Rhodesians in Salisbury. The principal difficulties remained the status of the 
Rhodesian army during the interim period and the composition of the future Zimbabwean 
military. The Front Line states along with the PF insisted that the Rhodesian security 
forces be dismantled and the new army be based on the liberation forces. The South 
Africans, however, insisted that the Rhodesian army remain intact and stated 
categorically that Smith could not accept a Zimbabwean National Army based on the 
liberation forces and remain in office. Vorster did not flatly reject the AAP but asserted 
that it was unlikely to provide enough security for Rhodesian whites to gain their 
acceptance.497   
               While the American and British  had been laboring over the nature and scope of 
the AAP, Smith had been busy developing his own Internal Settlement. As early as 
January 1977, Washington had become aware that the RF were actively developing an 
internal option to resolve the conflict. The basic aim was to negotiate a settlement with 
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moderate black leaders inside Rhodesia, notably Bishop Muzorewa, that would satisfy 
the broad majority of the Rhodesian white and black populations.498  
               In public statements, Smith claimed that the RF enjoyed the crucial support of 
Pretoria in building this solution to the Rhodesian conflict. It is certainly noteworthy that 
during bilateral discussions with the U.S., the South Africans repeatedly pushed for 
American approval of various configurations of this basic formula. President Carter, 
though, on the advice of Vance, opposed any internal solution on the grounds that it had 
already been rejected by the Front Line and the Patriotic Front and therefore would likely 
lead to an Angolan style civil war in Rhodesia.499  
                By late August, the CIA had noted that prospects of the Rhodesian Government 
reaching an agreement with moderates including Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole had 
increased. The settlement proposals advanced by Smith included a constitution involving 
a multi racial, although white dominated, Council of State, and a predominantly black 
Council of Ministers with a black African Prime Minister. The civil service and military 
would remain under white control. Both Muzorewa and Sithole were showing interest but 
were not prepared to accept pre-conditions put forward by Smith specifically the rejection 
of one man one vote.500 
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                On September 1, Owen and Young presented the Anglo-American Proposals to 
a hostile RF cabinet in Salisbury. The core elements of the plan included a transfer of 
power to a British transitional administration, free and impartial elections on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage, an independence constitution for a democratically elected 
government and protection of individual rights, a UN presence including a military force 
during the transition period which would liase with both the Rhodesian army and 
liberation forces and a development fund to revive the economy. The Rhodesians were 
also given a separate law and order statement regarding the composition of the 
transitional security forces as based on liberation movements. As noted by U.S. 
Ambassador to Zambia, Stephen Low, Salisbury was prepared to negotiate on the AAP 
but dismayed by the law and order statement.501 
              The timing of the meeting did not bode well. One day earlier, on August 31, the 
RF had won every seat in the Rhodesian elections reinforcing their belief in an Internal 
Settlement. While Smith was impressed by the integrity of Ambassador Young he was 
less enthused by the British Foreign Secretary. In his memoirs, he described Owen as 
‘one of these petty little men trying to fill a job which is too big for him, using an 
arrogant posture in the hope that this will impress his audience.’ Nevertheless, the 
Rhodesians, arguably under pressure from Pretoria, did not outright refuse the proposals. 
The Front Line states also gave their tacit acceptance to proceed and pushed the PF to 
avoid a public rejection. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo also informed 
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Washington that he essentially supported the proposals and was willing to contribute 
soldiers to a potential UN peacekeeping force.502     
         On September 29, the UNSC passed Resolution 415 which assigned a UN 
Special Representative to enter into discussions with all parties regarding support for the 
Anglo-American Proposals. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Indian 
Lieutenant General Prem Chand to the role. As noted by Owen, though, the negotiations 
at the UN had been no easy task and it was only after ‘extensive haggling’ that China and 
the USSR agreed not to veto.503   
         On November 1, Chand and British Resident Commissioner delegate Field 
Marshal Lord Carver opened a series of discussions with the Rhodesian Government and 
the Nationalists over the implementation of the Anglo-American Proposals. The talks, 
however, proved to be inconclusive. Salisbury and the Rhodesian military leaders did not 
directly rebuff the AAP but criticized the concept of a Zimbabwean Army based on the 
liberation forces and expressed concern over the ‘dictatorial powers’ of the British 
Resident Commissioner. The PF backed by Zambia also expressed displeasure with the 
proposals and demanded that power was directly transferred to the PF during the 
transition instead of the free and impartial election that the AAP had envisaged.504  
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         In a bid to reinvigorate the AAP, Owen and Vance invited the Rhodesian 
Government and the PF to hold military talks with the British, Americans and the UN on 
the Mediterreanean island of Malta. To their displeasure, the internal black leaders 
Muzorewa and Sithole were not invited to the ‘direct military talks’, but were to be kept 
informed of the issues to be addressed. The Rhodesians refused to send any participants 
as Salisbury believed that successful political talks should come before a ceasefire and 
transitional arrangements. The ‘all-parties’ conference was held between January 30 and 
February 1, 1978. At Malta, Young developed a close personal rapport with the PF 
delegation helping to facilitate negotiations but overall the meeting achieved little of 
note. The PF appeared to be positive and requested another round of talks based on the 
AAP although both Mugabe and Nkomo continued to demand a power sharing agreement 
with the British commissioner during the transitional period.505 
          For Smith, however, the AAP was merely a distraction from his primary goal of 
building what he saw as a viable internal agreement to end the conflict. On November 24, 
Smith announced that that he had invited three ‘internal’ black leaders, Bishop 
Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau to participate in negotiations on a 
qualified basis of majority rule in order to achieve a peaceful settlement.506  
           The Rhodesian leadership had been eager to bring ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo 
into the agreement. On September 25, Smith and Foreign Minister Van der Byl travelled 
to Lusaka where they gained the agreement of Kaunda. Under pressure from Mugabe and 
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his sponsor, Tanzanian President Nyerere, however, Nkomo insisted Mugabe be brought 
in as his number two. This was totally unacceptable to the Rhodesians. If Nkomo had 
signed on to the settlement, though, it would have added an authenticity to the internal 
option which none of the other black politicians could bring. The Rhodesian historian, 
Peter Baxter, observed that Smith’s partners  were ‘a C-team of political desperadoes 
who had nothing to lose and everything to gain by signing up.’507  
         In his New Year Message to the Nation on December 31 1977, Smith argued that 
the UK had been trying to settle the Rhodesian problem in a manner which would best 
serve its own interests and not the Rhodesians. Therefore, he concluded, the best 
approach for the country was to come to an agreement without outside help or 
interference. He further stated that the Rhodesian Government would accept majority rule 
in exchange for constitutional safeguards, including a bill of rights and an independent 
judiciary, which were necessary to retain the confidence of the white population.508  
          Vance, was less convinced that such an agreement offered a viable solution to the 
conflict. On November 29, in a memorandum to Carter, he stated that this offer was not 
likely to provide a practical solution. He further observed that a majority rule election 
which excluded the PF would stimulate further violence. In his opinion, the PF would 
claim to be justified in continuing the war against a black government that was merely a 
front for white power.509  
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Carter rejects the Internal Settlement 
           In January 1978, the talks on an Internal Settlement began in earnest. Along with 
Smith, Muzorewa and Sithole, other participants included Dr. Elliot Gabellah, Chief 
Chirau, Chief Kayisa Ndweni and James Chikerema. The Rhodesian Prime Minister 
faced a severe challenge just maintaining this uneasy alliance let alone gaining 
accordance on a draft agreement. Indeed, on January 27, Muzorewa stormed out of the 
discussions after being attacked for dishonesty by the other delegations. As noted by 
Baxter, ‘It was only with considerable skill that Smith managed to keep the whole bipolar 
coalition together.’510 
            On the morning of March 3, the Internal Settlement was formally signed into 
being. Bishop Muzorewa, who was noted roaming about singing ‘I am in the mood for 
signing’, drew a few smiles when he produced what Smith described as ‘a colourful 
embroidered fancy-dress costume’ which he then proceeded to wear as his signing outfit. 
Muzorewa would later inform Vance that he had only signed the agreement as a 
pragmatic way to ease Smith out of power while avoiding the destructive consequences 
of a mass exodus of the white community.511   
            The Internal Settlement itself created a two tier transitional government to oversee 
the development of a new constitution based on universal suffrage. The higher body was 
an Executive Council comprising Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau. The second tier 
consisted of a Ministerial Council composed of an equal number of black and white 
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ministers who would share ministerial portfolios. The Rhodesian Parliament would 
continue to operate during the transitional periods and serve limited functions.512  
            The leadership of the PF were invited to take part provided they laid down their 
arms and participated peacefully. This of course was an anathema to Mugabe and Nkomo 
who refused to engage in the process. The agreement also protected white minority rights 
by reserving twenty-eight seats in a future one hundred seat parliament for whites, 
enough for a veto over any constitutional changes. In addition, whites were to remain 
firmly in control of the civil service, judiciary, military and other levers of power.513       
            The Rhodesian agreement placed the White House in a policy dilemma. From one 
perspective, the Internal Agreement would potentially achieve the long sought after goal 
of majority rule. It was also believed that the majority of the American people supported 
the settlement and on Capitol Hill the President faced increasing pressure from 
Congressional conservatives to recognize the validity of the Rhodesian agreement. In a 
letter on February 28, U.S. Senators’ Jake Garn (R-Utah), Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) and 
Robert Dole (R-Kansas) reminded Carter that the PF was supported by communist states 
and that ‘The people of Rhodesia should be permitted the opportunity of solving their 
own problems without interference from the outside’. On March 3, Senator Harry F. Byrd 
advised the White House to assist the Rhodesians as the Internal Agreement would lead 
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to a rapid transition to majority rule within a constitutional structure. He further observed 
that such a course of action accorded with the democratic traditions of the U.S. and 
deserves encouragement not obstruction.514 
           The White House was, however, more than aware that the settlement would be 
unlikely to end the conflict due to the refusal of the PF to sign onto the deal. Furthermore, 
the continuation and possible escalation of the violence would present the communist 
states with further strategic opportunities including potential military involvement. 
Indeed intelligence reports suggested that  the USSR and Cuba were steadily affirming 
their interest in Southern Africa through dramatic increases in military aid to the 
Zimbabwean insurgents, notably ZAPU, and the placement of military personnel in key 
areas of the Front Line states bordering Rhodesia. Brzezinski was especially concerned 
by the fact that the Internal Settlement could provide a pretext for full scale Cuban or 
Soviet intervention.515 
          The White House also considered the agreement to be unrepresentantive of the 
human rights of the black population as it continued to preserve white privilege and 
power.  Domestically, the Carter was also being pushed by the Black Caucus and other 
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Congressional liberals to condemn the agreement and press for more meaningful 
change.516 
          It is worth noting that during the negotiations between Smith and the internal 
leaders, Carter does appear to have given serious consideration to the possibility of 
acknowledging any potential agreement. Indeed, according to Vance, Carter told both 
Vance and Young not to reject it outright. Nevertheless, in a letter to Nigerian leader 
Obasanjo, Carter described the Internal Settlement as internationally unacceptable. On 
March 10, a joint U.S.-UK statement announced that the two nations would continue to 
work towards an all-party conference to achieve a lasting solution. On March 14, the U.S. 
refused to veto UNSC Resolution 423 which declared that the Internal Settlement was  
both ‘illegal and unacceptable’.517 
            By early April, it was clear that the Carter was fully committed to advancing the 
basic elements of the AAP. On April 1, during a visit to Lagos, Nigeria, Carter stated that 
regarding any agreement in Rhodesia ‘Only a fair arrangement with broad support among 
the parties can endure’. The basic strategy was to draw the PF into the negotiating 
process while bringing together the ‘acceptable’, as termed by Vance, parts of the 
Internal Settlement into the AAP. The Front Line leaders were pleased at the continued 
                                                 
516 Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance, March 15 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project 
Number NLC-128-13-6-12-6 and Letter to President Carter from Congressman Cardiss Collins, Thomas J. 
Downey, Yvonne Burke, Andrew Maguire and Paul Tsongas, March 22 1978, NSA Staff Material-
North/South Funk, Zimbabwe, 3-9/78, Box 119, Carter Library and Vance, Hard Choices, 285. 
517 Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron from Henry Richardson, The Undesirability of 
“Internal” Solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia, January 5 1978, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, 
Zimbabwe, 11/77-2/78, Box 119, Carter Library, Letter from President Carter to General Obasanjo, March 
1 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number, NLC-16-101-2-17-2, Memorandum for the President from 
Cyrus Vance, March 14 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-128-13-6-11-7 and Vance, Hard 
Choices, 283-288. 
 
 
275 
 
British and American efforts to reach a solution involving all parties. Kaunda assured 
Carter that the PF was willing to be flexible on the AAP.518 
            On April 14-15, Vance accompanied by Owen met with the PF leadership in Dar 
es Salaam. The principal goal of the meeting was to convince both Mugabe and Nkomo 
to approve the AAP as a preliminary to the potential all parties meeting on Rhodesia. The 
meetings proved to be difficult and unproductive. Both leaders failed to acknowledge the 
changes that had taken place in Salisbury and regarding the AAP sought to weaken the 
powers of the British commissioner to such a degree that he would be able to achieve 
little without PF approval. Furthermore, Mugabe retracted his support for internationally 
supervised elections and Nkomo refused to countenance the idea of the police, who 
would be responsible for law and order during transition, being based on Rhodesian 
forces not the Patriotic Front.519 
            The Owen-Vance team then moved south to Pretoria before meeting with Smith 
in Salisbury on April 17. Once again, the meetings achieved little progress in advancing 
the AAP. The South Africans appeared skeptical over the possibility of the success of the 
Internal Settlement but indicated that Pretoria was not prepared to take any actions which 
would jeopardize the abilitity of the Executive Council to end the conflict.520  
            In Salisbury, Smith and Muzorewa stated that March 3 agreement satisfied the 
basic demands for democratic elections and majority rule and asked for the support of 
Washington and London in achieving this goal. In response to a request to engage in an 
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all-parties conference which would include the PF, they observed that there was no need 
as an agreement had already been reached. The PF were welcome to join the iniative as 
partners but not as preferential partners. Not long after Vance and Owen left Rhodesia, 
Muzorewa issued a statement that there would be no negotiations with PF and the 
Executive Council voted against attending an all-parties conference.521 
             The failure of Owen and Vance to convince the internal leaders to reinvest in the 
AAP, lay in part due to the  determination of the Executive Council, notably Muzorewa, 
to succeed with the Internal Settlement. In July, Bishop Muzorewa travelled to the U.S. at 
the invitation of Senator Garn and a number of his Senatorial and Congressional 
colleagues. Muzorewa met with Vance where he stated that an all-parties conference 
would be a waste of time and that the PF leadership was welcome to join the Executive 
Council. The bishop also criticized Washington for failing to support the Internal 
Settlement and pointed out that under the agreement there would be majority rule and 
free elections. He urged U.S. recognition as the conflict between Executive Council and 
Patriotic Front was a civil war between democracy and Marxism.522  
 
Congressional challenges: The Rhodesia Lobby seeks to lift sanctions   
              Domestically, Carter was confronted by an increasingly vociferous Rhodesia 
Lobby which pushed for acceptance of the Internal Settlement and the subsequent lifting 
of sanctions. In the view of Vance though, the Smith supporters in Congress were 
‘painting a simplistic picture of an embattled multiracial anti-communist Executive 
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Council under attack by a Communist-supported, radical Patriotic Front’. For the White 
House this was becoming a vision that was progressively difficult to counter.523 
          In June, Senator Helms proposed an amendment to the State Authorization Bill 
which would suspend U.S. compliance with UN sanctions against Rhodesia for up to 15 
months as a demonstration of support for the Internal Settlement. On June 28, the 
amendment was narrowly defeated by forty-eight votes to forty-two. Only a few weeks 
after his initial defeat Helms once again put forward legislation that would have 
immediately lifted sanctions on Rhodesia on a temporary basis.524 
          The chances of the Helms Amendment passing at the second time of asking 
appeared to have improved significantly. Media coverage of a number of guerrilla 
atrocities and a pro-Rhodesian editorial in the Washington Post had increased support for 
Salisbury. In addition, Muzorewa, while in Washington, had lobbied heavily on Capitol 
Hill on behalf of the amendment. The Rhodesian internal black leaders also sent a letter, 
via Helms, to every member of the Senate asking for the U.S. to remove the sanctions. By 
July 18, Helms was able to claim the support of fifty-one senators including Senate 
Majority leader Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia).525  
            The White House vigorously lobbied against the bill as it viewed the Internal 
Settlement as unrepresentative of majority rule therefore denying the black population its 
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basic human rights on a political level and furthermore did not believe that recognition of 
the Executive Council or lifting of sanctions would end the conflict. Carter was also well 
aware of the effect that the successful passage of the legislation would have on the global 
arena. In Britain, the opposition Conservative Party indicated that if the Senate passed the 
amendment then it would be under increasing pressure to support similar legislation in 
the British Parliament. President Machel, however, warned the U.S. Ambassador in 
Maputo that a victory for the Rhodesia Lobby would represent a serious problem for both 
Mozambique and the Organization of African Unity.526  
           In an attempt to resolve the issue, Senate Democrats and liberal Republicans 
proposed a compromise bill which became known as Case-Javits Amendment after its 
sponsors Jacob Javits (R-New York) and Clifford Case (R-New Jersey). The bill 
amended the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 to stipulate that the President 
would be required to lift sanctions by December 31 provided that two key conditions 
were met. First, that the upcoming Rhodesian elections were free, fair, open to all 
political and ethnic groups and conducted under international supervision. Secondly that 
the newly elected Rhodesian Government had demonstrated its willingness to attend an 
all-parties conference and discuss all relevant issues. The White House, though, was 
reluctant to support the potential legislation as it did not wish to appear to be acquiescing 
on the Rhodesian question.527    
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             On July 26, the Helms bill, was defeated on the floor by fifty-four votes to forty-
two. That same day, the Case-Javits Amendment was successfully adopted by the Senate 
by fifty-seven to thirty-nine. In one sense, the compromise offered a viable basis for 
continuing sanctions until the Rhodesian agreement had revealed itself as truly 
democratic via elections on the basis of one man one vote. In his memoirs, Vance 
observed that it provided a sound basis for maintaining sanctions at least until internal 
elections were held. It should be noted, however, that while the amendment granted 
Carter the decision making authority over the Rhodesian sanctions, nevertheless, the 
White House would now be forced to justify continued participation on the grounds of 
the Case-Javits criteria.528  
 
The growing guerrilla conflict heightens concerns for the White House   
           For Salisbury the security situation remained grim. A guerrilla amnesty campaign 
was failing and the overstretched Rhodesian military, even bolstered with South African 
support, was struggling to contain the scope of the guerrilla operations.  Insurgent activity 
was also expanding into the previously tranquil urban areas, in July 1978 Salisbury 
witnessed the first major gun battle within its city limits. White morale was also being 
dampened by the economic recession, an increasing tax burden, curtailed social services, 
the disruption in manpower and increased restrictions on goods. Although the Executive 
Council lifted some discriminatory legislation the failure to allow integration in the areas 
of education, medical care and residential housing combined with the refusal to repeal the 
Land Apportionment Act led to increased black disillusion with Muzorewa and the 
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Internal Settlement. In August, CIO Director Ken Flower stated at a high level meeting in 
Salisbury that ‘The security situtation has never been so desperate.’529  
          The Rhodesian Government believed, however, that by incorporating Nkomo into 
the agreement then with his participation a workable solution would be possible. If 
necessary, the Rhodesians were willing to consider bringing Mugabe in as well if it 
brought an end to the fighting. On August 14, Smith met with Kaunda and Nkomo. At the 
meeting, according to U.S. sources, Smith offered to give up the presidency of the 
Executive Council to Nkomo if he accepted the Internal Settlement. In his memoirs, 
however, the Rhodesian leader merely stated that the discussion had produced a 
‘workable plan’ to bring both Nkomo and Mugabe into the existing agreement.530    
             The ‘workable plan’, however, did not survive for more than a few days. 
According to Vance, Muzorewa and Sithole leaked word of the meeting and this led to 
outrage from the other Front Line leaders especially Nyerere who was unhappy at his 
exclusion. Mugabe, himself, was obstinate that he would not participate and at a meeting 
with Nkomo warned him that ‘if he became one of Smith’s puppets he would be treated 
accordingly.’531  
            Any chance of further negotiations was abruptly ended on September 3 when 
ZIPRA fighters shot down an Air Rhodesia Viscount with a Russian SAM 7 missile and 
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massacred ten of the surviving passengers. The attack and subsequent boastful admission 
by Nkomo that ZIPRA were responsible, shocked and outraged white Rhodesia. On 
September 10, Smith declared qualified martial law, warned of strikes on neighboring 
states if they harbored terrorists and stated that Rhodesia would ‘liquidate the internal 
working of those organizations associated with terrorism’.532                  
           The deteriorating situation concerned the White House. According to CIA reports, 
direct Cuban protection of guerrilla camps in Mozambique was a real possibility. It was 
feared that an increased Cuban or Soviet role in the conflict would lead to a greater South 
African presence and heighten the chances of a great power conflict over Rhodesia. In a 
letter to Nyerere, Carter expressed concern over the expansion of the communist 
intervention and highlighted his fervent belief that African problems must be solved by 
the Africans themselves without outside interference.533 
             By early fall, it was becoming clear to that the prospects of a negotiated 
settlement were increasingly scarce and an escalation of hostilities appeared likely. The 
positions of the Executive Council and PF had also hardened. Smith and his black 
colleagues remained convinced that despite the ostensible failings of the Internal 
Settlement to bring peace, the war would wither away following the establishment and 
international acceptance of a Government of National Unity (GNU). The PF, however, 
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despite being in disarray following the fall out of Smith’s attempt to persuade Nkomo to 
join the Internal Settlement, remained intransigent and confident of an eventual military 
victory.534  
            The situation was exacerbated by the fact that both Moscow and Havana were 
clearly seeking larger roles in the Rhodesian conflict. On September 14, when addressing 
the International Conference of Solidarity with the African and Arab People in Addis 
Ababa, Castro denounced the U.S.-UK plan for Rhodesia in unprecedentedly harsh terms 
and indicated that Havana could increase military support to both wings of the PF. On 
October 4, CIA Director Turner warned the White House that Cuba had stationed over 
1000 advisers or combat personnel in Mozambique and was likely to dispatch several 
thousand additional troops if negotiations continued to stall. Washington was also aware 
that the USSR was stepping up its support for both guerrilla groups and in the case of 
ZAPU had supplied heavy conventional weaponry including artillery and armored 
vehicles.535 
               The concerns over the increased communist activity were heightened by the fact 
that the Front Line states appeared to be increasingly receptive to the idea of a communist 
military presence within their territories. While Kaunda remained suspicious of Soviet-
                                                 
534 Rhodesia. Paper for the National Security Council, October 4 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project 
Number NLC-17-2-4-6-1, Memorandum for Director of Office of Management and Budget from Stansfield 
Turner, 4 October 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-132-56-5-3-5 and Letter to President 
Carter from Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of the Executive Council of Rhodesia, October 28 1978, 
WHCF, CO 129, Box CO-50, Carter Library. 
535 Morning Summary, September 11th 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-6-54-1-10-4,  
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Analysis, September 18 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number 
NLC-SAFE 17 B-13-71-10-1, Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, My meetings 
with President Giscard, Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Callaghan, October 4th 1978, Carter 
Library, RAC Project Number NLC-128-9-15-12-1, Rhodesia. Paper for the National Security Council, 
October 4 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-17-2-4-6-1, Memorandum for Director of 
Office of Management and Budget from Stansfield Turner, 4 October 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project 
Number NLC-132-56-5-3-5, Soviet Military Policy and Communist Military Activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, October 18 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-6-3-3-1-8. 
 
 
283 
 
Cuban intentions, the weakness of his military forces when confronted by Rhodesian 
cross-border raids was leading the Zambian leader to seriously consider asking for 
communist protection. Mozambique, it was believed was also prepared to request Cuban 
or Soviet assistance on the grounds of self-defence. On the other side of the spectrum, the 
South Africans, under the leadership of new hawkish Prime Minister P.W. Botha, made it 
clear that Pretoria would not tolerate a Cuban military presence in Rhodesia.536         
                On October 2, in an attempt to reinvigorate the AAP, Carter and British Prime 
Minister Callaghan wrote a joint letter to Presidents’ Kaunda and Nyerere. The letter 
expressed deep concern over the course of events in Rhodesia and observed that it could 
soon prove to be impossible to find common ground for a just and fair settlement. It 
urged all parties to come together to work on their differences and Carter offered New 
York as a neutral venue to host such a conference. In a reply from Nyerere, however, the 
Tanzanian president stated that it was unacceptable to have a Rhodesian all-parties 
conference as the  proposed ‘preconditions’ would strengthen the Smith government and 
weaken the common objective of bringing peace on basis of the AAP.537 
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Mr. Smith comes to Washington 
                 In the fall of 1978, the Rhodesia Lobby presented the White House with a new 
political headache. On September 14, Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa (R-CA) and twenty-
seven other Senators, among them Thurmond, Helms, Garn, Barry Goldwater and Harry 
F. Byrd, invited the members of the Rhodesian Executive Council including Smith to 
visit the U.S. and present their case. In the invitation, the senators stated that the 
American people had not heard all sides of the Rhodesian issue. While Kaunda and 
Nkomo had appeared on national television the Executive Council had not and the 
senators felt that it was time for a Rhodesian Government delegation, especially Smith, to 
be able to put forward their hopes and plans for the future of their country. In a letter to 
Carter, Hayakawa informed him of the invitation and requested that the White House 
instruct the State Department to facilitate the entry of the members of the Executive 
Council.538 
                The invitation placed the White House in a difficult situation. On one hand, the 
issuance of visas to the Executive Council would violate UNSC Resolution 253 which 
prohibited the issuance of a visa to any member of an illegal regime. Furthermore, it was 
believed that Smith had survived so long at least in part by being ‘a master at 
manipulating international public opinion’. The American public, which was generally 
uninformed about Rhodesia would be heavily influenced by Smith’s oratorial skills while 
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in superficially multi-racial company. It would also inevitably lead to condemnation in 
black Africa and the Third World.539  
                 On the other side of the coin, Carter was committed to finding a solution to the 
Rhodesian issue and believed that this was an opportunity to engage in dialogue with the 
Executive Council. The White House also believed in the promotion of free speech in 
America and expected that Smith would be discredited in the harsh glare of the U.S. 
media. Carter commented that ‘The views and proposals of Mr. Smith pose no threat 
when thoroughly exposed’. In addition, as noted by Vance, the refusal to issue visas to 
the Executive Council, could have played into the hands of the Rhodesian Lobby in the 
Senate who would have pushed even harder to lift sanctions. It is also worth noting that 
even Congressman Diggs, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa and 
proponent of the liberation cause in Southern Africa, wrote to Carter on September 20, 
urging presidential approval of the visas and even a direct meeting with the Executive 
Council to push the AAP.540 
              On October 4, the State Department granted the visas to the Rhodesian 
leadership. The White House, however, set up a Crisis Management Operation led by 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to deal with issues relating to the visit. The 
issuance of the visas, especially to Smith, was condemned by the Front Line states. The 
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Zambian Government stated that the decision eliminated the chance of an all parties 
conference until at least the spring of 1979.541  
             At the UN, the African states along with India and the USSR condemned the 
decision. On October 10, the UNSC adopted Resolution 437 which called on the U.S. to 
observe the provisions of the Security Council and expressed hope that Washington 
would continue to exert its influence in Rhodesia so that majority rule could be achieved. 
Britain, Canada, the U.S. and West Germany abstained from voting. As noted by Vance, 
it was a comparatively mild UN reaction which took note of the American rationale for 
granting the visas.542 
              On October 7, the Executive Council, travelling on South African Airways, 
arrived in New York. During the their two week stay the Rhodesian delegation met with a 
number of pro-Rhodesian Congressmen and Senators including Hayakawa, Helms, Harry 
F. Byrd, and James Eastland. Ian Smith also met with both Henry Kissinger and Gerald 
Ford who, according to Smith, were highly supportive of the Internal Settlement. At an 
America-Rhodesian Association dinner in New York, described by the Southern Africa 
Committee as a ‘triumph of illusion over fact for both Rhodesian and American racists’, 
the Executive Council was confronted by a group of demonstrators outside the hotel. In 
his memoirs, Smith noted that much to the amusement of himself and his colleagues one 
of the protestors held ‘a placard saying: ‘Down with Smith’, but he had forgotten his lines 
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and was shouting ‘Down with the Shah’’. Smith sardonically commented that had clearly 
been his ‘Rent-a-Crowd’ job for the previous week.543 
           On October 12, Smith told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 
Executive Council would attend an ‘adequately prepared’ all parties conference. 
According to Vance, Muzorewa was opposed to this course of action although he relented 
a few weeks later. This indication of willingness to attend a meeting of course placed the 
Executive Council in compliance at least on paper with one of the two conditions 
required under the Case-Javits Amendment. If the Rhodesians were able to fulfill the 
second criteria of free and fair elections then the White House would be obligated to lift 
sanctions.544  
          At the meetings with U.S. officials including Vance and Young, however, no real 
progress was made in moving toward a new settlement. While the Rhodesians affirmed 
interest in a potential all parties meeting they also saw no reason to abandon their present 
course. Smith and Sithole argued that all the Internal Settlement needed to make it a 
success was Western support. Vance reported that no progress was achieved in getting 
the Executive Council to accept the Anglo-American Proposals as a framework for 
negotiations.545  
           Overall, in terms of the White House goals of advancing the AAP and 
incorporating the PF into a Rhodesian settlement the visit of the Executive Council 
                                                 
543 Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Situation Room, November 18 1978, Carter Library, 
RAC Project Number NLC-1-8-5-38-8, Southern Africa Vol.11 No.8 November 1978, New York: 
Southern Africa Committee, 26, 
 http://www.aluka.org/action/showmetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nusa197811, and Smith, 
Bitter Harvest, 270-276. 
544 Vance, Hard Choices, 292-293. 
545 From Secretary of State To Embassies Dar-es-Salaam, Maputo, Lusaka, Gaborone, Lagos, U.S. Mission 
to UN NY, London, Pretoria, Rhodesia, October 1978, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-16-113-
5-43-7 and Smith, Bitter Harvest, 270-271 and 277. 
 
 
288 
 
accomplished little of note. From the Rhodesian perspective, however, it had allowed the 
Executive Council to present the merits of the Internal Settlement and their aspirations 
for a future Rhodesia to both Congress and the American public. Brzezinski observed that 
the main achievements of the visit were that the Internal Settlement gained a fair hearing 
in the media and that the Rhodesia Lobby on Capitol Hill was strengthened. Smith 
himself commented that it had been a well planned visit with good media coverage.546   
 
Hughes Mission reveals little hope of progress 
            In late 1978, London, with the support of the U.S., launched a new mission to test 
the willingness of all parties to attend a new conference and measure its prospects for 
success. Cledwyn Hughes, as the personal representative of Prime Minister Callaghan, 
toured Southern Africa visiting the Front Line capitals as well as Lagos, Pretoria and 
Salisbury. The PF indicated little willingness to compromise on its desire to dominate the 
transition militarily and politically. Nyerere indicated his willingness to co-operate on 
Rhodesia but insisted that Smith accepted the AAP as a pre-condition for a meeting. In 
Zambia, though, Kaunda seemed resigned to military action while Nigerian leader 
General Obasanjo told Hughes that the AAP had outlived its usefulness.547  
           In Salisbury, the Rhodesian Government appeared more determined than ever to 
proceed with the Internal Settlement. Smith told Hughes that if the UK and U.S. wanted 
to solve the situation they needed to cease trying to ‘appease the terrorists.’ Nevertheless, 
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the internal leaders were willing to participate in a conference although U.S. Ambassador 
to Zambia Low, suspected this was primarily to fulfill the obligations of Case-Javits. In 
Pretoria, the South Africans demonstrated concern over the situation but supported the 
Internal Settlement and were unlikely to end aid to Salisbury. The final report of the 
Hughes Mission concluded that while all parties would attend a conference there would 
be little chance of a breakthrough.548  
            The White House was thus faced with the choice of convening a conference 
which would be unlikely to achieve any meaningful settlement or to sit back and hope 
that a shift in events would provide a new opportunity for an initiative. Carter was aware, 
however, that a failed conference would not only undermine U.S. prestige but also open 
the way for pressure on Washington to take more drastic measures to end the conflict. It 
was also noted that it could lead to an intensification of the conflict and create a vaccuum 
for further Soviet involvement.549        
            As 1978 drew to a close, while Carter was unable to succeed in his goal of 
obtaining majority rule under the auspices of the AAP, he was handed a brief reprieve by 
the Rhodesian Government itself regarding the Case-Javits determination. In November, 
the Executive Council had postponed the upcoming Rhodesian elections until April. This 
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decision took the immediate pressure off the White House in considering the lifting of 
sanctions under the stipulations of the amendment.550   
 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: Salisbury gains ‘majority rule’ but the White House remains 
unmoved   
            
        For Rhodesia, 1979 would prove to be a pivotal year in its already turbulent history. 
The historic negotiations in the fall of that year at Lancaster House in London brought an 
end to the UDI era, returned Rhodesia to ‘legality’, as termed by the British, and 
normalized relations between Salisbury and the international community after fourteen 
years of diplomatic isolation. While the U.S. played no public role during the Lancaster 
House Conference the decisions made by the White House over the course of the year 
both facilitated the meeting and gave the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government little 
choice but to attend.   
           At the dawn of the new year, however, there appeared to be little hope that any 
negotiated settlement would be forthcoming. In late November, the Executive Council 
had reached a final agreement on the new constitutional arrangements. On January 2, the 
Rhodesian Government produced a White Paper outlining the new draft consitution          
which provided for majority rule including a black prime minister and a government 
numerically dominated by black represenatives. The white minority would retain a 
substantial influence over the levers of government for at least another ten years. In 
addition, the constitution would ensure continued white control over the military, police, 
judiciary and civil service for the foreseeable future. The nation would be renamed 
                                                 
550 Vance, Hard Choices, 293.  
 
 
291 
 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, a fact was strongly denounced by the Patriotic Front which opposed 
the symbolic retention of the European name.551   
           On January 30, in a white-only referendum, the electorate voted overwhelmingly 
to endorse the new constitution. CIA reports indicated that most white Rhodesians were 
ambivalent about the prospect of black majority rule and realized that the Internal 
Settlement would be unlikely to end the conflict. Neverthless, they rationalized that there 
was no alternative other than capitulation to the guerrillas. The faith of the white 
population in Smith remained mostly undiminished and they viewed him as the only 
individual able and willing to stand up for their interests during the difficult transition to 
majority rule. Among the black population, Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole 
appeared to still enjoy support despite the constitutional concessions given to Smith.552 
           The Patriotic Front, however, remained committed to guerrilla warfare. Indeed, 
ZIPRA, despite Nkomo being continually mooted as a potential internal partner, shot 
down a second Viscount on February 12 with no survivors. The Rhodesian military 
responded with raids into Zambian territory as well as a long distance strike on a ZIPRA 
camp near Luso, Angola. The Department of State noted that it was unlikely that large 
numbers of Rhodesian blacks would rally to support a regime that promised little change 
and a continuation of the conflict. The threat of potential Cuban or Soviet involvement 
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remained high. Castro, even warned UN Secretary General Waldheim of the possibility 
that Cuban combat troops might become involved along the Rhodesian-Mozambican 
border.553       
             The progression of the Internal Settlement continued to cause a major headache 
for the White House. On the one hand, the upcoming Rhodesian elections, which were 
scheduled for April, would undoubtedly produce a majority rule government headed by a 
black African prime minister. Moreover, to continue to oppose Salisbury would place the 
U.S. in the position of appearing to favor the Marxist guerrilla movements over a 
democratically elected government. Domestically, the White House, was also under 
increasing pressure on Capitol Hill to remove sanctions and recognize the new regime 
following the elections. Nevertheless, Carter was also well aware that the GNU would be 
unable to bring an end to the fighting thus heightening the opportunities for communist 
encroachment. On the level of human rights he also opposed the new constitution for its 
preservation of white Rhodesian privilege and power.554     
              On February 5, Bishop Muzorewa, on behalf of the Rhodesian Government, 
formally invited the U.S. to send official observers to the elections. The Rhodesians 
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believed that American political support was key to a peaceful settlement. In addition, if 
Salisbury was able to demonstrate compliance with the Case-Javits Amendment then the 
White House would be forced to lift sanctions thus invigorating the Rhodesian economy. 
On January 12, in Chiredzi, Smith had observed that obtaining U.S. recognition was the 
‘best bet’ for the success of the Internal Settlement.555  
             The White House experienced increasing political pressure from Capitol Hill to 
acknowledge the progress that was being made in Rhodesia. On February 23, Vance 
received a letter from Congressional Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-Texas). The 
Congressman urged the White House to send American obervers to the election. He noted 
that the U.S. had committed itself under Case-Javits to end economic sanctions if the 
Rhodesians was ready to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference and conduct 
free elections to be observed by impartial international observers. Wright stated that the 
bi-racial Executive Council had fulfilled both obligations. Regarding the fact that 
Mugabe and Nkomo had openly refused to participate, the majority leader commented 
that; ‘Surely U.S. policy is not to be bound nor influenced by terrorist leaders who 
publicly assert that they intend to seize power themselves through the barrel of a gun’.556 
              It is important to note that Congressional interest in the Internal Settlement was 
no longer solely confined to the traditional Rhodesia Lobby. In March, Senator George S. 
McGovern (D-South Dakota), the former Democratic Party nominee for president and a 
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noted liberal, proposed a concurrent resolution to send twenty-five to fifty Congressional 
unofficial observers to the elections. The resolution was co-sponsored by Senator 
Hayakawa. On March 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a motion to 
dispatch the observers. Two weeks later the Senate voted 66-27 in favor of the concurrent 
resolution. The bill, however, would later fail to pass in the House Subcommittee on 
Africa due in part to the efforts from Congressman Solarz.557 
            While Carter instructed the State Department not to oppose or support the 
McGovern bill the White House clearly rejected the proposition of sending Congressional 
or Executive observers to the election. On March 7, Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
M. Moose, in testimony to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that the 
administration was opposed to sending observers as the election was widely regarded 
both in Africa and internationally as illegal and unrepresentative. If Washington sent 
observers it could seriously undermine the international standing and prestige of the U.S. 
and its ability to work with parties on a lasting settlement.558 
             In spite of the vociferous support that the Rhodesians enjoyed in Congress the 
stance adopted by the White House also had its advocates on Capitol Hill. In early 
March, the President received a letter signed by twenty-nine Congressman and Senator 
Paul Tsongas (D-Mass) which expressed opposition to the bill and urged Carter not to 
send observers to Rhodesia. On April 9, the House of Representatives, in a close 
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Congressional vote of one hundred and ninety to one hundred and eighty, defeated a 
proposed amendment which would have authorized Carter to send official  observers and 
grant $20 million in assistance to the new government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.559               
           The first Rhodesian elections to choose the GNU took place in April. While held 
under the rules of universal suffrage, nevertheless, there were two separate ballots based 
on race. On April 10, the white population voted overwhelmingly for the RF who picked 
up all twenty seats. The RF received a further eight seats following a vote by both black 
and white parliamentarians. The black Rhodesians voted between April 17-21 and the 
UANC of Bishop Muzorewa swept up 51 of the 72 black parliamentary seats. The PF, 
deploying nearly ten thousand guerrillas, failed to disrupt the process, although as pointed 
out by Vance, there were indications of voter intimidation by forces loyal to internal 
black leaders.560 
           On June 1, Muzorewa formally took office as prime minister, somewhat bizarrely 
arriving at his official residence in a replica pioneer ox wagon, clad in West African 
robes and clutching a spear in his hand. Smith, who according to Baxter, ‘cringed at the 
ghastly spectacle’, was named in the new cabinet as Minister without Portfolio.561 
            American media outlets were well represented in Salisbury during the course of 
the election by as many as fifty journalists. Overall, the news coverage of the election 
                                                 
559 Letter to the President from Congressman Thomas J. Downey et al. March 7 1979, NSA Staff Material-
North/South Funk, 10/78-3/79, Box 119, Carter Library and Memorandum for the President from Cyrus 
Vance, April 9 1979, Carter Library, RAC Project Number NLC-128-14-6-7-1. 
560 Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance, The Rhodesian Elections, March 30 1979, NSA Staff 
Material-North/South Funk, Zimbabwe, 10/78-3/79, Box 119, Carter Library, CIA National Foreign 
Assessment Center, April 2 1979, Rhodesia Looking beyond the April election, Carter Library, RAC 
Project Number NLC-132-186-2-6-1, Memorandum for David Aaron from Jerry Funk, Rhodesian 
Elections Status Report, April 19 1979, NSA Staff Material-North/South Funk, Zimbabwe, 4/79, Box 119, 
Carter Library, Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance, April 23 1979, Carter Library, RAC 
Project Number NLC 128-14-6-17-0 and Baxter, Rhodesia, 480. 
561 Baxter, Rhodesia, 480 and Smith, Bitter Harvest, 305-306. 
 
 
296 
 
carried positive reports, noting the high election turnout, estimated at sixty-five percent 
by the New York Times, and the lack of violence. A Freedom House delegation oberved 
that Rhodesia had never seen so free and fair an election. The American Conservative 
Union Delegation also stated that the ‘Zimbawe Rhodesian elections of April 1979, were 
conducted on a free and fair basis.’562  
            The elections and establishment of the black majority GNU placed the White 
House in the position where a crucial decision on recognition needed to be made under 
the terms of Case-Javits. Presidential recognition and the removal of sanctions would 
have represented a massive boost to Salisbury. If the U.S., the most powerful and 
influential nation of the free world, recognized the government in Salisbury and lifted 
sanctions, then it was highly likely that other Western countries would follow the lead of 
Washington. According to the CIA, American recognition would also induce Rhodesian 
whites to fully support the GNU and militarily defend it, would stem the financial decline 
thus allowing economic improvements which could even tempt guerrillas to peacefully 
return. It would have also of course provide a major psychological boost for the new 
government.563   
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              On May 10, Muzorewa, via telegram, urged President Carter to officially 
recognize the GNU and lift sanctions. The bishop reminded Carter of the massive public 
support he had received and that on a humanitarian level the removal of sanctions would 
alleviate suffering, provide opportunities for the advancement of the black population and 
end the guerrilla conflict. In the telegram Muzorewa clearly acknowledged the need for 
U.S. recognition and stated unequivocably that; ‘I have no doubt at all that if you, as the 
acknowledged leader of the free world, were to give an immediate and positive indication 
of your intention to recognize my government as soon as it takes office and, at the same 
time, to lift sanctions, it would have a dramatic effect on the situation.’564 
               In Britain, the new Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that 
there was no sense in dwelling on the past and the UK would now ascertain whether 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was in compliance with the six principles of NIBMAR. As noted in 
Washington, however, Thatcher, made no firm commitment on British policy towards 
Salisbury. In her memoirs, Thatcher herself commented that while the British observer, 
Viscount Baird of Merton, had deemed the Rhodesian election to be free and fair ‘what 
the people of Rhodesia needed above all was peace and stability’ and this required the 
support of both the U.S. and the Front Line states.565 
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            The White House was also not unaware of the negative international implications 
of a positive finding under Case-Javits. On April 26, the Organization of African Unity 
had declared the Rhodesian election to be invalid and four days later UNSC Resolution 
448 condemned the elections as illegal. Washington, along with Paris and London had 
abstained from voting. Carter was certainly conscious of the vociferous hostility that 
would be directed at the U.S. from black Africa if he was to recognize the new 
government. This would have been damaging both politically and economically. Indeed, 
on May 24, Nigeria, which exported fifty percent of its oil to the United States threatened 
to cut off its supply if Carter recognized Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.566 
               Carter also believed that the Internal Settlement and the establishment of the 
GNU would fail to end the conflict and indeed would stimulate further communist 
military intervention. In April, the CIA had reported that Cuban and Soviet involvement 
was likely to grow in the foreseeable future regardless of the Rhodesian elections. In 
early May, President Nyerere of Tanzania informed the U.S. Ambassador that Moscow 
and Havana had proposed the formation of a ‘Provisional Government of Zimbabwe’ 
based on the PF. The Department of State believed that the creation of such a provisional 
government could provide a pretext for full military intervention at the behest of a 
friendly government even if not located in Rhodesia.567 
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                In Havana, Cuban Vice-President Rodriguez informed the British Ambassador 
that if London and ‘others’ accepted the GNU then all hopes for peace in Rhodesia were 
gone. In the view of Brzezisnki, it was obvious that ‘Havana is still not ready to abandon 
threat or use of military intervention as an instrument of policy.’ Furthermore, the 
administration was aware that if Havana did intervene then there was a strong possibility 
that Pretoria would invade her northern neighbour to combat the Cuban actions. Such a 
turn of events could lead to a massive racial war with the inevitable tragic consequences. 
In addition, if Havana was to prevail over the South Africans it would mean another 
strategic communist victory in Southern Africa.568  
               Domestically, Congressional and public opinion remained strongly divided on 
the issue of recognition. On Capitol Hill, a powerful group of senators led by Helms and 
Hayakawa put pressure on the White House to recognize the GNU and lift sanctions. 
Supporters of this policy included Thurmond, Garn, Goldwater and Harry F. Byrd. 
Former Congressman Howard Pollock (R-Alaska), a member of the American 
Conservative Union Delegation to the elections, informed Carter that it would be 
unconscionable not to recognize this ‘grand experiment in democracy in Southern 
Africa’. The White House was also aware of considerable public support for the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government. 569  
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              A number of political figures including Senators’ Tsongas and Edward Kennedy 
(D-Mass), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki (D-
Wisconsin), Congressmen Thomas J. Downey (D-NY) and Cardiss Collins, as well as 
members of the House African Subcommittee and the Congressional Black Caucus 
continued to oppose the Internal Settlement and the GNU regarding it as a fraud designed 
to perpetuate minority control under the auspices of a black-led government. It was 
argued that as the process fell short of true majority rule the White House should 
therefore find negatively when considering Case-Javits.570  
              Presidential correspondence also reveals strong opposition to recognition from 
important groupings such as the AFL-CIO and the National Bar Association. The black 
political community was especially vocal in its opposition to recognition. In a letter to 
Carter, Coretta Scott King, wrote that ‘In the interests of achieving full human rights for 
the people of Rhodesia, I urge you to maintain sanctions against the Rhodesian 
government.’571 
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               On June 7, Carter found negatively against recognition under the terms of Case-
Javits. The President argued that the elections were not free and fair as only whites could 
vote on the constitution and not all political parties could participate in the ensuing 
elections. Equally, he noted that the authorities in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had claimed to be 
willing to attend an all-parties meeting but they were not prepared to negotiate all 
relevant issues. As this was the case he deemed it to be neither in the best interests of the 
U.S. nor Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to lift sanctions though he was prepared to review this 
decision if further progress was made.572 
     A number of factors clearly influenced the presidential decision not to lift 
sanctions. The White House was certainly aware that domestically a positive recognition 
could have alienated liberals and jeopardized African-American support for the 
administration. Equally, given that world opinion was largely against the Internal 
Settlement a unilateral lifting of sanctions by the U.S. would not only violate 
international law but meant that America could suffer economic repercussions especially 
an increase in oil prices.573 
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   The primary rationales behind Carter’s decision, however, remained his belief that 
the GNU did not represent majority rule or satisfy the human rights of the black 
population and the fear of an escalating civil war with increased communist intervention. 
The President and his advisers, noted that the constitution under which elections occurred 
was voted on only by whites and entrenched white control of the civil service, police and 
army plus a blocking vote in a new parliament against changing the white entrenchment 
for ten years. Furthermore, while some steps had been taken to repeal racial 
discrimination they had only a limited impact on the situation of the black population and 
continued white controls within the legislative process would mean the new government 
could only proceed cautiously in implementing social change.574 
   The White House also believed that the Internal Settlement even with 
international support would prove unable to end the conflict. The PF remained 
determined to seize power and with the continued support of the Front Line states would 
carry on the war. The situation would remain a highly volatile stalemate and the longer 
the guerrilla struggle continued the greater the chances of cross-border Rhodesian raids 
into Zambia and Mozambique who could potentially request greater Cuban or Soviet 
support. It was believed that the internal solution merely played into the hands of Havana 
and Moscow who could only profit from the increasing instability in the region.575     
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            The decision of the White House not to lift sanctions under Case-Javits received 
widespread support from black Africa. The Tanzanian Ambassador, Paul Bomani, 
congratulated Carter on his ‘wise and timely decision’ that would strengthen Tanzanian 
resolve to resist Soviet actions against Rhodesia. In Salisbury, the GNU was dismayed by 
the decision and Muzorewa issued a strong condemnatory statement. In his memoirs, Ian 
Smith stated that ‘Carter’s hypocrisy and rank dishonesty was unbelievable and 
unforgivable. He advanced the reason that the removal of sanctions would be to the 
prejudice of our country - an absolutely infantile argument which nobody could credit, as 
the truth was the complete reverse.’576 
             On Capitol Hill, Congressional opinion was very much divided on the issue of 
the continuation of sanctions. As early as May 4, Representative Richard H. Ichord (D-
MO) introduced House Concurrent Resolution 116 which stated that Rhodesia was in 
compliance with the International Security Assistance Act and that sanctions should be 
lifted, the bill though was eventually defeated. On June 28, the House of Representatives 
voted 350-37 in favor of a compromise resolution, H.R. 4439, proposed by 
Representative Solarz which called for a termination of sanctions by October 15, unless 
Carter felt it was not in the national interest to do so.577 
             On July 8, Muzorewa travelled to Washington to press for recognition and the 
lifting of sanctions. Carter met with Muzorewa at Camp David despite the opposition of 
Brzezinski, who believed that the bishop’s visit was controlled by the RIO and Senator 
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Helms and was concentrating on public relations at the expense of substance. It was 
feared that meeting Muzorewa at the country retreat would not only legitimize him as a 
leader of a respected government but lead to condemnation domestically from liberal and 
black factions and cause a backlash internationally. At the meeting, however, Muzorewa 
failed to persuade Carter to offer recognition or lift sanctions.578 
              In an interesting twist to the discussions, though, Rhodesian figures including 
Smith, Van der Byl and CIO Chief Flower have claimed that prior to the prime minister’s 
trip to America the Rhodesian CIO had arrested three CIA agents caught spying in 
Rhodesia. Flower was reportedly assured by American contacts that if Muzorewa agreed 
to release the spies then Carter would not oppose the lifting of sanctions by Congress. In 
his memoirs, Smith claimed that upon his return to Rhodesia, Muzorewa stated that he 
had received the necessary undertaking from Carter and the spies were released. The 
Rhodesians then claim that Carter simply reneged on his word as if the incident had never 
happened.579  
              Muzorewa, also visited London between July 12-14 in the hope of convincing 
the Conservative government to recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and end sanctions. 
According to U.S. sources, however, Thatcher informed Muzorewa that all party 
participation was necessary for recognition and the removal of sanctions. Arguably, 
Carter’s decision not to recognize the Muzorewa government had played a major role in 
changing British thinking on Rhodesia. Thatcher was an avowed advocate of the ‘special 
relationship’ between London and Washington making Carter’s position on Zimbabwe-
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Rhodesia of great importance. On a pragmatic level, the prime minister was also aware 
that U.S. support was vital for any settlement.580  
             For Thatcher, the Rhodesian question was proving to be a baptism of fire. On 
May 6, 1979, a mere two days after her electoral victory, Thatcher received a letter from 
virtually every Commonwealth ambassador warning against recognition. In July, the 
Organization of African Unity designated the PF as the ‘sole legitimate and authentic 
representative’ of the people of Zimbabwe. The threat to London’s interests was not 
merely political in nature. In May, Nigerian leader Obasanjo announced that public 
contracts would be denied to British firms until majority rule was established in 
Rhodesia. In July, Abuja nationalized BP Nigeria in protest against the sale of oil to 
South Africa and sending a warning to the politicians in London.581 
              At the August Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, Thatcher informed 
the delegates that she had every intention of formally recognizing Zimbabwe-Rhodesian 
independence but not under the terms of the Internal Settlement which had given a 
disproportionate amount of power to the white minority. The Prime Minister also sought 
to emphasize that the situation remained a British responsibility and that London was 
prepared to reassume authority and supervise elections. The Front Line states welcomed 
the change in direction and demonstrated a willingness to work towards a solution. 
Nyerere even acknowledged that the April elections had created a ‘political change in 
Rhodesia’. It was agreed that any settlement must provide for genuine majority rule, 
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minority safeguards, all parties involvement to end conflict and free and fair elections 
under British control and Commonwealth supervision.582 
              In order to achieve this objective, Thatcher committed the British Government to 
hosting an all-party conference in London. On August 14, Foreign Secretary Lord 
Carrington issued an invitation to all factions to attend a conference at Lancaster House 
with the aim of amending the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution, organizing a cease-fire 
and defining arrangements for elections. In an address to parliament on August 22, 
Bishop Muzorewa informed that he had accepted the invitation to attend. Smith also 
agreed to represent the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian delegation. The PF also consented to 
participate and was represented by Mugabe and Nkomo.583 
              In his memoirs, Smith noted that the Rhodesians had little choice but to accept 
as the military situation had become untenable and that the Western leaders would be 
unlikely to accept a solution which conflicted with the views of the black African states. 
Indeed, by the fall of 1979, the Nationalists had four times more insurgents in Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia than in 1976 and the official white emigration rate had reached 2,000 a month. 
Smith himself bluntly stated at a town hall meeting in 1979 that ‘To think we can mount 
an operation and defeat terrorism is moonshine…We simply haven’t got enough 
men…’584        
            The PF also faced pressure to achieve a negotiated settlement. The escalating 
conflict was proving costly for their Front Line patrons. Observing sanctions on Salisbury 
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was costing Mozambique and Zambia hundreds of millions of dollars annually while 
hosting the growing guerrilla armies posed a threat to the stability of their own regimes. 
Salisbury was also escalating its cross border raids to include the economic infrastructure 
of the Front Line states to induce Lusaka and Maputo to to force the PF towards a more 
conciliatory position.585 
 
The Lancaster House Agreement: American ‘quiet diplomacy’ helps to achieve a 
settlement                   
                
           On September 10, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitutional Conference formally 
opened at Lancaster House. The conference comprised of over two months of difficult 
diplomatic wrangling and the use of considerable British direct and indirect pressure on 
both sides to reach a compromise. Smith commented that the  British diplomacy 
comprised of ‘no-holds-barred all-in-wrestling’ while Mugabe actually broke away from 
the conference and was narrowly intercepted by the Mozambican ambassador at the 
behest of Lord Carrington. The British also faced accusations of bias from all sides.586 
               In a triumph, however, at least for the British, on December 21, after forty-
seven long plenary sessions, the Lancaster House Agreement was accepted by all parties. 
The settlement included an outline of the independence constitution which included 
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twenty percent of parliamentary seats to be reserved for the white population, 
arrangements for the pre-independence period and a cease-fire agreement. All 
participants also undertook to accept the authority of the British governor, to abide by the 
constitution, to comply with the pre-independence arrangements, to adhere to the cease-
fire agreement, to campaign peacefully and without intimidation and to accept the 
outcome of the elections.587 
              On December 11, ten days earlier, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian parliament had in a 
historical vote rescinded UDI and agreed to return the country to British rule prior to the 
upcoming elections. The newly appointed governor, Lord Christopher Soames, arrived in 
Salisbury the following day and London declared a return to legality. On December 21, in 
response to the events at Lancaster House the UNSC passed Resolution 460 which 
terminated its sanctions against Rhodesia. In the view of Thatcher, ‘Britain had 
demonstrated her ability, by a combination of honest dealing and forceful diplomacy, to 
settle one of the most intractable disputes arising from her colonial past.’588 
            Ostensibly, the U.S. played no prominent function during the negotiations in 
London. The White House, nevertheless, played an important role in assisting the UK in 
attaining the final agreement. The U.S. ambassador in London, Kingman Brewster was 
instructed to maintain contact with all sides and insisted on the important condition that 
all parties be treated equally during the ceasefire. One notable contribution related to the 
possibility of financial aid to an independent Zimbabwe. When the conference turned to 
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the controversial question of potential land redistribution and how it could be financed 
the discussions became a deadlocked impasse. Notably the PF vehemently rejected the 
idea that a majority rule government would be required to compensate white property 
owners for land that it believed had been stolen from the indigenous African 
population.589         
              As observed by Jeffrey Davidow, although Carter was reluctant to commit to 
this issue, the fact that Washington offered the possibility of aid to pay off the white 
landowners allowed the PF to end the stalemate as opposed to merely backing down. 
Ambassador Brewster, also assured Lord Carrington that the U.S. would co-operate in a 
multi donor development effort for Zimbabwe subject to a successful settlement. This 
position was made clear to the Front Line states.590 
              Earlier, in September, Vance had been required to mediate in a dispute between 
Lord Carrington and Senator Helms. Helms had dispatched two aides, John Carbaugh and 
James Lucier to attend the Lancaster House Conference as observers. The British 
believed that they were making promises to both Smith and Muzorewa, allegedly on 
behalf of the U.S. Congress, and their presence was endangering the negotiations. Lord 
Carrington contacted Vance and asked him to take steps to facilitate their removal. The 
matter was made more complicated though by the British refusal to supply a written 
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request apparently due to domestic political reasons. Vance, however, was able to 
persuade Helms to order his aides back to Washington.591  
            The White House was also prepared to offer logistical aid to London to ensure a 
smooth implementation of the settlement. It had been agreed by all parties that during the 
transitional period the ceasefire would be enforced by the presence of Commonwealth 
peacekeeping troops. In addition to British soldiers, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and 
Kenya agreed to send forces. On an operational level, this created logistical difficulties 
for London especially regarding transportation of the peacekeepers and the necessary 
military equipment and supplies. In order to assist the British and bolster their negotiating 
position, Carter offered the use of C5A Galaxies to transport land rovers and helicopters 
from the UK to Rhodesia as well as a Kenyan troop contingent from Nairobi to Salisbury. 
Brzezinski further advocated this action as a declaration of U.S. will and capability to act 
in a way to preclude Soviet or Cuban expansion in Southern Africa.592  
            The most significant issue, however, related to the lifting of sanctions. Carter was 
required by Section 408 of State Department Authorization Act to lift sanctions by 
November 15 1979 unless he determined that it was not in the national interest to do so. 
The British had determined to end sanctions on December 12 when the governor took 
office in Salisbury which meant that, in the view of London, Rhodesia had therefore 
returned to legality. The British felt that it was crucial that the White House state that the 
U.S. would lift sanctions at the same time. London argued that even if the PF was 
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excluded and UNSC maintained sanctions the restoration of legality to the UK removed 
all basis for the enforcement of sanctions.593    
           The White House, however, feared the impact of a hasty decision to lift sanctions. 
Both Vance and Brzezinski, were concerned that if Washington was linked too closely to 
the British position this could lead to less influence over the settlement and less 
credibility with the black Africa potentially jeopardizing any potential agreement. 
Furthermore, it would be almost impossible to justify under international law a lifting of 
sanctions prior to Britain officially  ‘returning Rhodesia to legality’ or a UNSC action 
terminating sanctions.594 
                On November 14, Carter determined that that it was in the national interest of 
the U.S. to continue sanctions against Salisbury. Carter, though, indicated a general intent 
to lift sanctions when the British governor arrived and the process to impartial elections 
began. The White House would maintain flexibility regarding the final decision and 
timing over the lifting of U.S. sanctions. The carefully worded announcement was 
accepted by the British who recognized that it essentially supported their hand in 
negotiations and was also well received by the black African states. In Pretoria and 
Salisbury, however, the determination was met with degrees of consternation.595  
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               It is worth noting that the domestic reaction to the presidential determination 
was predominantly positive. It was commended in the media and well received by the 
black community. On Capitol Hill, the House Congressional leaders responded 
encouragingly to the decision. The Senate, notably, Senator Helms was initially more 
circumspect. On December 6, the Senate passed the Church-Javits legislation, which 
required sanctions to be lifted following the arrival of the British governor in Salisbury or 
not later than January 31 1980, by ninety votes to zero. The overwhelming victory had 
been made possible due to the support of Helms who had indicated that in view of White 
House assurances that sanctions would be lifted not later than one month after 
assumption of British authority then he would back the legislation.596  
             Overall, during the Lancaster House negotiations the White House carefully 
followed developments and played an important supporting role as an advising party to 
the British, the Front Line States and the PF. The British looked to the U.S. to support her 
constitutional position and Washington also vouched for UK sincerity to the African 
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states. The Front Line and PF viewed America as a more impartial party who would press 
London into making concessions when such ‘nudging’ was required.597  
           The British were well aware of the significant contribution that the White House 
made to the successful outcome of the Lancaster House Conference. On December 17, at 
a State Dinner in Washington, Thatcher offered her gratitude to Carter and Secretary of 
State Vance and observed that without their stalwart aid the ‘whole process would have 
been incomparably more difficult, and we may never have reached success.’598    
           The President was delighted at the outcome of the talks in London. In 
correspondence with Presidents’ Kaunda and Nyerere, Carter expressed his ‘personal 
satisfaction…that the goals of majority rule and independence that we have pursued 
together during the past three years can at last be achieved’ and thanked them for their 
support in this endeavor. In the view of the White House, the settlement represented not 
only a step forward in terms of human rights via the implementation of free elections 
leading to majority rule but also greatly diminished the potential threat of Cuban or 
Soviet intervention due to the support of the Front Line and PF for the British brokered 
agreement.599  
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Elections and Independence: Carter welcomes the dawn of the Mugabe era 
           While the President had expressed elation at the outcome of the settlement the 
situation on the ground in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia remained fraught with tension and 
potential pitfalls. On December 21, at the signing ceremony of the Lancaster House 
Agreement, Lord Carrington had stated that ‘Any party which systematically breaks the 
ceasefire, or indulges in widespread intimidation, will be disqualified from the election.’ 
Smith, ever suspicious of British intentions, questioned whether this implied that 
‘breaches of the ceasefire which were not systematic, and intimidation which was not 
widespread, would be in order?’600 
          On December 24, ZANLA military commander Josiah Tongogara had been killed, 
ostensibly in a traffic accident while travelling on a road north of Maputo, Mozambique. 
Tongogara, a comparative moderate who had once worked as a garden hand for Agnes 
Smith, the mother of the future Rhodesian leader, believed in reconciliation to allow all 
parties to work together to build the new nation. Many white Rhodesians, including 
Smith and Van der Byl, suspected foul play due to his moderate views which did not fit 
with the vision of the extremists within ZANU-PF. Vance also noted the suspicions 
regarding the so called accidental death. He was replaced by Rex Nhongo, who in the 
words of Baxter, was a ‘far less scrupulous man’ who had no compunction with using the 
ZANLA guerrillas as a tool for political violence.601   
          Governor Soames had given the PF guerrillas until January 2 to gather at the 
assembly points for monitoring. By January 4, approximately eighteen thousand 
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insurgents had arrived at the camps, which according to the ZANLA and ZIPRA 
commanders, Nhongo and Lookout Masuku, accounted for the majority of their 
combatants. It was obvious, however, that large numbers of armed guerrillas remained at 
large to politicize and coerce the rural black population. This clear violation of the 
ceasefire arrangements was acknowledged by ZANU Press Secretary Edison Zvogbo 
several years later.602 
          The PF, however, was not the only group that actively violated the Lancaster 
House ceasefire. Auxiliaries loyal to Bishop Muzorewa and Sithole were permitted by the 
British to roam freely and were alleged to have been involved in political violence. The 
British also allowed the deployment of the Rhodesian security forces which permitted 
some factions to engage in various attacks including a February 3 assault by the Selous 
Scouts on a civilian bus which killed sixteen Africans and was intended to be blamed on 
ZANLA. Rhodesian elements also made several assassination attempts on the life of  
Mugabe.603 
            South Africa was also once again meddling in the affairs of its northern neighbor. 
At Lancaster House, according to Onslow, the decision of Prime Minister Muzorewa to 
step down from his office was primarily due to a promise from Pretoria to extensively 
support his campaign in the ensuing elections. As early as November 15, Smith was 
informed of the presence of South African troops accompanied by Puma helicopters and 
transport aircraft to ‘support’ the Muzorewa campaign. UNSC Resolution 460 had 
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specifically directed the UK, as the administering power, to remove any foreign forces 
from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The South African military presence, however, comprising of 
six thousand soldiers with airpower and heavy artillery and operating up to one hundred 
kilometers from the border remained in place until late January.604                   
             While playing no direct role in the process, the White House, though, worked 
diplomatically to ensure the success of the transitional period. Carter strongly urged 
London to abide by the Lancaster House settlement and pressed the Front Line leaders to 
ensure the success of the agreement. Carter stated that despite the enormous contribution 
the Front Line had already made it was necessary to ‘redouble collective efforts to ensure 
process moves to a successful outcome.’ The President also advised South African Prime 
Minister Botha that Pretoria should view the settlement as an opportunity to improve 
stability and build a long term peaceful future in the region. On February 2, the U.S. 
voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 463 which called on all parties to abide by Lancaster 
House and for Britain to fully implement the agreement.605                                         
             The transitional elections took the form of two separate ballots. On February 14, 
the white community voted for the twenty reserved seats all of which were won by the 
RF. Approximately two weeks later, between February 27-29, the black population went 
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to the voting booths. The elections were marred by violence and intimidation notably by 
supporters of ZANU-PF. A delegation from Freedom House observed that ‘the climate of 
fear permeating much of the country significantly reduced the freedom with which the 
voter cast his or her ballot.’ Nevertheless, the group also stated that the election 
represented a further step forward toward democracy.606 
             On March 4, it was announced that ZANU-PF had achieved a spectacular 
electoral victory. Mugabe had won an outright majority with a total of 57 seats in the new 
parliament. In comparison Nkomo possessed twenty and Muzorewa a mere three seats. 
The election results stunned the white population but British Election Commissioner Sir 
John Boyndon, however, felt that the election results were in general a reflection of the 
wishes of the population, this thought was also aired by Governor Soames. Despite 
pressure from leading white Rhodesians including Smith and General Peter Walls the 
British refused to disqualify Mugabe.607  
             Elements of the Rhodesian military had conspired to prevent Mugabe taking 
office in a bold plan known as Operation Quartz which would have involved the 
destruction of the ZANLA assembly points and attacks on ZANU-PF leaders including 
Mugabe himself. Indeed, according to Smith, on March 2, General Walls had assured him 
that ‘In the final event we will not allow Mugabe to win.’ For reasons that are still not 
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clear the operation never went ahead. Pretoria, was also actively plotting to thwart 
ZANU-PF from taking power. In a particularly audacious plan, South African military 
intelligence aimed to assassinate Mugabe along other international dignitaries including 
Prince Charles and Lord Soames during the April independence celebrations. The cynical 
intention was to provoke a brutal backlash against the white community which would 
then provide an excuse for the SADF to move in and restore order. The attempt was 
discovered and scotched by Rhodesian intelligence who were horrified by the prospect of 
the potential bloodbath.608  
            On April 18, Zimbabwe formally gained independence from Britain and Mugabe 
was appointed prime minister of the new nation. At the independence celebration guests 
included international figures such as Prince Charles and UN Secretary-General 
Waldheim while reggae legend Bob Marley entertained the crowds at the Rufaro 
Stadium. Smith, however, travelled to South Africa during the handover of power. In his 
memoirs the former Rhodesian prime minister stated that ‘The thought of being 
confronted by a scene where they (British politicians) would be wringing their hands in 
apparent pleasure, and fawning around a bunch of communist terrorists who had come 
into their position through intimidation, corruption and a blatantly dishonest election, was 
a situation against which my whole system would revolt.’609   
           Carter formally extended diplomatic recognition to Zimbabwe immediately after 
independence on April 18. The same day the White House also announced that Robert V. 
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Keeley, formerly the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, would serve 
as the first U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe.610    
           Shortly before the granting of independence, Prime Minister elect Mugabe 
expressed his gratitude to Carter for the key role that Washington had played in bringing 
peace to his country. African leaders were equally aware and appreciative of the 
American actions to bring majority rule to Zimbabwe. In a personal letter, Nyerere 
praised Carter for his assistance and leadership in aiding Zimbabwean independence and 
for his respect for other peoples and nations even when infinitely smaller and weaker than 
his own.611 
            The White House was clearly elated at having finally resolved the longstanding 
Rhodesian problem. In his memoirs, Vance expressed great encouragement at the 
outcome and praised Mugabe for his ‘statemanship’ and ability to swallow his 
‘repugnance of Smith and the Rhodesian Front.’ U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Young, 
was to later observe that making a contribution to the creation of political and racial 
harmony in Zimbabwe was his most gratifying achievement during his tenure at the 
UN.612  
             President Carter, himself, stated that the arrival of majority rule would bring a 
sense of dignity to a people who had for too long been subjugated to racial oppression 
and been deprived of their basic human rights. He also observed, at a White House 
briefing for civic and community leaders, that Mugabe who had been previously regarded 
as a Marxist and an enemy of the U.S. had become ‘one of our strong and potentially 
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very good and loyal friends.’ On August 27, Carter hosted a White House reception for 
the new Zimbabwean leader and praised Mugabe for his leadership of the now legally 
independent nation.613         
 
 The Carter Years               
               The election of President Carter led to a fundamental change in U.S. policy 
towards Southern Africa which rang the death knell for white minority rule in Rhodesia. 
The new administration held little sympathy for the views of Smith and the RF viewing 
them as colonial era racists who wished to maintain political control at the expense of the 
indigenous black majority and in so doing were destabilizing an entire region. Even 
before his arrival in the Oval Office, Carter was determined to use American power as a 
lever to end UDI and white minority rule.  
               As early as March 1977, the importance of this issue to Carter was reflected in 
Presidential Directive 5 which focused on ways in which the U.S. could progressively 
transform both Rhodesian and South African society in order to achieve majority rule. In 
his first months in office Carter clearly demonstrated his intention to coerce Salisbury 
into making meaningful political changes. The White House aided the repeal of the Byrd 
Amendment, pressed allies to enforce sanctions and attempted to close the RIO. 
              The AAP, developed in coordination with London, insisted on a transfer of 
power to a British transitional administration and free and impartial elections on the basis 
of universal adult suffrage. The White House insisted that Washington would accept 
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nothing less than an end to UDI and the immediate implementation of black majority 
rule. Carter’s rejection of the Internal Settlement and active opposition to the Helms 
Amendment further reinforced this view and also made clear that any constitutional 
arrangements needed to involve the PF. 
               In June 1979, the presidential determination on Case-Javits, which found 
negatively against recognition or the lifting of sanctions, ended any chance that the new 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government had of attaining international recognition or assistance. 
The decision was devastating to Salisbury not only diplomatically but also economically 
and psyschologically. The success of the subsequent Lancaster House Agreement was 
due to a large extent to the groundwork laid by the AAP in preceding years as well as 
political assistance from Washingon, both overt and covert, during the course of the 
negotiations.    
               Overall, the Carter era reinvigorated the prospects for peace by permanently 
injecting the diplomatic authority and credibility of the U.S. into the Rhodesian issue 
which had bedevilled Britain and the UN for almost fifteen years. American diplomatic 
leverage combined with a vehement resolve to end minority rule provided the sorely 
needed impetus to bring an end to the UDI era. 
              The fervent opposition of the White House to the continuation of white minority 
rule in Rhodesia stemmed chiefly from three principal factors. First of all,  Carter held a 
deep ideological commitment to the doctrine of human rights which was shared by many 
of his principal advisers including Vance, Young and to a degree Brzezinski. The 
president was determined that human rights would attain a central importance in foreign 
policy decision making. In the opinion of the White House, minority rule and racial 
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inequality in Rhodesia deprived the black citizens of their basic humanitarian rights and 
needed to be ended as soon as possible.  
              Carter’s commitment to racial equality in Rhodesia was heightened by his own 
childhood in the Jim Crow era South. As a young man he had personally observed the 
discrimination suffered by African-Americans in rural Georgia. As president he felt a 
responsibility, even perhaps a culpability, for the persecution of blacks in the southern 
states and was determined to push forward an agenda of civil rights and opposition to 
racism. In the judgment of the White House, there was a direct correlation between the 
domestic racism that had existed in the South and the white controlled governments of 
Southern Africa.      
               Finally, the White House was also motivated by the Cold War realities of the 
late 1970s. In the opinion of the administration any prolongation of the conflict would 
offer increasing opportunities for the advancement of Cuban and Soviet power in 
Southern Africa. The continued existence of the white controlled states in the region was 
not only the underlying cause of the bloodshed but also provided a validation for 
intervention by Havana or Moscow. Carter believed that the only way to end the war and 
rein in communist involvement was to develop a formula for free and fair elections, in 
which all parties could participate, followed by independence and genuine majority rule.      
               The Carter Presidency, indisputably played a crucial role in ending both the 
UDI era and white minority rule in Rhodesia. The president’s sense of morality combined 
with Cold War rationale fully committed the diplomatic and economic might of the U.S. 
to the resolution of the Rhodesian question. The naissance of a black controlled and 
internationally recognized Zimbabwe was to a large extent due to the determination of 
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the White House to use American global power to achieve for indigenous Zimbabweans 
the goals of majority rule and independence.        
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CONCLUSION      
 
        The Rhodesian UDI, in the words of Ian Smith, ‘a blow for the preservation of 
justice, civilisation and Christianity’, presented a strategic, political, economic and moral 
quandary for U.S. policymakers. The ability of Salisbury to endure despite international 
condemnation, the open hostility of neighboring states and comprehensive UN sanctions 
meant that the Rhodesian question would remain a nettlesome issue for four successive 
presidential administrations.614     
        Examining U.S. relations with Rhodesia, through the lens of the Oval Office, 
provides us with a better grasp and awareness of the pressure points which guided foreign 
policy during the 1960s and 70s. White House decision making regarding Salisbury 
demonstrates the changing geopolitics of the Cold War, the shifting patterns of global 
power, the rise of human rights, domestic race relations, economic concerns and the 
importance of strategic raw materials on foreign policy. Moreover, an analysis of 
American actions towards Rhodesia reveals the broader struggle between pragmatism and 
morality in U.S. foreign relations during the UDI era as well as the differing 
interpretations of what constituted a pragmatic or moral approach. 
         The Cold War, on both strategic and ideological levels, was a major element 
determining the nature of the approach to the Rhodesian rebellion. Washington, was 
engaged in a broad struggle for supremacy with the communist powers and was well 
aware of the importance of the Third World in potentially determining the outcome of the 
global contest. Indeed, Southern Africa was both economically and militarily vital to the 
                                                 
614 From Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office, No.1707, 11th  November 1965, PREM 13/545, 
National Archives, London, From Salisbury to Commonwealth Relations Office, No.1708, 11th  November 
1965,  PREM 13/545, National Archives, London. 
 
 
325 
 
West and the CIA along with other organs of national intelligence frequently warned of 
the need to combat the growing Chinese, Cuban and Soviet influence in the region.  
       Cold War geopolitics, though, provided conflicting visions of how to approach the 
racial struggle in Southern Africa. On one hand, the vehement anti-communism, military 
strength and strategic location of of the white minority regimes meant that the pragmatic 
if somewhat distasteful solution was to support Pretoria and Salisbury, covertly if 
necessary, as a bulwark against the global communist threat. The counter-argument, 
however, stated that the continued existence of white regimes, provided an opportunity 
for Moscow, Peking and Havana to align themselves with black African aspirations and 
therefore the contined existence of the white regimes facilitated communist gains in the 
region. By the mid 1970s, the increasing intensity of the Rhodesian Bush War combined 
with the expanding Cuban military presence in Africa lent further credence to the 
contention that the pragmatic approach was to accelerate the process of majority rule to 
prevent further communist meddling. 
        Trade, in particular, the strategic need for critical raw materials for both commercial 
and military purposes was also a pressing issue for policymakers during this era. 
Questions of pragmatism, however, also entered into economic considerations. The 
mining industry of Southern Africa not only offered a highly lucrative source of 
investment for a number of major U.S. corporations but also provided the American 
economy with a range of resources deemed critical to national security, most specifically 
chrome. Trade with the profitable markets of black Africa, however, was also burgeoning 
and in order to maintain these trade ties the U.S. needed to avoid the perception that 
Washington supported continued white rule in the region.      
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        The changing constellations of power in international forums, notably the UN, also 
provided a conundrum for policymakers. The increasing power and influence of the Afro-
Asian bloc, meant that the U.S. sought Third World support to advance its global 
objectives, including the containment of communism. Given that the issue of continued 
white political control in Rhodesia was of utmost importance to black Africa, 
Washington needed to be seen to support effective measures to end UDI. Policy makers, 
however, sought to avoid radical actions that could lead to an economic or military 
confrontation with South Africa to the detriment of Western interests.  
         By the mid 1970s the rise of the global human rights movement had become a 
potent force in U.S. foreign policy. The growing importance of human rights, specifically 
the right of a population to chose how it is governed stimulated greater American 
participation in seeking a resolution to the Rhodesian problem. Nevertheless, within the 
U.S. differing moral interpretations existed of how the question of human rights applied 
to Rhodesia. From one point of view not only did Salisbury suppress the political rights 
of its citizens, but the racial discrimination experienced by black Rhodesians also 
violated their basic human rights. An opposing standpoint, though, highlighted the fact 
that the white Rhodesians also had human rights and would potentially suffer social, 
economic and political injustices in a black ruled Zimbabwe.  
         On a pragmatic level, domestic race relations, specifically the rise of African-
American political power also impacted foreign relations with Africa. Civil rights groups 
and liberals, including leading political figures such as Martin Luther King and Andrew 
Young linked the liberation of black Africans from white minority rule with the struggle 
for racial justice in America itself. As African-American influence grew in importance 
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the occupants of the White House became ever more conscious of the need to develop 
foreign policies which would not provoke a backlash from a large domestic minority. 
Nevertheless, the occupants of the Oval Office were also cognizant that white voters 
remained an electoral majority and that Rhodesia enjoyed considerable public support 
among white Americans especially in the South.   
       White House policy towards Salisbury encapsulated the U.S. approach to foreign 
relations during the 1960s and 1970s and revealed the broader factors that shaped 
decision making. These international and domestic dynamics at times intersected with 
each other but equally often competed and jockeyed for supremacy. The case of 
Rhodesia, further highlights the struggle between morality and pragmatism when 
formulating policy as well as the competing views of how to develop a pragmatic or 
moral approach to foreign relations. The various presidential administrations, however, 
differed greatly in how they prioritized and sought to manage the confluence of these 
determinants.  
       The LBJ Administration opposed UDI on both moral and pragmatic grounds. 
President Johnson, a strong supporter of the Civil Rights movement, possessed an 
inherent moral commitment to racial equality that opposed the continuation of white 
political supremacy whether in the cotton fields of the Deep South or the veld of 
Southern Africa. On a practical level, the White House was also aware that Washington 
needed unequivocally to oppose UDI in order to retain Third World support for its Cold 
War aims as well as to protect its economic interests in black Africa. 
         Pragmatic considerations, however, also dictated that the U.S. avoided radical 
actions against Rhodesia. Washington possessed close geopolitical and economic ties to 
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Salisbury’s de facto allies in Lisbon and Pretoria. LBJ was not prepared to support any 
measures that would lead to a direct confrontation with NATO ally Portugal or 
countenance the possibility of an economic or military confrontation with South Africa. 
Johnson was also deeply concerned that any actions that escalated racial conflict in 
Southern Africa would intensify tensions in the U.S. itself and undermine the progress his 
presidency had achieved through the passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.   
       The LBJ years, therefore, represented a balancing act between the moral and 
pragmatic rationale behind opposing UDI and a rational awareness that extreme measures 
against Salisbury would be detrimental to American interests internationally and 
domestically. The U.S. while remaining publicly critical of UDI and supportive of British 
diplomacy nevertheless adopted a cautious and guarded stance on the Rhodesian 
problem. . 
      Under President Nixon, White House thinking on Rhodesia was dominated by hard-
headed calculations relating to Cold War rationale and economic interest. For Nixon and 
National Security Adviser Kissinger the vehement anti-communism of Salisbury and the 
vast mineral wealth, notably chrome, within Rhodesia ordained the necessity of closer 
ties with the white minority regime. The Cold War, though, also dictated an avoidance of 
full normalization of relations with Salisbury which would have aggravated ties with the 
British and allowed the communists to portray themselves as the friends of black 
liberation. The White House, however, had little interest in the moral question of majority 
rule and indeed, on racial grounds, Nixon expressed greater sympathy for the white 
Rhodesians than the black population.   
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            During the Nixon era, White House policy towards Rhodesia embodied pragmatic 
considerations of real politik with little concern for the moral questions raised by UDI or 
the continued existence of white minority rule. The Nixon Administration, therefore, 
adopted a policy of ‘limited association’ with Salisbury, while avoiding official American 
recognition, and overtly violated international law by formally allowing the importation 
of strategic and critical Rhodesian minerals into the U.S.  
           The Ford Administration signified the first occasion when pragmatic and moral 
considerations came together to shape American relations with Rhodesia. On a moral 
level, President Ford, possessed a deep sense of humanity and commitment to achieving 
racial justice that led to his public and private opposition to white minority rule. The 
escalation of the Cold War in Southern Africa brought a less altruistic rationale for 
seeking a transition to majority rule. The MPLA victory in Angola, supported by Cuban 
combat troops, led to fears in Washington of the creation of a radical anti-Western bloc in 
the region. It was deemed essential to facilitate the establishment of a moderate black 
government in Rhodesia in order to thwart further intervention by Moscow or Havana. 
      The Ford years, consequently, marked the beginning of significant American 
involvement in the Rhodesia problem and by the time that Ford left office, the power and 
prestige of the U.S. had been firmly positioned behind the objective of majority rule. 
Indeed, it is highly noteworthy that by 1976 Ford was prepared to alienate his electoral 
base in the Republican primaries during an election year in an attempt to bring peace and 
stability to Rhodesia. The importance accorded to this issue by the White House 
represented the significance of the confluence of both moral and pragmatic determinants 
to end UDI.    
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.    Under President Carter, relations with Rhodesia were characterized by a vehement 
hostility towards the regime in Salisbury. The vociferous opposition towards white 
Rhodesia adopted by the Carter Administration stemmed from the alignment of 
international and domestic pressure points, both moral and pragmatic in nature, behind 
the goal of achieving majority rule in an independent Zimbabwe. For Carter, a deeply 
held ideological commitment to human rights, shaped in part by his childhood in the 
Deep South witnessing the injustices of Jim Crow segregation, meant that on moral 
grounds it was imperative that U.S. power was used to end the vestiges of racial 
discrimination in Southern Africa.  
      The geopolitics of the Cold War, continued to offer a more pragmatic rationale for 
greater U.S. intervention. The Rhodesian Bush War was escalating in intensity, providing 
a pretext for greater involvement by Moscow or Havana and the White House believed 
that only a genuine transition to majority rule would end the potential for communist 
expansion. Domestic dynamics also shaped Carter’s approach, specifically the necessity 
of maintaining the African-American vote which had proved critical in his electoral 
triumph further stimulated the need for a strong approach against Salisbury. This 
combination of geopolitical, moral and electoral factors led the Carter Administration to 
implement a course towards Salisbury that unquestionably brought an end to UDI.   
          Rhodesia, during the UDI era, was in many ways a unique case for American 
policy makers. A tiny landlocked Southern African country whose white minority had 
engaged in an anti-colonial rebellion in order to continue to suppress the political rights 
of the indigenous majority and thus remain in political control of the nation beyond the 
end of formal colonial rule. Rhodesia, however, was representative of the broader racial 
 
 
331 
 
struggle for political power that dominated the region until the dismantling of apartheid 
in the early 1990s. 
          U.S. policy towards Salisbury was therefore indicative of the approach adopted by 
Washington towards the other members of the ‘White Redoubt’. Both Lisbon and 
Pretoria were fervently anti-communist and while Portugal was a NATO ally, the 
strategic location of South Africa fueled the argument, oft repeated by the National Party 
leadership, that South Africa was a vital Western partner in the fight against global 
communism. Overt American support, however, for continued white rule, would as with 
Rhodesia, hand the moral advantage to the communist nations who backed the liberation 
movements. 
        The close economic ties between South Africa and the U.S. further complicated 
relations with the apartheid state. South Africa, like Rhodesia, possessed large deposits of 
valuable or strategic minerals, including gold, diamonds and chrome, and American 
companies were prominent investors in the profitable mining industry. At the UN, 
however, as with Salisbury, Lisbon and Pretoria were frequent targets of the Afro-Asian 
bloc and Washington needed to strike the correct balance between appeasing the black 
African nations and avoiding diplomatic measures that would damage geopolitical or 
trade relations with white ruled Africa. 
         As was the case with Rhodesia, the rise of the human rights movement placed 
further pressure on Washington to take stronger measures against South Africa and the 
Portuguese Territories. Indeed, frequently Pretoria not Salisbury was the principal object 
of criticism. The rise in African-American political influence also pressured the White 
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House to adopt a far tougher line against all the remaining defenders of the laager in 
Southern Africa. 
       By examining U.S. relations with Rhodesia, one can also glean a picture of the role 
that Africa played during the wider Cold War struggle for supremacy between 
Washington, along with its Western allies, and the communist world. In the geopolitics of 
the Cold War, the military balance of power, especially the possession of nuclear 
weapons on both sides, meant that direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow 
was not only unwinnable but would serve to assure the mutual destruction of both 
superpowers.  
        The Third World, therefore became increasingly important as both the Americans 
and Soviets sought to gain the balance of power by attaining greater influence in the 
periphery through diplomacy, economic aid and proxy wars. The vast natural resources of 
the African continent which included large deposits of critical and strategic minerals 
along with the increasing strength of the independent black nations at the UN led both the 
Western powers and the communist bloc to seek a regional order which catered to their 
interests. 
         In the case of Washington, the successive presidential administrations sought to 
prevent the spread of communism especially in Southern Africa, a region that seemed 
firmly in the Western orbit. During the Sixties and early Seventies, the occupants of the 
Oval Office sought to counter Marxist influence through the promotion of free market 
capitalism as well as financial assistance and support for anti-communist regimes that 
opposed radicalism and were willing to acted as regional policemen to maintain the status 
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quo. The internal practices of such de facto allies, including Zaire and South Africa, were 
of less consequence than a mutual loathing of international communism. 
          In the mid 1970s, there was a marked shift towards the achievement of racial 
justice in the region as a means to combat the growth in communist power and prevent 
further overt intervention by Moscow or Havana. Thus Ford and Carter sought an end to 
the Rhodesian impasse and the latter championed the right of the guerrilla groups to 
participate in the electoral process. It is worth noting, however, that the White House 
continued to utilize the authority of  Pretoria to pursue its anti-communist agenda. Both 
Ford and Carter enlisted the help of the apartheid regime to bring about majority rule in 
Rhodesia and Ford colluded with the pariah state in its invasion of Angola. Indeed, over a 
decade later President Ronald Reagan was vocal in his support for the white South 
Africans. Until the end of the Cold War, Pretoria remained for many Americans a 
stronghold of anti-communism in a region filled with untrustworthy Marxist despots.               
        From their perspective, the communist nations viewed Africa as a fertile 
battleground to challenge Western interests and compete for the allegiance of the Third 
World. Unlike the Western nations, the communist bloc possessed few economic or 
political ties with the colonial administrations or white minority regimes and could 
portray themselves as the supporters of freedom. Policymakers in Havana, Moscow and 
Peking, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons, sought to align themselves with the 
cause of black liberation. By the early 1960s, the Chinese and Soviets were increasingly 
active in cultivating diplomatic ties with the newly independent black states and offering 
tangible aid to the insurgent movements. Havana, motivated by its own sense of cultural, 
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racial, and ideological solidarity with the anti-imperialist black guerrillas, dispatched 
Cuban soldiers to train and fight alongside their African comrades.   
          By the mid 1970s, Moscow and especially Havana felt secure enough to intervene 
militarily in support of favored leaders or movements who were considered to espouse 
Marxist ideals. Cuba was particularly active in Africa dispatching advisers or combat 
troops to Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and most notably Angola. While 
portraying themselves as the true supporters of African liberation both Cuba and the 
USSR supported repressive socialist regimes or radical nationalist dictators so long as the 
governments in question displayed sufficient anti-Western credentials.    
          It is important to note, however, that African nations were not merely passive 
actors in the Cold War struggle. In the decades following their independence many black 
African leaders were more than cognizant of their ability to play off the opposing powers 
in order to achieve their own national objectives. The growing power of the Afro-Asian 
bloc at the UN and its role in other international organizations, including the Non-
Aligned Movement, strengthened the ability of black Africa to pressure both Moscow 
and Washington on diplomatic, economic and psychological levels.     
          For their part, the defenders of the ‘White Redoubt’ used Cold War rhetoric, 
especially the threat posed by communism to Southern Africa, in order to garner Western 
support, discredit the black liberation movements and divert international focus from the 
question of the legitimacy of white minority rule. It is significant, however, to note that 
while this was in many ways a self-serving propaganda tool, both the Rhodesian Front 
government in Salisbury and the National Party leadership in Pretoria were fervently anti-
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communist and in their worldview saw their nations as bastions of Western civilization 
under siege from the forces of international communism.  
        At the broadest level, Rhodesia also set a precedent of how the U.S. would respond 
to the presence of ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states both during the Cold War and in the post 
Cold War era. Rogue states are excluded from international society because they 
subscribe to standards of behavior that are considered egregious violations of the salient 
values of the existing international system. The most common determinants for exclusion 
are the pursuance of weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring of terrorism or most 
pertinently in the case of Rhodesia, a lack of democratic governance and violations of 
human rights. For American policy makers such regimes may not present a direct threat 
to the U.S. itself but to the security of regions vital to Washington and as threats that 
jeopardize international stability in a fundamental way.  
         Rhodesia, condemned as a pariah state, indeed a threat to international security, at 
the UN and by the vast majority of the global community, due to Salisbury’s refusal to 
accept the value system of the post World War Two era, helped to shape the American 
approach in dealing with future rogue states. Official condemnation, the imposition of 
bilateral and UN sanctions while avoiding excessive damage to strategic interests has 
been representative of U.S. policy towards other pariahs including Iran, North Korea and 
apartheid South Africa. It should be noted, however, that the stance adopted towards 
Salisbury, especially the question of the use of force, was moderated for both racial and 
geopolitical reasons and is thus reflective of Washington’s approach towards apartheid 
South Africa and to a degree Israel as opposed to the more aggressive line taken with 
other international ‘rogues’ such as Iraq and Syria.                               
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        Overall, White House policy towards Rhodesia during the UDI era reveals the core 
determinants which guided foreign relations during the 1960s and 1970s. The choices 
made by the occupants of the Oval Office demonstrate the influence of Cold War 
geopolitics, the shifting constellations of global power, the importance of maintaining 
access to strategic raw materials, domestic race relations and the human rights movement 
on decision making. Furthermore, using Rhodesia as an illuminative lens exposes the 
interaction between pragmatism and morality in formulating foreign policy during the 
UDI era as well as the competing visions of what constituted pragmatism or morality. 
       Analyzing policy towards Salisbury also reveals the U.S. attitude towards the 
presence of the broader ‘White Redoubt’ in Southern Africa as well as other international 
pariahs and highlights the role that Africa played in the global strategic game of the Cold 
War. Rhodesia offers an interpretive prism through which one can view the changing 
nature of the American approach to global relations and the dynamics which shaped that 
process. 
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